Definition
A non-affirming negation (prasajyapratiṣedha, Tib. med dgag) is a negation that simply removes its object without implying any positive remainder. In contrast, an affirming negation (paryudāsapratiṣedha, Tib. ma yin dgag) removes one thing while affirming another. For example, “the pot is not blue” (affirming: implies it is some other colour) vs. “there is no pot” (non-affirming: nothing further is implied).
In Madhyamaka, emptiness is classified as a non-affirming negation: it simply negates intrinsic nature (svabhāva) without affirming any positive ultimate reality in its place.
Interpretations
Tsongkhapa (in his own words): In Illuminating the Intent, Tsongkhapa insists that ultimate truth IS an object of knowledge and is obtained by rational cognition of suchness — but it is “not established through its own essence.” Being obtained by meditative equipoise does not make something truly existent. He explicitly distinguishes two senses of “ultimate” to avoid the trap: the rational cognition characterised as “ultimate” does establish phenomena, but existence through a thing’s own objective mode of being does not. Tsongkhapa is aware of the objection that his approach reifies emptiness, and his two-senses distinction is designed to pre-empt it. (From tsongkhapa-illuminating-intent-1418, Ch 9 and Ch 11)
Tsongkhapa (via Gorampa’s critique): Gorampa charges that Tsongkhapa treats emptiness as a non-affirming negation that is the proper object of inferential cognition — making emptiness a specific, identifiable cognitive content, a conceptually accessible absence. This grasps at emptiness as an object. (From gorampa-distinguishing-views-1469)
Gorampa’s critique: Gorampa argues that Tsongkhapa’s approach effectively converts the non-affirming negation into a grasped object — a conceptual thing that the mind holds onto. By making emptiness the content of inferential cognition, Tsongkhapa has paradoxically turned it into a form of grasping. For Gorampa, the real ultimate truth lies beyond even this non-affirming negation as conceptually apprehended; it is accessible only through yogic gnosis that transcends all conceptual proliferation, including the concept “non-affirming negation.” (From gorampa-distinguishing-views-1469)
Gorampa’s rejection of double negation: The negation of existence does not entail the acceptance of non-existence. Gorampa’s position is yod min med min — “neither existent nor non-existent.” The negation of the first koṭi does not produce the second; all four koṭis of the catuṣkoṭi are negated. (From gorampa-distinguishing-views-1469)
Textual loci
- MMK 13:18 — emptiness as antidote to all views, not itself a view
- MMK 22:11 — “empty,” “non-empty,” “both,” and “neither” should not be stated
- Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā on the distinction between prasajya and paryudāsa negation
- Tsongkhapa’s Ocean of Reasoning — systematic treatment of emptiness as med dgag
Role in Tenpa’s argument
The non-affirming negation is central to the Tsongkhapa-Gorampa debate and thus to the paper’s argument about productive disagreement within the hermeneutical framework (Section 6.3). The dispute over whether emptiness-as-non-affirming-negation can be a cognitive content or must transcend cognition entirely is one of the deepest fault lines in Tibetan Madhyamaka.
Tsongkhapa on prasajya negation and excluded middle (via Jinpa): In jinpa-tsongkhapa-qualms-1999, Jinpa reports that Tsongkhapa argues even the non-affirming negation (prasajya) must presuppose the law of excluded middle to be effective. He cites Vigrahavyāvartanī 26b: “If the absence of intrinsic being is reversed, intrinsic being becomes established.” Without subscribing to fundamental principles of logic, one results only in a state of indecision. This is directed against the “no-thesis” proponents who reject all logical argumentation. For Tsongkhapa, the ultimate insight into the middle way must be an active state of “knowing,” not a withdrawal of cognitive activity — otherwise it is indistinguishable from Hva-shang’s no-thought meditation.
Open questions / points of contention
- Does Gorampa’s position on the real ultimate truth collapse the distinction between non-affirming negation and sheer ineffability?
- Is Tsongkhapa’s “grasping at emptiness” actually problematic, or does Gorampa misrepresent the Geluk position on how inferential cognition of emptiness functions?
- How does this debate relate to the question of whether a Buddha has conceptual cognition?