The Essence of Other-Emptiness

Thesis / main argument

Tāranātha’s The Essence of Other-Emptiness is a concise Jonang presentation of the zhentong (“other-emptiness”) doctrine within the framework of Buddhist tenet systems. It argues that the “Great Middle Way” (dbu ma chen po) surpasses the “Ordinary Middle Way” (dbu ma phal pa, i.e. the rangtong traditions of Buddhapālita, Bhāviveka, Candrakīrti, and Tsongkhapa) by correctly identifying the ultimate — the thoroughly established nature (yongs su grub pa), the matrix-of-One-Gone-Thus (tathāgatagarbha), self-arisen pristine wisdom — as truly existent and empty only of what is other than itself (adventitious defilements and conventionalities), not of its own entity. The text draws extensively on Dolpopa’s Mountain Doctrine to authenticate this position through Indian scriptural sources and the three-natures framework.

Key claims

• Ordinary vs. Great Middle Way: The Middle Way divides into “Ordinary” (rangtong — Buddhapālita, Bhāviveka, Candrakīrti, and their followers) and “Great” (zhentong). The Ordinary Middle Way is “mistaken” in asserting the ultimate noumenon is like space (mere negation of proliferations), that a Buddha’s pristine wisdom is conventional and not truly existent, and that even ultimate truth lacks true existence (pp. 57–60).
• The thoroughly established nature truly exists: Self-illuminating self-cognition devoid of all proliferations; synonymous with noumenon (dharmatā), element of attributes (dharmadhātu), thusness (tathatā), and ultimate truth. It does not conventionally exist but ultimately exists, and thus truly exists (p. 86).
• Three natures as interpretive key: Imputational characters do not exist even conventionally. Other-powered characters conventionally exist but not truly. The thoroughly established character truly and ultimately exists. A basis of the emptiness of the thoroughly established nature does not occur — it is never empty of itself (Dolpopa’s Mountain Doctrine 233, cited at p. 87).
• Other-emptiness defined: The thoroughly established nature is primordially empty of others (conventionalities, adventitious defilements) but never empty of its own entity. Conventionalities are empty of both others’ entities and their own entities. The ultimate is empty only of others’ entities (pp. 101–102).
• Self-arisen pristine wisdom is permanent: Not merely permanent in the sense of an unending continuum (which would make all compounded things permanent), but truly permanent, uncompounded, and immutable. Not equivalent to the non-Buddhist self because it is emptiness — but an emptiness that is other-empty, not self-empty (pp. 19–20, 105–106).
• Scriptural authority: The zhentong view is illuminated by Maitreya’s Five Doctrines (especially the Uttaratantra, Madhyāntavibhāga, and Dharmadharmatāvibhāga), by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, and by Nāgārjuna’s Praise of the Element of Attributes (Dharmadhātustotra) (pp. 62–65, 77–78).
• Revisionist claim: Tāranātha asserts that Buddhapālita, Bhāviveka, and others being “renowned as Proponents of Self-Emptiness” is merely “taking what is renowned to the ordinary world” — they are actually proponents of the Great Middle Way (p. 92 and fn.).
• Critique of Prāsaṅgika non-assertion: Quotes Tsongkhapa’s own critique of those who claim Consequentialists have no position, but then uses this against the Ordinary Middle Way as a whole (pp. 58–60).

Methodology

Tāranātha works within the traditional Tibetan grub mtha’ (tenet system) genre, presenting a hierarchical ladder of Buddhist schools in which each higher school corrects the errors of the lower. This is a scholastic method: each tenet system is presented through its assertions, its errors are identified, and the highest system (Great Middle Way) emerges as the corrective culmination. Dolpopa’s Mountain Doctrine is cited extensively as the authoritative voice; Tāranātha’s own contribution is the concise synthetic organisation and the supplementary Twenty-one Differences comparing Dolpopa with Shākya Chokden.

Hopkins’s translation includes extensive annotations that illuminate the Geluk counter-positions, providing a useful comparative dimension.

Tenpa’s critical notes

This is the first sympathetic presentation of zhentong in the wiki, complementing gorampa-distinguishing-views-1469, which treats zhentong as “non-Buddhist.” The contrast is stark: where Gorampa classifies Dolpopa’s view as falling outside the Buddhist tradition entirely, Tāranātha presents it as the highest and most complete Buddhist view, grounded in Maitreya, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and even Nāgārjuna. This is a direct contradiction that needs to be flagged and presented in the paper.

For the paper’s argument, the zhentong position is an important boundary case for the hermeneutical framework thesis. Dolpopa/Tāranātha operate within the framework (Two Truths, Three Turnings, commentarial tradition) but apply it in a way that inverts the standard Madhyamaka priorities: the Third Turning (tathāgatagarbha sūtras) is definitive, the Second Turning (Prajñāpāramitā) requires interpretation. The framework is the same; the hermeneutical ordering is reversed. This raises the question: does the framework accommodate zhentong as a legitimate internal option, or does it have boundary conditions that exclude it?

The three-natures framework used here is strongly Yogācāra in origin, which supports Gorampa’s charge of Cittamātra affinities. But Tāranātha explicitly distinguishes the Great Middle Way from Mind-Only, arguing that the confusion is a later misunderstanding.

The revisionist claim that Buddhapālita and Bhāviveka are “actually” zhentong practitioners is notable as an extreme form of hermeneutical absorption — reading the entire Indian tradition through one’s own lens.

Connections

• Presents the position of: Dolpopa (extensively, through Mountain Doctrine citations) and Tāranātha (through his own synthetic framework)
• Directly contradicts: gorampa-distinguishing-views-1469 — Gorampa classifies zhentong as non-Buddhist; Tāranātha argues it is the highest Buddhist view
• Critiques: Tsongkhapa and the Geluk tradition (through the “Ordinary Middle Way” critique) and Prāsaṅgika non-assertion
• Engages with: Shākya Chokden (in the supplementary Twenty-one Differences)
• Draws on: Maitreya’s Five Doctrines, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Nāgārjuna’s Dharmadhātustotra, Kālacakra Tantra
• Tension with: Westerhoff — Westerhoff’s “consistent nihilism” is at the opposite pole from zhentong’s affirmation of a truly existent ultimate

Relevance to paper

• Section 4.4 (Dolpopa): primary source — the fullest sympathetic presentation of zhentong now in the wiki; corrects the one-sided picture from Gorampa
• Section 4.3 (Gorampa): provides the zhentong position that Gorampa critiques as non-Buddhist; useful for showing both sides
• Section 2.1 (Two Truths): the zhentong inversion of the standard Two Truths ordering is key evidence that the framework generates internal diversity
• Section 2.2 (Three Turnings): zhentong’s definitive/provisional ordering (Third Turning definitive, Second Turning provisional) inverts the Geluk ordering
• Section 6.3 (framework present but disputed): zhentong is the strongest boundary case — does the framework accommodate it or exclude it?
• Section 6.2 (what happens without framework): by contrast, zhentong is deeply embedded in the framework even when other Tibetan traditions reject its conclusions