The Karmapa's Middle Way: Feast for the Fortunate

Thesis / main argument

The Ninth Karmapa Wangchuk Dorje’s Feast for the Fortunate (c. 1578) is an abridgement of the Eighth Karmapa Mikyö Dorje’s Chariot of the Takpo Kagyü Siddhas (c. 1545), itself a commentary on Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra. The text presents the Karma Kagyü Prāsaṅgika position: genuine Followers of the Middle Way dismantle the views of others while not positing a position of their own. All phenomena — including emptiness — are free from all conceptual elaborations of existence, nonexistence, arising, ceasing, and so on. The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction is primarily methodological, not a difference in what reality is. The Karmapa critiques Tsongkhapa’s “object of refutation by reasons” (isolating “true existence” as the target rather than phenomena themselves), Dolpopa’s zhentong, and Gorampa’s and Shākya Chokden’s positions on self-awareness and conventional existence. Translation by Tyler Dewar (Snow Lion, 2008), under guidance of Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche.

Key claims

• No thesis of one’s own: “In following the Middle Way, one dismantles the views of others while at the same time not positing a position of one’s own view” — repeated as the most fundamental declaration of the entire commentary (p. 16/Introduction)
• Three stages of analysis: No analysis (worldly conventions accepted as-is), slight analysis (emptiness — phenomena lack inherent nature), thorough analysis (freedom from elaborations — even emptiness is not reified). Linked to Āryadeva’s Four Hundred Verses 8.15 and MMK 18.6 (pp. 3–5)
• Critique of Tsongkhapa’s object of negation: Tsongkhapa isolates “the true existence of the vase” as the target of refutation rather than the vase itself. The Karmapa argues this produces a “partial emptiness” (nyi tshe ba’i stong pa nyid) that misses the real source of confusion: sentient beings cling to “the vase,” not to “the true existence of the vase” (pp. 39–41). Corroborated by Gendun Chöpel’s critique: “you need to refute the vase; you need to refute the pillar”
• Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika as methodological: The Karmapa’s main interest is debunking myths about the distinction, particularly elevating the Autonomists as genuine Followers of the Middle Way. “Their intentions are the same. The slight differences in their approaches are similar to a doctor treating different kinds of illnesses” (p. 29). The Autonomists do not believe conventional phenomena are real on the relative level; they merely speak of them “from the perspective of their performing functions” (p. 29)
• Two Truths: neither same nor different: The two truths are beyond all conceptual elaborations of being the same or different. The distinction is drawn “from the side of the perceiving subject” — ultimate truth is what is seen by enlightened beings; relative truth is what is seen by ordinary, confused beings (pp. 33–34). Even the ultimate truth, when presented as a dichotomous opposite to the relative, is a relative truth (p. 23)
• Emptiness as pedagogical tool: “All phenomena from form through omniscience are, from the outset, not established whatsoever as any extreme elaboration such as existent, nonexistent, arisen, ceased… To that lack of establishment, mere conventional terms such as ‘emptiness’ and ‘suchness’ are given. It is nothing more than that.” (pp. 36–37)
• Clinging to true existence is afflictive obscuration: In agreement with Tsongkhapa and against Gorampa and Shākya Chokden, the Karmapa holds that all instances of clinging to true existence (bden ‘dzin) are afflictive obscurations, not cognitive obscurations (p. 35)
• Refutation of zhentong: Dolpopa’s “supreme other” that is beyond interdependence is untenable. Both the true nature and appearing phenomena are beyond elaborations; it is impossible for only one to be “existent” or “real” on its own. Sūtric and tantric emptiness are the same in profundity; the difference lies only in skillful methods for accelerating meditative realisation (pp. 65–66)
• Buddha nature as conventional, not ultimate: The Karmapa treats buddha nature as provisional meaning and conventional, not ultimate. However, this does not diminish its power as a basis for yogic practice. After analysis, even in the Vajrayāna, the person does not exist (pp. 61–62)
• Hearers and solitary realisers realise phenomenal selflessness: Using “three reasonings and seven scriptural quotations,” the Karmapa proves that arhats realise the selflessness of all phenomena, not just of persons. When one realises the emptiness of one phenomenon, one has realised the emptiness of all (pp. 18–19). Against Mipham on this point.
• No common object of perception: There is no basis of appearance shared between the six classes of beings. Hungry ghosts see pus, humans see water — neither perception is more “real”; both are equally false relative appearances arising from ignorance, afflictions, and karma (pp. 45–46)
• Self-awareness does not exist even conventionally: In agreement with Tsongkhapa, against Gorampa and Shākya Chokden. Candrakīrti does not accept any phenomenon as existent or nonexistent in either truth (pp. 46–48)

Methodology

The Karmapa’s method is strictly Prāsaṅgika: drawing out absurd consequences of opponents’ positions without advancing a counter-thesis. The text alternates between word commentary on Candrakīrti’s root verses and “general meaning” (spyi don) sections that explore contested issues at length, often through debate-style refutations of Tsongkhapa, Dolpopa, Gorampa, Shākya Chokden, and Bodong Chokle Namgyal. The commentary preserves the Eighth Karmapa’s refutations while adding the Ninth Karmapa’s clarifications and paraphrases. Occasional forays into Mahāmudrā pointing-out instructions and siddha realisation songs integrate the scholarly and meditative streams.

Notable quote

“Since this is an important point, I have made it not once but several times, and will continue to make it!” — on the principle of having no thesis of one’s own.

Tenpa’s critical notes

1. Unique positioning in the Tibetan landscape: The Karmapa refutes Tsongkhapa, Dolpopa, Gorampa, AND Shākya Chokden — positioning himself as a distinct voice, not simply aligned with any one critic. He agrees with Tsongkhapa on some points (self-awareness, afflictive obscurations) while sharply criticising his object of negation and postdisintegration theory. He agrees with Gorampa’s impulse to critique Tsongkhapa but rejects Gorampa’s positions on self-awareness and conventional existence. This makes him genuinely independent.

2. The “partial emptiness” critique is powerful: The Karmapa’s charge that Tsongkhapa advocates a “partial emptiness” by isolating “true existence” rather than phenomena themselves is the sharpest version of this widespread criticism. It aligns with Gorampa’s wider object of negation but from a different angle — the Karmapa argues phenomena themselves must be refuted, not because the catuṣkoṭi demands it (Gorampa’s reasoning), but because that is what sentient beings actually cling to.

3. Three stages of analysis: This framework (no analysis / slight analysis / thorough analysis) is distinctive and maps illuminatingly onto the paper’s argument. At the stage of no analysis, conventions are accepted — this is where Kalupahana’s reading operates. At slight analysis, emptiness is established — this is where most Madhyamaka philosophical discourse operates. At thorough analysis, even emptiness is transcended — this is where the Karmapa claims genuine Followers of the Middle Way abide. The paper can use this to show that the Karmapa’s framework contains Kalupahana’s level within a larger structure.

4. Buddha nature as provisional: The Karmapa’s explicit classification of buddha nature and zhentong as provisional meaning directly opposes Dolpopa/Tāranātha. This is important for Section 6.3 — it shows the framework generating not just debate about method (Tsongkhapa vs. Gorampa on the object of negation) but about the very scope of what counts as definitive teaching.

5. Agreement with Tsongkhapa on some points: The agreement on self-awareness and afflictive obscurations while disagreeing on the object of negation shows that the Tibetan debate is not simply factional but genuinely philosophical — positions are adopted point by point, not as package deals.

Connections

• Tsongkhapa: The most refuted master. The Karmapa criticises his object of negation (“partial emptiness”), postdisintegration as a thing, and other “eight great difficult points.” But agrees on self-awareness not existing conventionally and on clinging to true existence being afflictive.
• Gorampa: Also criticised — on self-awareness existing conventionally and on the Karmapa’s reading, certain positions on conventional truth. The Karmapa and Gorampa share the impulse to criticise Tsongkhapa’s object of negation but diverge on the replacement.
• Dolpopa / Tāranātha: Zhentong explicitly refuted. An ultimate beyond interdependence is untenable; sūtric and tantric emptiness are the same in profundity. Buddha nature is classified as provisional meaning.
• Kalupahana: The Karmapa’s three stages of analysis implicitly contain Kalupahana’s position (the level of “no analysis” where worldly conventions are simply accepted) but situate it as the first stage rather than the endpoint.
• Mipham: The Karmapa agrees with Mipham that the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction is primarily methodological, but disagrees on whether hearers/solitary realisers realise phenomenal selflessness (Karmapa: yes; Mipham: apparently no).
• Śāntarakṣita: The Introduction acknowledges Śāntarakṣita’s role in bringing Madhyamaka to Tibet and his Yogācāra-Svātantrika approach. The Karmapa’s sympathetic treatment of Autonomists resonates with Mipham’s later reading of Śāntarakṣita.
• Gendun Chöpel: The translator adduces Gendun Chöpel’s Ornament to Nāgārjuna’s Thought as corroborating the Karmapa’s critique of Tsongkhapa’s object of negation. This aligns the Karmapa with the broader “wider object of negation” position.

Relevance to paper

• Section 3.3 (Candrakīrti): the Karmapa’s reading of the Entrance provides a Kagyü Prāsaṅgika perspective on Candrakīrti alongside the Geluk (Tsongkhapa) and Sakya (Gorampa) readings
• Section 4 (Tibetan commentarial interpretations): primary source for a Kagyü voice — the paper currently has Geluk (Tsongkhapa), Sakya (Gorampa), Jonang (Dolpopa/Tāranātha), Nyingma (Mipham); the Karmapa completes the picture with a Kagyü representative
• Section 6.3 (framework present but disputed): the Karmapa’s simultaneous agreements and disagreements with Tsongkhapa and Gorampa demonstrate point-by-point philosophical engagement, not factional allegiance — strong evidence for the paper’s claim about productive framework-internal debate
• Section 6.1 (framework necessity): the three stages of analysis provide a clear articulation of why the Two Truths framework is needed — without it, one is stuck at “no analysis” (= Kalupahana’s position)
• Outline flag: The current outline does not include a Kagyü section under Section 4. This source strongly suggests adding a Section 4.X for the Eighth/Ninth Karmapa, parallel to 4.2 (Tsongkhapa), 4.3 (Gorampa), 4.4 (Dolpopa), and 4.5 (Mipham). This would complete the four-lineage coverage.