Position summary
Śāntarakṣita is the principal figure of the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka (rnal ‘byor spyod pa’i dbu ma pa) school, synthesising Dharmakīrti’s epistemological tradition with Madhyamaka emptiness. His signature contribution is the two-step method: conventional reality is analysed through Cittamātra — external objects are shown to be mind’s projections — and then mind itself is shown to lack intrinsic nature through Madhyamaka reasoning. The central logical tool is the “neither one nor many” (gcig du bral) argument: anything that is neither truly singular nor truly plural cannot possess intrinsic being.
Śāntarakṣita also distinguishes between the approximate ultimate (rnam grangs pa’i don dam) — emptiness as conceptually cognised through reasoning — and the actual ultimate (rnam grangs ma yin pa’i don dam) — emptiness beyond all conceptual elaboration. This distinction is structurally parallel to Gorampa’s later quasi-ultimate / real ultimate distinction.
Hermeneutical approach
Śāntarakṣita works fully within the Mahāyāna hermeneutical framework. He presupposes the Two Truths, uses Yogācāra categories for the conventional, and employs Madhyamaka reasoning for the ultimate. His method is svātantra (independent syllogistic reasoning), making him a Svātantrika — though Mipham later argues this does not imply a lesser view than the Prāsaṅgika. He integrates the pramāṇa (valid cognition) tradition of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, unique among major Indian Mādhyamikas.
Key claims
- All entities lack intrinsic being because they are neither truly one nor truly many (root verse 1) — from shantarakshita-madhyamakalankara
- External objects do not exist; they are mind’s projections (Cittamātra step) — root verse 92
- Mind itself is devoid of self (Madhyamaka step) — root verse 92
- The approximate ultimate is “attuned” to the actual ultimate but is not identical with it — root verses 70–71
- Non-Buddhist and Buddhist tenet systems form a hierarchy of progressively subtler views, each critiqued by the next
Tenpa’s assessment
Śāntarakṣita is the paper’s primary source for Section 3.4 (Indian commentarial interpretations). He demonstrates that the Mahāyāna hermeneutical framework can accommodate genuinely different philosophical syntheses — his Yogācāra-Madhyamaka approach is quite different from Candrakīrti’s pure Prāsaṅgika, yet both operate within the same framework. This is key evidence for the paper’s claim that the framework generates productive diversity rather than uniformity. His historical role is also significant: he brought Madhyamaka to Tibet, and his student Kamalaśīla defended the Indian gradualist approach at the Council of Samyé.
Related scholars
- Mipham — 19th-century Nyingma commentator on the Madhyamakālaṅkāra; reinterprets Śāntarakṣita’s Svātantrika as converging with Prāsaṅgika
- Kamalaśīla (c. 740–795 CE) — Śāntarakṣita’s student; author of the Madhyamakāloka (commentary on Madhyamakālaṅkāra) and Bhāvanākrama
- Dharmakīrti (c. 600–660 CE) — epistemological tradition that Śāntarakṣita integrates with Madhyamaka
- Tsongkhapa — classifies Śāntarakṣita as Svātantrika-Yogācāra; presents his view as a stepping stone to the subtler Prāsaṅgika
- Gorampa — his approximate/actual ultimate distinction parallels Gorampa’s quasi-ultimate / real ultimate
- Atiśa — explicitly contrasted his “pure” Candrakīrti-lineage Madhyamaka with the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka of Śāntarakṣita/Kamalaśīla that Tibetans had inherited. Key differences: Atiśa rejected pramāṇa for realising emptiness (Śāntarakṣita/Kamalaśīla accepted inference); Atiśa denied any real conventional basis (Śāntarakṣita granted conventionally real mental elements); Atiśa rejected common establishment (ubhayasiddhatva) in debate (apple-jewels-middle-way-2018)