Source provenance. This is an excerpt from Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā (Tib. Tshig gsal, Lucid Words) — specifically his commentary on MMK 1.1 (“Not from themselves and not from others, / Not from both nor causelessly — / In things, of whatever type they may be, / Arising never exists”), corresponding to ACIP TD3860, folios 05B–11B. The excerpt physically appears as Appendix I of karmapa-feast-fortunate-1578 (Snow Lion 2008), where translator Tyler Dewar bundled it because the Karmapa’s discussion of the Consequentialist–Autonomist distinction in Feast for the Fortunate presupposes this passage. It is treated here as its own source — Candrakīrti’s text, not Karmapa material — because of its independent foundational importance for the Buddhapālita–Bhāviveka–Candrakīrti exchange. Roman-numeral section headings (I–XII) are the translator’s, keyed to the corresponding sections of Feast for the Fortunate. The full Prasannapadā has not been added.
Thesis / main argument
Candrakīrti defends Buddhapālita’s refutation of arising-from-self against Bhāviveka’s critique that prasaṅga (consequentialist reasoning) is methodologically deficient and must be supplemented by autonomous syllogisms (svatantra-anumāna). The defence has two prongs. First, Buddhapālita’s reasoning, properly understood, does meet the formal criteria Bhāviveka demands: it implicitly contains a five-part probative argument with reason, example, application, and conclusion, all using inferences accepted by the opponent (the Sāṃkhya Enumerators). Second, and more fundamentally, the Mādhyamika should not state autonomous inferences at all, because the Mādhyamika holds no thesis of his own; the use of prasaṅga against the opponent’s own commitments is not a methodological defect but the only method consistent with Madhyamaka’s own non-positionality. Candrakīrti then turns the criticism back: Bhāviveka’s autonomous arguments themselves fail by his own standards, since the subjects and reasons they invoke (e.g. “the inner sense sources,” “they exist”) are not established for either party once Madhyamaka analysis is applied.
Key claims
- Buddhapālita’s argument is formally complete: Although stated as a consequence (“things do not arise from themselves, because their arising would be pointless and endless”), it implicitly contains a five-part probative argument with the example of a clearly manifest vase that the Enumerators themselves accept (sections II, VI of the extract; pp. 6–8)
- The Mādhyamika holds no thesis: Citing Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka (“Against someone who does not hold any position / Of existence, nonexistence, or both, / One cannot prevail in argument”) and Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī 29 (“If I had a thesis, I would have a fault. / Since I have no thesis, I am strictly faultless”) to ground the prohibition on autonomous inferences (section IV; pp. 3–4)
- “We do not debate with the insane”: If revealing internal contradictions does not move opponents to abandon their view, no further argument will (section III; p. 3) — Bhāviveka’s preference for autonomous inference is “merely showing his own affection for inferences”
- The reversed meaning of consequences applies only to the opponent, not to the Mādhyamika: Because the Mādhyamika has no thesis, drawing absurd consequences from the opponent’s premises does not commit the Mādhyamika to any opposing thesis. “Words do not disarm their speakers as if they were bandits armed with sticks and nooses” (section VII; p. 9)
- The qualifier paramārthatas (“ultimately”) is meaningless and unnecessary: Bhāviveka’s autonomous argument adds “ultimately” to its predicate (“the inner sense sources do not ultimately arise from themselves”). Candrakīrti rejects this on multiple grounds: arising-from-self is not to be accepted at any level, including the relative; the Sūtras and MMK 28.10 reject it without qualification; the worldly do not in fact conceive of arising-from-self, so the qualifier is communicatively idle (sections IX–X; pp. 10–12)
- Bhāviveka’s autonomous arguments boomerang on his own criticisms of the hearers: Bhāviveka had himself argued, against the śrāvaka claim that the inner sense sources arise because the Tathāgata said so, that the reason is either non-established (relative) or contradictory (ultimate). Candrakīrti shows this same dilemma applies to Bhāviveka’s own autonomous arguments — the subjects and reasons they invoke are equally non-established once Madhyamaka analysis is applied (section XI; pp. 14–17)
- Inferences need only be established for the counterpart, not for both parties: “In all instances of inferences for oneself, what is established for oneself is most conclusive, and never is establishment by two parties required.” Refutation by inference accepted only by the opponent is the standard Mādhyamika method (section XII; pp. 17–19)
- Mistaken and non-mistaken cognition cannot share an object: Because the relative phenomena Bhāviveka invokes as subjects of his syllogisms are seen by mistaken cognition (like falling hairs to a person with eye disease), they cannot serve as bases for affirmation by non-mistaken cognition. Hence the very subject of Bhāviveka’s argument fails to be established (section X; pp. 13–14)
Methodology
Candrakīrti proceeds dialectically through Bhāviveka’s Prajñāpradīpa commentary, taking each criticism in turn and responding both internally (showing Buddhapālita’s reasoning meets Bhāviveka’s stated formal criteria) and externally (showing why Bhāviveka’s own methodological commitments are wrong). The response weaves three resources together: scriptural citation (Sūtras on dependent arising, Lalitavistara, MMK 5.1, 4.2, 28.10), citation of earlier Madhyamaka authorities (Āryadeva, Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī), and turning Bhāviveka’s own argumentative moves against his own positive arguments. The final move (section XII) is a meta-argument about logical method itself: refutation operates by reasons accepted by the counterpart, not by reasons jointly established — “as it is in the world, so it should be in logic, for only the conventions of the world can apply in the treatises of logic.”
Notable quote
“If I had a thesis, I would have a fault. Since I have no thesis, I am strictly faultless.” — Nāgārjuna, Vigrahavyāvartanī 29, cited at section IV.
Connections
- karmapa-feast-fortunate-1578: Source containing this excerpt; the Ninth Karmapa’s discussion of the Consequentialist–Autonomist distinction in Feast for the Fortunate relies extensively on this passage. The Karmapa’s “no thesis of one’s own” dictum is a direct extension of section IV–VII of this excerpt.
- ruegg-svat-pras-2006: Ruegg’s six-criteria reconstruction of the Tibetan distinction is partly a reading of this passage; criteria (1) (autonomous inference vs prasaṅga) and (2) (the paramārthatas qualifier) come directly from sections IV–X of this text. Confirms Ruegg’s claim that the Tibetan distinction has Indian roots, even though the school-designation is Tibetan.
- tsongkhapa-illuminating-intent-1418: Tsongkhapa builds his Prāsaṅgika position on this text but reads the “no thesis” view in a qualified way — autonomous inferences are rejected, but conventional positions are preserved. The reading of section VII as “no autonomous thesis” rather than “no thesis whatsoever” is Tsongkhapa’s interpretive move.
- gorampa-distinguishing-views-1469: Gorampa reads the same passage as endorsing a stronger “no thesis” position than Tsongkhapa allows.
- jinpa-tsongkhapa-qualms-1999: The four early-Tibetan misreadings of Prāsaṅgika that Tsongkhapa critiques (Jayānanda, Khu Lotsawa circle, “present-day Prāsaṅgikas,” followers of Patshap Lotsawa) are all attempts to read this very passage. The fact that this single text generated four distinct early Tibetan readings — and the further Tsongkhapa, Gorampa, and Karmapa readings — is itself evidence for the “framework-internal debate is productive” argument.
- apple-jewels-middle-way-2018: Atiśa transmitted Candrakīrti to Tibet through this text (Apple notes the Prasannapadā was a key Atiśa text). Atiśa’s “Great Madhyamaka” that synthesises Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti without ranking them is consistent with reading section XII as a pragmatic methodological recommendation rather than an ontological hierarchy.
- shantarakshita-madhyamakalankara: Śāntarakṣita’s autonomous-inference Yogācāra-Madhyamaka stands in the methodological lineage Candrakīrti is rejecting here — though Mipham’s later defence of Śāntarakṣita argues the paramārthatas qualifier can be deployed pedagogically without the metaphysical commitments Candrakīrti is criticising.
- Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: This excerpt is commentary on MMK 1.1 specifically; secondary citations include MMK 4.2, 5.1, 28.10. The reading of MMK 1.1 as the textual locus of the Madhyamaka method itself (not just a refutation of Sāṃkhya cosmology) is Candrakīrti’s interpretive contribution.