“The Karmapa’s Middle Way: Feast for the Fortunate” — Wangchuk Dorje (Ninth Karmapa), 1578.
Thesis / main argument
The Ninth Karmapa Wangchuk Dorje’s Feast for the Fortunate (c. 1578) is an abridgement of the Eighth Karmapa Mikyö Dorje’s Chariot of the Takpo Kagyü Siddhas (c. 1545), itself a commentary on Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra. The text presents the Karma Kagyü Prāsaṅgika position: genuine Followers of the Middle Way dismantle the views of others while not positing a position of their own. All phenomena — including emptiness — are free from all conceptual elaborations of existence, nonexistence, arising, ceasing, and so on. The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction is primarily methodological, not a difference in what reality is. The Karmapa critiques Tsongkhapa’s “object of refutation by reasons” (isolating “true existence” as the target rather than phenomena themselves), Dolpopa’s zhentong, and Gorampa’s and Shākya Chokden’s positions on self-awareness and conventional existence. Translation by Tyler Dewar (Snow Lion, 2008), under guidance of Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche.
Chapter-by-chapter walk-through: see karmapa-feast-fortunate-1578-summary.
Key claims
- No thesis of one’s own: “In following the Middle Way, one dismantles the views of others while at the same time not positing a position of one’s own view” — repeated as the most fundamental declaration of the entire commentary (p. 16/Introduction)
- Three stages of analysis: No analysis (worldly conventions accepted as-is), slight analysis (emptiness — phenomena lack inherent nature), thorough analysis (freedom from elaborations — even emptiness is not reified). Linked to Āryadeva’s Four Hundred Verses 8.15 and MMK 18.6 (pp. 3–5)
- Critique of Tsongkhapa’s object of negation: Tsongkhapa isolates “the true existence of the vase” as the target of refutation rather than the vase itself. The Karmapa argues this produces a “partial emptiness” (nyi tshe ba’i stong pa nyid) that misses the real source of confusion: sentient beings cling to “the vase,” not to “the true existence of the vase” (pp. 39–41). Corroborated by Gendun Chöpel’s critique: “you need to refute the vase; you need to refute the pillar”
- Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika as methodological: The Karmapa’s main interest is debunking myths about the distinction, particularly elevating the Autonomists as genuine Followers of the Middle Way. “Their intentions are the same. The slight differences in their approaches are similar to a doctor treating different kinds of illnesses” (p. 29). The Autonomists do not believe conventional phenomena are real on the relative level; they merely speak of them “from the perspective of their performing functions” (p. 29)
- Two Truths: neither same nor different: The two truths are beyond all conceptual elaborations of being the same or different. The distinction is drawn “from the side of the perceiving subject” — ultimate truth is what is seen by enlightened beings; relative truth is what is seen by ordinary, confused beings (pp. 33–34). Even the ultimate truth, when presented as a dichotomous opposite to the relative, is a relative truth (p. 23)
- Emptiness as pedagogical tool: “All phenomena from form through omniscience are, from the outset, not established whatsoever as any extreme elaboration such as existent, nonexistent, arisen, ceased… To that lack of establishment, mere conventional terms such as ‘emptiness’ and ‘suchness’ are given. It is nothing more than that.” (pp. 36–37)
- Clinging to true existence is afflictive obscuration: In agreement with Tsongkhapa and against Gorampa and Shākya Chokden, the Karmapa holds that all instances of clinging to true existence (bden ‘dzin) are afflictive obscurations, not cognitive obscurations (p. 35)
- Refutation of zhentong: Dolpopa’s “supreme other” that is beyond interdependence is untenable. Both the true nature and appearing phenomena are beyond elaborations; it is impossible for only one to be “existent” or “real” on its own. Sūtric and tantric emptiness are the same in profundity; the difference lies only in skillful methods for accelerating meditative realisation (pp. 65–66)
- Buddha nature as conventional, not ultimate: The Karmapa treats buddha nature as provisional meaning and conventional, not ultimate. However, this does not diminish its power as a basis for yogic practice. After analysis, even in the Vajrayāna, the person does not exist (pp. 61–62)
- Hearers and solitary realisers realise phenomenal selflessness: Using “three reasonings and seven scriptural quotations,” the Karmapa proves that arhats realise the selflessness of all phenomena, not just of persons. When one realises the emptiness of one phenomenon, one has realised the emptiness of all (pp. 18–19). Against Mipham on this point.
- No common object of perception: There is no basis of appearance shared between the six classes of beings. Hungry ghosts see pus, humans see water — neither perception is more “real”; both are equally false relative appearances arising from ignorance, afflictions, and karma (pp. 45–46)
- Self-awareness does not exist even conventionally: In agreement with Tsongkhapa, against Gorampa and Shākya Chokden. Candrakīrti does not accept any phenomenon as existent or nonexistent in either truth (pp. 46–48)
Methodology
The Karmapa’s method is strictly Prāsaṅgika: drawing out absurd consequences of opponents’ positions without advancing a counter-thesis. The text alternates between word commentary on Candrakīrti’s root verses and “general meaning” (spyi don) sections that explore contested issues at length, often through debate-style refutations of Tsongkhapa, Dolpopa, Gorampa, Shākya Chokden, and Bodong Chokle Namgyal. The commentary preserves the Eighth Karmapa’s refutations while adding the Ninth Karmapa’s clarifications and paraphrases. Occasional forays into Mahāmudrā pointing-out instructions and siddha realisation songs integrate the scholarly and meditative streams.
Notable quote
“Since this is an important point, I have made it not once but several times, and will continue to make it!” — on the principle of having no thesis of one’s own.
Appendices (independently added)
The Tyler Dewar translation includes three appendices that are not Karmapa material and have been added separately:
- Appendix I — Excerpt from Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā on MMK 1.1 (the locus classicus of the Prāsaṅgika–Svātantrika debate, on which the Karmapa’s analysis depends). Now added as candrakirti-prasannapada-mmk1-excerpt.
- Appendix II — Atiśa’s Madhyama-upadeśa (Key Instructions of the Middle Way), a short stand-alone primary text translated by Naktso Tsültrim Gyalwa in collaboration with Atiśa at the Trūlnang Temple of Lhasa. Now added as atisha-key-instructions; text page at Madhyama-upadeśa.
- Appendix III — Translator’s reference summary of the Five Great Reasonings of the Middle Way (vajra slivers, presence/absence of result, four permutations, neither one nor many, interdependence). Not itself a primary source, but the content has been synthesised into a dedicated concept page: Five Great Reasonings.
Connections
- Tsongkhapa: The most refuted master. The Karmapa criticises his object of negation (“partial emptiness”), postdisintegration as a thing, and other “eight great difficult points.” But agrees on self-awareness not existing conventionally and on clinging to true existence being afflictive.
- Gorampa: Also criticised — on self-awareness existing conventionally and on the Karmapa’s reading, certain positions on conventional truth. The Karmapa and Gorampa share the impulse to criticise Tsongkhapa’s object of negation but diverge on the replacement.
- Dolpopa / Tāranātha: Zhentong explicitly refuted. An ultimate beyond interdependence is untenable; sūtric and tantric emptiness are the same in profundity. Buddha nature is classified as provisional meaning.
- Kalupahana: The Karmapa’s three stages of analysis implicitly contain Kalupahana’s position (the level of “no analysis” where worldly conventions are simply accepted) but situate it as the first stage rather than the endpoint.
- Mipham: The Karmapa agrees with Mipham that the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction is primarily methodological, but disagrees on whether hearers/solitary realisers realise phenomenal selflessness (Karmapa: yes; Mipham: apparently no).
- Śāntarakṣita: The Introduction acknowledges Śāntarakṣita’s role in bringing Madhyamaka to Tibet and his Yogācāra-Svātantrika approach. The Karmapa’s sympathetic treatment of Autonomists resonates with Mipham’s later reading of Śāntarakṣita.
- Gendun Chöpel: The translator adduces Gendun Chöpel’s Ornament to Nāgārjuna’s Thought as corroborating the Karmapa’s critique of Tsongkhapa’s object of negation. This aligns the Karmapa with the broader “wider object of negation” position.