Position summary
Westerhoff is professor at the University of Oxford (Lady Margaret Hall) and one of the most prolific contemporary scholars of Madhyamaka. His interpretive approach is distinctive in combining rigorous analytic philosophy with serious engagement with traditional Indian and Tibetan commentarial sources. He reads Sanskrit and Tibetan and works directly with primary texts.
In westerhoff-madhyamaka-2009, Westerhoff presents Nāgārjuna’s philosophy as a unified systematic project centred on the denial of substance (svabhāva as substance-svabhāva). His central innovation is a threefold analysis of svabhāva — essence-svabhāva, substance-svabhāva, and absolute svabhāva — which he argues reduces to a twofold distinction: absolute svabhāva is essence-svabhāva applied universally (emptiness is the essential property of all objects). The resulting position is a general metaphysical anti-realism and anti-foundationalism, combined with epistemological contextualism and truth as warranted assertibility. He insists on the cognitive dimension of svabhāva: it is not merely a theoretical concept but a cognitive default requiring meditative practice to overcome.
In westerhoff-nihilist-2016, he pushes this framework further, arguing that the nihilist interpretation of Madhyamaka is both textually and philosophically defensible — but only in a carefully qualified form. His “consistent nihilism” (eliminativism about the dependent + non-foundationalism) avoids the five forms of nihilism that Madhyamaka explicitly rejects. He proposes an “equilibrium principle” whereby the best interpretation of Madhyamaka is opponent-relative: against today’s naturalistic realism, the nihilist reading provides the sharpest edge.
Hermeneutical approach
Westerhoff engages extensively with traditional commentaries (Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā, Asańga’s Bodhisattvabhūmi, Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa) and treats them as philosophically substantive, not merely historical documents. He also draws on Gendun Chöpel’s modern Tibetan critique of Geluk interpretive narrowness. At the same time, he freely deploys Western analytic categories (eliminativism, non-foundationalism, dependence-structures) as tools for reconstruction.
He operates within the hermeneutical framework (Two Truths, conventional/ultimate distinction) even when his conclusion (Madhyamaka as a form of nihilism) appears provocative. This is what distinguishes him from Burton and Williams, who apply Western philosophical categories without the traditional interpretive context.
Key claims
- Nāgārjuna’s philosophy is a unified systematic project, not a quarry of isolated arguments — all chapters converge on the denial of substance-svabhāva (from westerhoff-madhyamaka-2009)
- Three senses of svabhāva (essence, substance, absolute) reduce to two: absolute svabhāva = essence-svabhāva of all objects = emptiness (from westerhoff-madhyamaka-2009)
- Svabhāva has an irreducible cognitive dimension: it is a conceptual superimposition the mind automatically projects onto phenomena, requiring practice (not just argument) to remove (from westerhoff-madhyamaka-2009)
- Causation is conceptually constructed: within a presentist framework, one relatum must always be mentally supplied (from westerhoff-madhyamaka-2009)
- The “ineffable substance” view (Murti, Stcherbatsky, Dharmapāla) fails: positing objects “beyond conceptual frameworks” still assumes mind-independent entities (from westerhoff-madhyamaka-2009)
- The persistent charge of nihilism against Madhyamaka across two millennia points to real features of the system, not mere incomprehension (from westerhoff-nihilist-2016)
- A consistent nihilism can be built from eliminativist + non-foundationalist premises, and it is compatible with Madhyamaka (from westerhoff-nihilist-2016)
- The five forms of nihilism Madhyamaka rejects (extreme view, annihilationism, denial of efficacy, reified non-existence, moral nihilism) are distinct from this consistent nihilism (from westerhoff-nihilist-2016)
- The right interpretation of Madhyamaka is opponent-relative (equilibrium principle) (from westerhoff-nihilist-2016)
Tenpa’s assessment
Westerhoff is the closest to operating within the hermeneutical framework while maintaining academic methodology — exactly what the paper argues produces more coherent readings. His nihilism conclusion is provocative but coherent precisely because he has done the commentarial homework. This supports the paper’s thesis from an unexpected angle: even a “nihilist” reading succeeds when it engages the framework.
The challenge for the paper is positioning Westerhoff’s partial concession to nihilism. He doesn’t argue “Burton is wrong because he lacks the framework.” He argues “Burton is wrong because his nihilism is crude — here’s a better nihilism informed by the tradition.” The paper should note this as evidence that the framework is necessary even for defending nihilism.
Related scholars
- Agrees with Siderits on eliminativism/reductionism distinctions
- Directly responds to Burton and Williams — refutes their nihilism charges
- Draws on Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā as primary textual evidence
- Cites Gendun Chöpel approvingly as precedent for widening the object of negation
- Engages with Asańga and Vasubandhu as Buddhist critics of Madhyamaka