Removal of Wrong Views — chapter-by-chapter summary

Companion to gorampa-removal-wrong-views. For thesis, key claims, methodology, critical notes, and paper-relevance tagging see the source page. Cross-references throughout to tsongkhapa-illuminating-intent-1418-summary (Tsongkhapa’s dGongs pa rab gsal) let the reader see Tsongkhapa’s actual position on each disputed verse.

Removal of Wrong Views (Lta ngan sel) is a verse-by-verse general-meaning commentary (spyi don) on the entirety of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra (MA), composed by the Sakya master Gorampa Sönam Senge (1429–1489) in the productive last two decades of his life. The work follows the eleven Madhyamakāvatāra chapters tracking the ten bodhisattva grounds and the resultant Buddha ground, with a concluding section, a colophon, and an epilogue. Within this verse-by-verse frame Gorampa inserts fifty-nine numbered “moot-points” (dka’ gnas / དཀའ་གནས་) — polemical excursuses where he refutes identified or anonymous opponents. Throughout this summary, “Tsongkhapa” should be read as the default referent of Gorampa’s “somebody” / kha cig / “later scholar” / “later Centrist”: the apparatus and translator’s notes, together with verbatim coincidence with passages in Tsongkhapa’s dGongs pa rab gsal, identify Tsongkhapa as the principal target in the overwhelming majority of cases (with his immediate Geluk successors Gyaltsap and Khedrup as secondary targets, and a small minority directed at others — Bhāviveka, Bcom Ldan Rig Ral, Pa Tshab vs Nag Tsho translation disputes, the Vatsīputrīya, Sammitīya, and the early Centrist “pseudo-Centrist” who is not yet Tsongkhapa). Tsongkhapa is named only twice at the apparatus level (as “the Geshe Bio (Bzang Grags pa)” / “Geshe Tsong Ba” / “Geshe Bio Ba”) in MPs 24, 28, and 39, but every other “somebody has written” who can be cross-referenced lands a verbatim or near-verbatim hit on Illuminating the Intent. Where the present summary calls the opponent simply “an opponent” or “an unnamed opponent,” the apparatus is genuinely indeterminate; everywhere else the opponent is named.

The argument unfolds cumulatively: the standard sa bcad outline of Candrakīrti’s ten-grounds presentation is preserved as the architecture, and the polemical engagements emerge organically at the points where Gorampa believes Tsongkhapa’s dGongs pa rab gsal has misread the underlying Sanskrit-Tibetan stanza. The bulk of the philosophical work falls in the long sixth-ground section (MA VI, on the perfection of wisdom and the two selflessnesses), which alone occupies more than half the text; the other grounds are by comparison brief, but each contributes one or more moot-points whose substance feeds back into MA VI’s central disputes. The translation reproduces the CIHTS Tibetan pagination in bracketed numbers throughout, and the printed table of contents enumerates all 59 moot-points by ground and verse-number.

The Appendix at the bottom of this page catalogues every discrete claim Gorampa makes against Tsongkhapa and other opponents, one row per claim, with cross-references into the Tsongkhapa summary on the corresponding MA verse.

Prologue

Gorampa opens with salutations to Buddha as expounder of dependent origination, to Nāgārjuna as “lion of expounders” who scared away the deer of the extremists with the lion-roar of emptiness, and to Candrakīrti, “whose fame (kīrti), since he illuminated the garland of Nāgārjuna’s presentations with the moon (candra) rays of his elucidations, pervades the three realms” (p. 10 [Tib. 4]). The eight lines of the Tibetan prologue echo Nāgārjuna’s salutary verse to MMK; the closing image — “one whose intellect firmly holds to reference and reasoning, like a captain to his boat, and is then well moved by the superior intention, like a boat by the wind, is bound to obtain the jewel of the profound meaning” — sets out the work’s hermeneutical method: scripture (lung) plus reasoning (rigs pa) plus bodhicitta motivation.

Introduction — The Meaning of the Name

A short philological orientation. “Madhyamakāvatāra” is parsed in two senses: the “middle” as referent (dharmadhātu / ཆོས་དབྱིངས་, free of conceptually elaborated extremes) and the “middle” as expressing words (the textual corpus that teaches the referent). Among such expressing texts, Gorampa places MA as belonging to the treatise category — a commentary aimed at introducing Candrakīrti’s MMK by way of Candrakīrti’s own spyi don. Two methodological points are flagged at the outset that will become load-bearing later: the Sanskrit prasaṅga method in the sixth chapter is “a particularly sublime method of interpreting the import of the theses … which negate a real arising” (p. 13 [Tib. 5]); and MA is structured by Nāgārjuna’s Ratnāvalī triad of the bodhicitta, compassion, and non-dual wisdom, then extended over the ten bodhisattva grounds. Gorampa cites MA VI.7bcd and XIII.1 to establish MA’s self-description as a compilation “from centrist treatises, in conformity with sermons and essential instructions.”

The Main Text — Introduction of the Main Text

This section covers the salutation (translators’ reverence to Mañjuśrī) and Candrakīrti’s praise of compassion (MA I.1) as the chief cause of buddhahood, and contains moot-points 1–4. The substantive philosophical work begins with the differentiation among the four “persons” (Hearer / Self-Buddha / Bodhisattva / Buddha). Gorampa walks through MA I.1’s autocommentary on the manner in which Hearers and Self-Buddhas proceed from a Buddha and Buddhas in turn proceed from Bodhisattvas.

Moot-point 1 (p. 20 [Tib. 11]) — on the philological reading of śrāvaka. An unnamed scholar (apparatus identifies as Tsongkhapa-school) argues that the literal “hearer” explanation can be waived for formless-realm Hearers because “the chief term is used as the name; it is not necessarily certain that this has the mark which is the cause of the literal explanation” (cf. lake-grown-from-dry-lotus example). Gorampa rejects: (i) formless-realm Hearers had previously obtained the path of seeing in a desire-realm body, so they did “hear” in the relevant sense; (ii) on the opponent’s logic one would have to apply the same waiver to all activities of arhats (going, walking, sleeping), reducing the opponent to absurdity. The footnote at p. 20 makes Gorampa’s frame explicit: “this is the first of 59 views which will be refuted by Gorampa in this text.”

Moot-point 2 (p. 22 [Tib. 12]) — on the term “Tattva-buddha” / “self-Buddha.” The opponent (here, on the apparatus, identified as preferring Nag Tsho’s translation against Pa Tshab’s) argues that “Buddha” can simply mean “one who realises Reality” and so applies univocally to all three persons. Gorampa rejects on three grounds: (i) the autocommentary’s gloss restricts “buddha” to “one whose wisdom is complete” — the two lower Foe-Destroyers do not have complete wisdom of Reality; (ii) the opponent’s own translation choice would force a parallel reformulation of MA I.1 itself, but Pa Tshab’s standard rendering remains canonical; (iii) the “lotus opening, awakening from sleep” gloss does not displace the primary sense. The opponent here is preferring Nag Tsho — not Tsongkhapa as such — but the argumentative posture is one Gorampa associates with the broader Geluk tradition that sides with Nag Tsho.

Moot-point 3 (p. 30 [Tib. 19]) — on whether the Bodhisattva of the path of accumulation is a “real” Bodhisattva. The opponent (Tsongkhapa) holds that the Bodhisattva’s prior generation of the mind (of enlightenment) is “designed as an incentive” but is not the real generation, comparable to the rind of sugar cane vs the cane itself; the real Bodhisattva is from the first ground onwards. Gorampa rejects this on five grounds: (i) it is inconsistent with Nāgārjuna’s Praise of the Sphere of Reality on the new-moon image, which establishes the first-ground Bodhisattva and not the path-of-accumulation Bodhisattva as the new moon; (ii) it is inconsistent with Maitreya’s Supreme Tantra (Uttaratantra) on the seed-shell-destroyed-by-sprout simile; (iii) the opponent’s own earlier commentarial gloss on those texts is incompatible with what he says here; (iv) the All-pervading Teaching and Jewel Garland citations of “mind of enlightenment firm as Mount Meru” cannot be made consistent with a non-real first generation; (v) the eagle-young-from-egg and emperor-son-from-womb examples cannot bear the weight the opponent puts on them. Gorampa: “it is an interpretation that is frightening (like) an abyss” (p. 36 [Tib. 24]).

Moot-point 4 (p. 41 [Tib. 30]) — on the cognitive aspect of the second compassion (compassion focused on phenomena). The opponent has tried to load the suffering of creation (the third aspect, properly belonging to the third compassion) into the second. Gorampa: this confuses the focal-object basis of differentiation with the cognitive-aspect basis. cf. 1-preliminaries — Tsongkhapa himself (Jinpa pp. 47–55) differentiates the three compassions by focal object with the cognitive aspect uniform; in Illuminating the Intent he criticises “certain Tibetan commentators who confuse the focal object with the cognitive aspect” — an interesting case where Tsongkhapa is making a structurally similar move to Gorampa’s MP 4. Gorampa here may not be targeting Tsongkhapa directly; the opponent is more likely an early-Geluk pre-dGongs pa rab gsal writer.

The Causal Bodhisattva Grounds — The First Ground (Joyful)

Gorampa explains MA I.4cd–I.5ab as identifying the meditative balance of the first uncontaminated wisdom; the “joy” is the post-meditational aftermath in which the bodhisattva has just attained the path of seeing. Nine further moot-points (5–13) cluster on this ground, and despite the brevity of the Daśabhūmika material the polemical content is dense — the disagreements anticipated here recur in expanded form on the sixth ground.

Moot-point 5 (p. 50 [Tib. 32]) — on the application of the name “Bodhisattva.” Tsongkhapa: “Even though a Bodhisattva is spoken of, what is meant is a Bodhisattva of ultimate sense, and it is not taught that the ordinary person is not a real Bodhisattva.” Gorampa rejects: the bodhicitta is divided into superficial and ultimate, but the Bodhisattva designation itself is not — there is a “Bodhisattva of ultimate sense” stage, not “a real vs non-real Bodhisattva.” He cites the autocommentary’s “the time, that is distinctive of the stage of the ultimate sense, but not of the Bodhisattva” verbatim as decisive.

Moot-point 6 (p. 53 [Tib. 36]) — on the enumeration of the “eighth holy person” at MA I.7d. Tsongkhapa counts the Approacher to the Stream-Enterer as the eighth (counting downwards from Foe-Destroyer Abider through the eight types). Gorampa shows three faults: (i) this is inconsistent with the autocommentary, which has the Abider in the Fruit (Stream-Enterer) as the eighth, “in the holy Stream-Enterer the qualities of a holy, corresponding with his own (ground), are realised”; (ii) the opponent’s count would invert the natural reading order of the four-Approacher / four-Abider list; (iii) “He himself further arbitrarily counts (by way of) that mode of counting because even when that Approacher is counted as the eighth, it is not that the four Abiders in the fruit are counted first.”

Moot-point 7 (pp. 64–87 [Tib. 44–63]) is the longest of the first-ground moot-points and arguably the most consequential of the early text. It opens out from MA I.7d (“He is taught to be like the eighth holy”) into the long-form dharma-nairātmya dispute: do hearer-arhats and self-buddha-arhats realise the realitylessness of phenomena? Gorampa argues yes. The sub-claims here are numerous and proceed in three layers — first establishing his positive case, then refuting two long Tsongkhapa positions.

Gorampa’s positive case:

1. Two reasonings that Hearer/Self-Buddha Foe-Destroyers must perceive dharma-nairātmya: (a) without it they could not abandon all defilements of the three realms; (b) without it their intellects, conceiving form as real, would be perverted, and the personal selflessness itself could not be perceived (since the aggregates are the designative cause of the person).
2. Three scriptural references establishing the same:
   • Ratnāvalī on the cycle of fire-brand causation (the two-stanza “as long as there is an apprehension of the aggregates” passage and the closing “those are not seen as arisen from themselves” passage).
   • Ratnāvalī’s nineteen-stanza sequence determining the elements as realityless and the form derived from them as realityless (“just as the eye erroneously…” through “one who is not stuck and does not appropriate is liberated”).
   • The discourse-collection passage attributed to “the Friend of the sun” — “form is foam, feeling is bubble, discriminating awareness is mirage, compositional factors are banana tree, consciousness is illusion.”
3. Nāgārjuna’s own intent — “in the Universal Vehicle non-arising is taught; the extinction taught by the others is emptiness. Since extinction and non-arising are one in meaning, therefore be tolerant” — and Bhāviveka’s contrary reading (“if the objective selflessness were also taught in the Hearer Vehicle, the teaching of the Universal Vehicle would be useless”) is shown to be itself rejected by the autocommentary. The Universal Vehicle has four distinguishing features beyond dharma-nairātmya alone: bodhisattva grounds, transcendences, aspirational prayers, and the noumenon not encompassed by thought — so the redundancy charge fails.

Refutation of the first long Tsongkhapa position — that the Daśabhūmika phrase “established in the superior knowledge of his own domain” refers only to the Bodhisattva’s realisation of the cessation truth, not to dharma-nairātmya:

4. The opponent has elsewhere accepted that no Universal/Individual Vehicle difference exists at the level of Reality, so by his own commitment the Daśabhūmika phrase cannot be restricted to Bodhisattvas.
5. The opponent rejects the abandonment-by-nine-paths-of-cultivation account (small/medium/great defilements abandoned across grounds 2–10) but in doing so spurns the Ornament of Realisations and Maitreya’s exegeses.
6. The opponent’s claim that on the Buddha ground entering and rising from Thatness is more difficult (because mind and Thatness have become uniform) generates the consequence that on the Buddha ground entering and rising from Thatness cannot occur at all — and the implicit consequence that “intellect in which these two have intermingled to become one in experience has not penetrated the true state of things” — which contradicts the standard Mahāyāna account of Buddha-cognition. (cf. 25-the-resultant-ground on the Buddha-mind-as-water-poured-into-water doctrine.)

Refutation of the second long Tsongkhapa position — the elaborate “complete” vs “incomplete” personal selflessness based on direct realisation of the sixteen four-truth aspects (impermanence, suffering, etc.):

7. It is incoherent within the Pure Science (Abhidharma) tradition itself, which does not divide selflessness into complete-and-incomplete.
8. It is inconsistent with Centrist Consequentialist principles — the autocommentary states that “among the four truths, the truths of suffering, origin and path pertain to the superficial, while the truth of cessation is the truth of the ultimate sense,” and direct realisation of the sixteen aspects requires direct realisation of cessation, which requires direct realisation of ultimate truth.
9. It confuses theory-postulation with personal-continuum description — the opponent has “built into his own Centrist tradition the view of the realisation of selflessness as it is held by the Substantivists.”
10. It imports Substantivist categorisation (Pure-Science vs Centrist defilements as separate) into a system that does not admit the distinction.
11. The opponent’s appeal to Bodhicaryāvatāra’s “even nirvana remains difficult for minds attended with objects” passage to justify the Hearer/Self-Buddha attaining only an “incomplete” path is itself misread (see MP 10 below).
12. In the rope-/ chariot-analogy frame, Rong Ston’s reading is decisive: “this mere ‘I’, its objective referent, which is the designative basis of a person, and the objective referent of the instinctual view with regard to a destructible (collection)” — for the Consequentialist there is no separate substantial designative base of the kind the opponent’s apparatus requires.

The polemical climax: “in this system a direct realization of the sixteen (categories), impermanence and so on, without the realization of Thatness is impossible … it seems that he has not even the clear intellect of a discursively analyzing, average modern graduate in religious studies” (p. 75 [Tib. 53]). cf. 3-the-first-ground-perfect-joy — Tsongkhapa’s actual Illuminating the Intent position (pp. 82–106) does affirm that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas realise emptiness (citing Bodhicaryāvatāra IX); MP 7’s target is therefore likely Tsongkhapa’s secondary doctrine that systematic Mahāyāna realisation differs in completeness, not the basic affirmation of dharma-nairātmya — Gorampa’s polemic here partly overshoots its target.

Moot-point 8 (pp. 65–66 [Tib. 45–46]) — sub-claim of MP 7’s third Tsongkhapa-refutation, addressing the opponent’s claim that on the Buddha ground entering and rising from Thatness becomes harder because mind and Thatness have become “uniform in experience.” Gorampa derives the consequence that on the Buddha ground entering and rising from Thatness cannot occur at all, and thereby that the opponent has implicitly accepted “that intellect in which these two have intermingled to become one in experience has not penetrated the true state of things, and that intellect which understands them as different has penetrated the true state of things.” This contradicts the standard Mahāyāna account of Buddha-cognition.

Moot-point 9 (pp. 70–73 [Tib. 49–52]) — on whether ordinary persons can directly realise the sixteen four-truth aspects without realising emptiness. Tsongkhapa’s two sub-positions are both rejected: (i) that ordinary trainees, having heard impermanence-suffering teachings, can directly realise sixteen aspects with great effort while not yet having realised emptiness — Gorampa: this is internally incoherent because direct realisation of the sixteen requires direct realisation of cessation, which requires direct realisation of ultimate truth; (ii) that “manifest defilements” are temporarily abandoned by such a path even before emptiness-realisation. Gorampa points out that “manifest defilements” in the Pure Science correspond to one set, and “manifest defilements” in the Centrist tradition correspond to another (nescience-attended-with-defilement and the views and non-views), and the opponent has confused the two. Gorampa quotes Rong Ston favourably: the Consequentialist has no separate substantial designative base.

Moot-point 10 (pp. 75–76 [Tib. 54]) — on the Bodhicaryāvatāra “even nirvana remains difficult for minds attended with objects” passage. Tsongkhapa: this proves a person can have eliminated defilements while not having realised Thatness. Gorampa: read the passage in light of the Uttaratantra’s teaching that hearer-arhats have given up coarse birth-old-age-sickness-death but not the subtle uncontaminated-action counterparts and the level of the habit-energy of nescience. They have not attained ultimate nirvāṇa. So the passage proves the opposite of what Tsongkhapa wants: it shows that without comprehensive dharma-nairātmya, there is residual obstruction.

Moot-point 11 (pp. 77–78 [Tib. 55–56]) — refutes Tsongkhapa’s “comprehensive vs concise” account of the Two Vehicles’ difference. Tsongkhapa: Universal and Individual Vehicles realise the same Thatness, but the Universal cultivates “many reasonings” while the Individual cultivates “one summarised reasoning”; the difference is “in the capacity to abandon obscurations.” Gorampa derives three damaging consequences:

1. On this view, intellectual keenness will be amiss in the Universal Vehicle and intellectual dullness in the Individual — the inverse of what the tradition holds — because the Universal has to cultivate many reasonings to grasp one Thatness, whereas the Individual succeeds with one.
2. The single object to be abandoned, the reality-habit, “cannot in two countless eons be abandoned by the one whose understanding of Thatness is extensive while the other (the Foe-Destroyer) can abandon it in three lives” — a reductio ad absurdum.
3. The presupposition that one person can “understand by means of many different reasonings a merely single object to be established” violates the path of logic itself, since after one reasoning establishes the conclusion all subsequent reasonings are redundant. The Centrist multi-reasoning corpus exists to address different antagonists, not to deepen the conclusion.

Moot-point 12 (pp. 79–87 [Tib. 56–63]; printed as a single moot-point but spanning two sub-sections) — a dense Sanskrit-grammatical excursus on the etymology of pāramitā (param + ita) and the Mind-Only / Centrist boundary in Haribhadra’s Abhisamayālaṃkāra tradition. Three grammatical errors in the opponent’s parsing are exposed:

1. The second-case singular am affixation is mishandled (the vowelless m added to param must combine with ita, but the opponent’s gloss treats the case marker as inappropriate).
2. The opponent’s misreading of “preshodar” (Sanskrit “preṣodara” — the term for euphonic contraction).
3. A self-contradiction between the opponent’s “after wisdom is adopted” reading and his “is mentioned as transcendence because it is like transcendence” reading.

The sub-issue concerns whether the meaning of “given up the adherence to external objects” in Haribhadra’s Ornament of Realisations commentary (the “Centrist or Mind-Only” question): the opponent has tried to leave both options open, but Gorampa shows the opponent’s own argument forces Haribhadra into the Mind-Only camp (“It follows that the meaning of this is the tradition of the Mind-Only school, because it is the commentarial tradition of Haribhadra”). The opponent’s Self-Buddha-as-Reality-realiser thesis also commits him to inconsistency with the Ornament. Five distinct sub-claims in this single MP — each grammatical and doctrinal — should be counted separately; see appendix.

Moot-point 13 (pp. 88–89 [Tib. 65]) — on the “three-factor apprehension” (agent / object / recipient of giving) on the first ground. The opponent (Tsongkhapa) takes giving on the first ground itself as falling under the “mundane” rather than the “supramundane” transcendence of giving when there is attachment to the three factors. Gorampa rejects on two grounds: (i) on the first ground (where direct cognition of selflessness already obtains) “an apprehension of reality is impossible” — the opponent has confused the post-meditational ordinary cognition (which has dualistic appearance) with the apprehension of reality (which is gone); (ii) the opponent’s deeper assumption that “just the apprehension of reality is all that is to be relinquished in the Centrist tradition, and that an apprehension of reality is prevalent on the grounds below the seventh” propagates as a thematic error throughout the Geluk system. The chapter closes with the moon-light example: the first ground is exemplified by the moon, gradually waxing through the subsequent grounds.

The Second Ground (Stainless)

Morality (śīla / ཚུལ་ཁྲིམས་) predominates. Gorampa parses śīla etymologically as “shita” (coolness, cessation of the fire of sin) and “kuśa” (virtue), explains the seven bodily-and-verbal abandonments + three motivating factors as the tenfold path of action, and treats lay versus monastic vow taking by way of the Jewel Heap discourse on the four “violations of morality” by ascetic monks who hold to a self. The chapter treats the maturation typology of the ten non-virtues from the Daśabhūmika (each non-virtue producing a hell, animal, or preta birth, and on subsequent human birth two further specific maturations — for instance, killing produces shortened lifespan and abundant disease).

Moot-point 14 (pp. 98–99 [Tib. 70]) — disputes a reading of MA II.8b. The opponent (apparatus uncertain — possibly Tsongkhapa, possibly an earlier Tibetan commentator) tries to harmonise Candrakīrti’s Catuḥśatakaṭīkā statement that “in the house where the auspicious dwells, the baneful without doubt also exists” with MA II’s statement that the bodhisattva of the second ground does not co-dwell with immorality. Gorampa shows the opponent has misconstrued: the Catuḥśatakaṭīkā passage means that whatever is contaminated is suffering — not that two persons “auspicious” and “baneful” co-dwell. Both commentaries are agreed on the synonymity of “baneful” and “inauspicious.” The second ground is exemplified by the moonlight.

The Third Ground (Luminous)

Patience (kṣānti / བཟོད་པ་) predominates, and a copper-coloured light is spiritually seen. The chapter walks through kṣānti via the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra and Maitreya-praṇidhāna, treats the disadvantages of impatience (citing the Mañjuśrīvikrīḍita on anger destroying merit accumulated in 100 eons, and the Bodhicaryāvatāra on 1000 eons — Gorampa harmonises the discrepancy via the directional asymmetry of bodhisattva-anger versus ordinary-anger toward bodhisattvas).

Moot-point 15 (pp. 107–108 [Tib. 73–74]) — on Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti’s designation of the truth of cessation alone as ultimate. Tsongkhapa attempts to harmonise the passage by reading it as a temporary “thinning out” of manifest defilements via mundane concentrations and formless equipoises, in line with Asaṅga’s Bodhisattvabhūmi. Gorampa derives two consequences: (i) on the first ground “not all nine meditative equipoises have been achieved” — but the opponent has elsewhere accepted that a first-ground Bodhisattva has all nine; (ii) the opponent’s separate-defilement-categorisation (Pure Science defilements vs Centrist defilements) confuses theory-postulation with mode-of-actual-existence. The third ground is exemplified by the light of the sun.

The Fourth Ground (Radiant)

Diligence (vīrya / བརྩོན་འགྲུས་) predominates.

Moot-point 16 (pp. 110–111 [Tib. 75]) — opens the disagreement that will dominate the sixth ground. Tsongkhapa: on the fourth ground “the seeds of the two forms of self-habit which on this ground are the objects to be given up have been given up, but not that they are entirely exhausted.” Gorampa treats as “truly astonishing” the position that a Bodhisattva who directly cognises the natural state could still openly possess a reality-habit apprehending a person as real, and warns that “this wrong theory-system pervades whatever is said before or later” — i.e. this small disagreement at the fourth ground is the visible tip of the systematic Geluk reading he will combat across MA VI. (cf. 9-identifying-the-object-of-negation on Tsongkhapa’s distinction between innate and acquired grasping at true existence — Gorampa’s MP 16 essentially refuses the cogency of the innate-grasping-up-to-7th-ground apparatus.)

The Fifth Ground (Difficult to Conquer)

Brief: meditative concentration (dhyāna / བསམ་གཏན་) predominates.

Moot-point 17 (p. 113 [Tib. 76]) — turns on the ultimate-versus-superficial status of the truths. Gorampa accepts the Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti statement that the truth of cessation is ultimate and the other three superficial, but rules that this cannot be Tsongkhapa’s final position because Tsongkhapa has elsewhere asserted “that an ordinary person who has not perceived Thatness directly perceives the sixteen (categories) of the four truths, viz. impermanence and so forth” — a position incompatible with the cessation-as-ultimate reading. The internal contradiction is decisive.

The Sixth Ground (The Advancing One)

By far the longest section. Moot-points 18–52 cluster here, covering the negation of arising according to the four alternatives, the two-truths exposition (MA VI.23–29), the Cittamātra refutation (MA VI.34–97), the negation of the personal self (MA VI.120 ff.), and the explanation of emptiness in its sixteen and four divisions. The opening situates the sixth ground as the place where the bodhisattva attains the cessation in which all conceptual elaborations have ceased, on the basis of the perfection of wisdom that has now become predominant. Gorampa quotes Candrakīrti’s autocommentary: the noumenal nature does “not lie within the domain of (people like) us, whose eyes of intelligence are entirely covered with a thick layer of nescience” (p. 116 [Tib. 78]), and reads this as Candrakīrti’s deliberate humility-trope — Candrakīrti himself had attained the grounds before composing MA — inserted “in order that in this way the pride in future writers and commentators might be subdued.”

The chapter is structured by the Daśabhūmika’s “ten equalities of things” (marklessness, characteristiclessness, non-arising, non-producedness, isolation, primordial purity, absence of elaborations, absence of object-to-be-adopted-or-abandoned, equality with illusion-dream-hallucination-echo-water-moon-reflection-emanation, and equality of having-neither-existence-nor-non-existence). Eight are ultimate equalities; the ninth (illusion etc.) is superficial; the tenth straddles. Then Nāgārjuna’s MMK 1.1 tetralemma (“not from self, not from other, not from both, not without cause”) is identified as the rational structure for the chapter, generating the two-school division between Buddhapālita’s prasaṅga method and Bhāviveka’s svatantra method.

MA VI.1–7 — preliminaries; the most extended methodological refutation (MPs 18–19)

Moot-points 18–19 (pp. 127–149 [Tib. 87–98]) constitute Gorampa’s most extended methodological refutation: the rejection of the Geluk account of the difference between Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika. Tsongkhapa holds that the Svātantrika negatee is “establishment without being merely nominally imputed,” while the Prāsaṅgika negatee is the deeper “establishment by virtue of appearing to the mind.” (cf. 9-identifying-the-object-of-negation for Tsongkhapa’s positive presentation, which has the Svātantrika identification given first as “great skilful means” and the Prāsaṅgika identification as the subtler view; pp. 110+ in the Tsongkhapa source page.) Gorampa’s refutation in MP 18 contains roughly seven distinct sub-claims, and MP 19 four further sub-claims, plus Gorampa’s own positive account (the six-fold reasoning differences and three-fold conventional differences). I enumerate them.

MP 18 — refutation of Tsongkhapa’s two-negatee account:

1. Bhāviveka self-contradicts the Geluk reading: Bhāviveka does accept external objects as established with intrinsic essence, intrinsic identity, and intrinsic reality; the proposed “manner of settlement not established by virtue of appearing to the mind” therefore cannot be Bhāviveka’s negatee. The opponent’s characterisation is internally inconsistent.
2. The Svātantrika part-and-whole reasoning the opponent invokes is misread: in no Svātantrika treatise is “parts and possessor of parts as a single essence” established by a reasoning establishing realitylessness; the treatises only establish absence of unity-and-plurality.
3. The chariot/parts case forces a reductio: if the opponent’s logic holds, then chariot and components, self and aggregates, would all be seen as separate essences — but the opponent has accepted in his own commentary on this text that the fivefold heterodox view of an essential difference between self and aggregates is not listed among the views concerning a destructible collection.
4. The “negatee of the Consequentialist tradition” claim that this is a “non-mere-nominal-establishment” reduces to a mere thesis without proof: the Consequentialist negatee is the six (reality, ultimate-existence, etc.); both Consequentialist and Svātantrika alike find no referent on the strength of nominal designation when sought by ultimate analysis, so the proposed marker fails to differentiate.
5. The proposed “third option” mind that grasps neither extreme contradicts the Prajñāpāramitā itself (“when one engages in the statement, ‘Form is empty,’ he engages in marks; when one engages in the statement, ‘It is not empty,’ he engages in marks”).
6. It contradicts Maitreya (“a discriminative awareness which applies the aggregates of form, etc., to emptiness is unacceptable”).
7. It contradicts Nāgārjuna’s MMK 18 negation of all four extremes (“you deigned to show the nectar of emptiness in order that all views might be relinquished. But you rebuked those who adhere even to this”) and Āryadeva (“non-existence is incomplete (emptiness). The deluded ones adhere (to this)”).

MP 19 — refutation of further Tsongkhapa attempts to draw the Prāsaṅgika–Svātantrika line by other markers:

8. The opponent’s “Own-Continuum school must establish things by their own characteristics, and therefore employs reasons of an own continuum; the Consequentialist school does not” — Gorampa: this is incoherent, because on this logic the Own-Continuum school would also need things established by their own characteristics in order to negate the four-alternatives-arising. The marker fails.
9. To differentiate by acceptance/non-acceptance of own-continuum reasons in the conventional fails because also in the Consequentialist school there exist many proofs based on logical subjects established as commonly given for both disputants (smoke proving fire, lineage signs, irreversibility signs). The opponent’s “the meaning of own-continuum is independence, and the meaning of independence is reality-status” propagates as a baseless slogan.

Gorampa’s positive account (pp. 145–149 [Tib. 95–98]):

10. The principal difference is the reasoning method: Buddhapālita uses prasaṅga; Bhāviveka uses svatantra. From this six grammatical-logical differences derive — logical subject, predicate, thesis, reason, example, syllogism — each spelled out at length.
11. Plus three conventional-side differences (basis, path, result), each yielding sub-positions: (a) basis: non-acceptance/acceptance of arising-from-other in the conventional, of common substratum of created and non-deceptive, of the non-deceptive as characteristic of pramāṇa, of two vs four pramāṇa, of authentic-vs-perverted at object/subject; (b) path: whether Hearers/Self-Buddhas penetrate objective selflessness, whether holy meditative balance is appearance-free or not; (c) result: whether on the Buddha ground separate meditative balance and aftermath exist.

Sakya Paṇḍita is cited as the locus classicus: “to postulate the non-deceptive in the conventional is the logicians’ tradition, the Own-Continuum school partially tallies with this, and the Consequentialist school does not postulate a reality in the conventional.”

MA VI.8–22 — refutation of arising

The arising-from-self refutation (MA VI.8–13) draws on Buddhapālita’s “an arising would be pointless” prasaṅga, with Candrakīrti’s added “an arising would have no chance” supplement, the “endless arising” supplement, the “muddled cause-result natures” supplement, and the “mutual conceptual equality” supplement. The arising-from-other refutation (MA VI.14–22) is then mounted via the Yuktiṣaṣṭikā “if there is a difference of cause and result, a cause would be equal to a non-cause” reasoning, an examination by time (separate-time non-difference, simultaneous-time non-arising), and an examination by the four combinations (existent-result, non-existent-result, both-result, neither-result).

MA VI.23–29 — the two-truths division and the load-bearing MA VI.23 reductio (MPs 20–24)

Moot-point 20 (pp. 173–175 [Tib. 113–115]) — the load-bearing verse-level reductio of Tsongkhapa’s “the two truths are one in nature but aspectively separate, like being produced and being impermanent” doctrine, with its supporting Bodhicittavivaraṇa citation. (cf. 11-the-two-truths — Tsongkhapa’s positive presentation: “the two truths are two natures of a single entity, not two different entities … identical in nature (ངོ་བོ་གཅིག་) but distinct conceptual identities (ལྡོག་པ་ཐ་དད་), like ‘being produced’ and ‘being impermanent.’“) Gorampa quotes the entire Tsongkhapa passage verbatim, then refutes it on five distinct interlocking grounds:

1. Collapse of the truths: if the two truths are a single nature, then “the nature found by a delusive perception is the nature found by an authentic perception.”
2. Collapse of the cognitions: “what is found by a delusive perception is found by an authentic perception … there can be no difference between the procedures whereby these two find the nature of the object.”
3. Collapse of the designative basis: if both natures inhere in one entity (e.g. a sprout), “the meditative balance of the holy perceives the very basis which is found by a delusive perception, and a delusive perception … causes the establishment of the very basis found by an authentic perception.”
4. The bden grub qualifier becomes mandatory and self-defeating: “in order to establish the emptiness of an intrinsic essence, it is necessary that one add the qualification ‘in the ultimate sense’ to the negatee, because as conventions the two truths are not empty of an intrinsic essence.” Gorampa derives the bden grub qualifier as a cost of the underlying error.
5. Re-reading the Nāgārjuna citation: “what ‘produced’ and ‘impermanent’ epitomise is the non-existence of separate natures, but not (the existence of) a single nature, for a Centrist Consequentialist accepts neither a single nature nor separate natures in things established in contingency upon each other.”

The whole reductio is re-applied at MA VI.29 (p. 188 [Tib. 125]) via the autocommentary’s hairs-in-bell-metal image: “this text [MA] also negates that the two truths are a single nature, because the two — the absence and the presence of hairs in a dish of bell-metal — are impossible in a single nature.”

Moot-point 21 (p. 178 [Tib. 116]) — addresses the Geluk distinction between an “authentic” and “false” superficial as a Svātantrika-vs-Prāsaṅgika tag. Tsongkhapa-school: “the terms ‘authentic superficial’ and ‘false superficial’ are the tradition of the Own-Continuum school, whereas the Consequentialist school accepts a ‘superficial that is true for the world alone’ and a ‘superficial that is false for the world alone’.” Gorampa’s responses:

1. The opponent’s argument relies on the contradiction-of-terms charge (“when something is authentic, it is a contradiction to say it is superficial”), but the same charge applies symmetrically to “true superficial” — so the opponent’s own preferred terms are equally faulty.
2. The autocommentary itself divides the delusive perception into two sub-types (authentic vs delusive perception of organs free from impediments vs hampered by them).
3. Direct primary-text appeal to the early Pa Tshab lineage: “Earlier great experts in the Consequentialist tradition, such as Atiśa and his followers, Zang Thang Sag pa and his followers … set up their systems without drawing a separating distinction in terms of a right and wrong designation between the Consequentialist school and the Own-Continuum school. Therefore, in keeping with them, we should accept that there is no difference.” This is the strongest primary-text statement in Removal of the Sakya genealogy that excludes Tsongkhapa’s terminology.

Moot-point 22 (pp. 172–174 [Tib. 119–120]) — long technical refutation of Tsongkhapa’s treatment of MA VI.26 on non-Buddhist conceptual objects. Tsongkhapa had distinguished between (a) non-Buddhist three-quality theories that don’t even superficially exist, (b) ordinary blue/sound that “must” exist as appearing-to-sense-consciousness even though not established by intrinsic identity, and (c) reflections that must be accepted “as an experiential medium of form” because Candrakīrti elsewhere says reflections generate the consciousness that sees them. Gorampa rejects the entire structure with five sub-claims:

1. The opponent has confused the superficial truth of the world (which excludes both the conceptual-object of faulty-organs and the mistaken object of misknowledge) with conventional truth simpliciter.
2. From the opponent’s logic it follows that “the appearing object of a consciousness of organs free of faults and that of a consciousness of faulty organs are equal in that both do not exist,” because both are mistaken with regard to their respective appearing object.
3. The opponent’s division of superficial truth into “true for the world alone” / “false even for the world” is unsustainable: by his logic, magical illusions and reflections (which are objects of faulty-organ consciousness) cannot even be conventional truths.
4. The opponent’s claim that reflections are external objects (justified by Candrakīrti’s saying reflections generate the consciousness that sees them) is inconsistent with his own earlier denial that Candrakīrti accepts a sense-consciousness in dreams.
5. Gorampa’s own systematic position: “the whole false superficial is superficial truth, but it is not that it exists as convention. There is no concomitance of superficial-truth-and-existence; there is a concomitance of conventional-truth-and-existence.” This is the operative distinction Gorampa proposes against the Geluk apparatus.

Moot-point 23 (p. 175 [Tib. 121]) — extends the dispute to the term pramāṇa itself. Tsongkhapa-school applies “validating rational cognition” (tshad ma) to the post-meditational cognition of the holy ones at MA VI.27. Gorampa rules: “such a presentation is not appropriate, because a validating rational cognition is an inference based upon reason.” The “stainless mind” of MA VI.27d is the exalted knowledge of the meditative equipoise — not Dharmakīrtian inference. This continues the Atiśa anti-pramāṇa Madhyamaka recovery already documented at apple-jewels-middle-way-2018. cf. 9-identifying-the-object-of-negation on Tsongkhapa’s reframing of pramāṇa not as foundationalist (Dignāgan unique-particulars) but as still admitting a pramāṇic vocabulary for ārya cognition; Gorampa treats this entire move as illegitimate.

Moot-point 24 (pp. 185–186 [Tib. 122–123]) — at MA VI.28 on saṃvṛti, one of the sharpest passages in the book and the first place Tsongkhapa is named at the apparatus level. Two distinct moves:

1. Saṃvṛti applies to objective compositional factors, not only subjective truth-habit: against the Geluk reading of saṃvṛti as merely the subjective truth-habit, Gorampa insists it includes the objective compositional factors that obscure the post-meditational state of the three holy persons: “the objective aspects, (or) the compositional factors, which to the three holy persons appear in their post-meditational (state) also obscure the authentic, because, having emerged on the strength of residues of duality appearance, they obscure the appearance-free meditative equipoise.” (cf. 11-the-two-truths on Tsongkhapa’s “deferring to the world” / “unanalysed conventional cognition” framing — which Gorampa here treats as obscuring what should be the objective meaning of saṃvṛti.)
2. The “eighth-ground-only” thesis: “Somebody asserts that the eighth ground functions as the lowest limit for Bodhisattvas who have given up nescience along with the emotional afflictions. However, he thus casts aspersion on the path of the Universal Vehicle. For he has accepted that the Hearers can eliminate the truth-habit by cultivating selflessness in three lives, but that in the Universal Vehicle it cannot be eliminated in spite of its cultivation in one countless eon … This tradition of the Geshe Bio (Bzang Grags pa), one among the Tibetan exegetical traditions of the ‘Introduction’, abounds in utterly serious errors.” This is the passage where Tsongkhapa is named outright at the apparatus level.

MA VI.32–33 — the zhig pa dngos po dispute opens

Moot-point 25 (pp. 182–183 [Tib. 126–127]) — at MA VI.32–33 launches Gorampa’s first major attack on the Geluk zhig pa dngos po / med dgag doctrine — the position that absolute negation of one inconsistent thing positively establishes its opposite. Gorampa derives the consequence that “a seed exists at the time of its sprout, because it is not non-existent.” The argument exposes the reductio at the verse-level. (cf. 12-the-merits-of-negation for Tsongkhapa’s three-consequences reading of MA 6.34–36 against intrinsic characteristic, and the gzhan stong refutation; the zhig pa doctrine is the heart of Tsongkhapa’s positive account that emptiness is itself an entity-of-elimination preventing nihilism.)

MA VI.34 ff. — the Cittamātra refutation, target identification, and the long zhig pa refutation

Moot-point 26 (p. 187 [Tib. 130]) — names the disagreement directly. Tsongkhapa: the opponent of MA VI.34 ff. is in part a covert Svātantrika strawman. Gorampa: “Somebody, ignorant of this meaning, identifies the exponent of the preceding position with an Own-Continuum Centrist.” This is rejected with two sub-claims:

1. The autocommentary itself states that “an exponent of the Own-Continuum school does not accept an arising in the ultimate sense, after all” — making it impossible for the MA VI.34 opponent (who does assert ultimate-sense arising) to be a Svātantrika.
2. Tsongkhapa’s interpretive move that the Mind-Only school does not assert that emptiness is seen “by way of the repudiation of an other-powered intrinsic reality” misses the autocommentary’s systematic structural point: the Centrist is showing the Mind-Only position has a discrepancy between its account of true-nature and its account of the grasping pattern of the holy ones.

Moot-point 27 (p. 189 [Tib. 132]) — refutes a “pseudo-Centrist” (apparatus: not Tsongkhapa, but a fellow-traveller — perhaps Gyaltsap, perhaps an early-Tibetan figure) who has misread MA VI.34. Opponent: “if a vase were empty of a vase, no vase could exist in a vase. Because it itself would not exist in itself … a vase would prove totally non-existent.” Gorampa: “That one who is plagued with a mind apprehensive that when a vase is empty of an intrinsic essence it would be totally non-existent, pretends to be a Centrist, this is really surprising!” Three sub-claims: (i) the opponent’s mind already comprehends a vase as empty of intrinsic essence and yet existing; (ii) what then is the “essence of vase” the opponent imagines is the negatee?; (iii) the opponent’s structure presupposes that intrinsic essence of vase is itself a “reality of vase” without being a vase — a contradiction.

Moot-point 28 (pp. 199–222 [Tib. 138–149]) — the longest single moot-point in the entire book. A more than twenty-page systematic destruction of the Geluk zhig pa dngos po doctrine. The opponent’s position is quoted verbatim across a long block: “for the Centrist system, which does not posit a reality-status, destruction is established as an entity … the destruction of the first moment in the next is necessarily perceived after the direct elimination of the negatee. Thus, since it is a negation without, however, being an absolute negation, it is an implicative negation, for it does not merely eliminate the matter that is to be destroyed, but brings forth the single entity of its elimination.” This is named polemic against “Geshe Tsong Ba” and is the second place Tsongkhapa is named at the apparatus level.

Gorampa structures the refutation under four poetic headings — “systematic removal of dust heaps,” “rain of further harming reasonings,” “thunder of contrary reasoning,” and “dragon-roar” — yielding eight specific consequences. Each is a distinct claim:

1. Consequence of arising from what is different: action and result rent asunder by an entity-destruction would be different essences, entailing arising-from-other, which the Centrist negates.
2. Consequence of generation without contact: the destruction-as-entity rends cause and result, so cause must generate result without contact — but contact-and-non-contact were both negated in earlier MA VI texts.
3. Parity of contradiction with other supposed bridge-bases: all the contradictions stated against general basis, retentiveness, and attainment apply equally to zhig pa dngos po. Why should this one bridge succeed where the others fail?
4. Graver fault than other positions: zhig pa dngos po is a heterodox-Vaiśeṣika tenet not held by any prior Buddhist school; even the Vaibhāṣika do not assert each destruction is an entity.
5. Consequence of space being filled with destructions: the entity-destruction at moment 2 implies an entity-destruction-of-the-destruction at moment 3, and so on, multiplying without bound until “the entire sphere of space would be filled with these destructions of a single destroyed entity.”
6. Consequence of impossibility of a dependence of the uncreated: the svabhāvakāya would be created, since by the opponent’s logic the cultivation of the four trainings as cause produces the Essence Body as result-as-entity.
7. Inevitability of a further fruition apart from the fruition: a destroyed action’s destruction-as-entity persists after the result obtains, so it produces another result — generating an infinite regress of fruitions from a single action.
8. A fatal identity-or-difference dilemma: this entity of destruction of a destroyed action must be either essentially identical with the action or different from it. Identity makes the action not destroyed; difference makes the destruction-entity essentially different from the result, blocking dependent arising.

The moot-point closes with explicit, named polemic: “It is inconsistent with what has previously been accepted … This Geshe Tsong Ba thus displays skill, but in all his theory-systems only (things of) this kind are to be found. Therefore, his followers should by all means consult authoritative scriptures and conduct analytic examinations.” This is the strongest named attack on Tsongkhapa in the entire text.

MA VI.39 ff. — the ālayavijñāna / general-basis dispute

Moot-points 29–32 treat the general-basis dispute. Each is brief but distinct.

Moot-point 29 (p. 222 [Tib. 156]) — refutes Tsongkhapa-school’s claim that accepting a general basis entails Cittamātra (no external objects). Gorampa: the same parity-argument applies to bare acceptance of “mind” itself; the opponent’s structure equally fails. Opposing scriptural citation: Bodhicittavivaraṇa’s “the consciousness perceives the object of consciousness. Without object of consciousness there is no consciousness.”

Moot-point 30 (p. 224 [Tib. 158]) — refutes the view that general-basis acceptance is incompatible with the action-result connection. Gorampa: the general basis is not the substantial bearer of action-result; conventional acceptance of general basis as support of action-result is allowed because “that sort of general basis [the substantially-real Cittamātra one] is not accepted.” The action-result connection in the Centrist tradition rests on action’s not arising in terms of intrinsic reality.

Moot-point 31 (p. 226 [Tib. 159]) — refutes Tsongkhapa’s reading of the scriptural “load carrier is the person” passage. Tsongkhapa would read in the qualifier “substantially existent” (so the negation is of a “substantially-existent person”). Gorampa: “If the load carrier is not (even) laid down to such an extent, does a middle son of a barren woman carry a load of rabbit horns which is tied with a rope (made) of the hairs of a turtoise, then?” The qualifier-insertion strategy generalises in absurd ways: by parity it would have to be inserted into “all those teachings in which a sentient being, creature or person are taught, are known as (being of) interpretable sense” — but no Centrist accepts this universal qualifier-insertion.

Moot-point 32 (p. 227 [Tib. 160]) — corrects Tsongkhapa’s reading of the Tarkajvālā on the “School of the Eastern Mountain.” Tsongkhapa: this splinter Mahāsāṅghika school had a fully elucidated dharma-nairātmya in the Hearer canon. Gorampa: this is “diametrically opposite to the explicit statement in this commentary that such a (teaching) does not exist,” and Tsongkhapa “even has himself accepted it this way, on that occasion” — i.e., is internally inconsistent across his own oeuvre. The “acts of accommodation to the world” are taught from the side of the conventional, but a full elucidation of dharma-nairātmya in the Hearer canon is not there.

MA VI.45–97 — the long Cittamātra refutation, with focus on Tsongkhapa’s exotic dream-form doctrine (MPs 33–43)

Moot-point 33 (p. 233 [Tib. 163]) — Tsongkhapa-school: Candrakīrti’s confutation-by-similarity-of-reason on subject-and-object is to be read as making the negatees on each side different (so the parity does not actually hold). Gorampa: the parity holds. The dream-consciousness (without the elephant object) must proceed by either the true superficial or the false superficial. Either horn forces the parity:

1. If true superficial — then the dream-consciousness is a consciousness of faulty organs (which would be absurd).
2. If false superficial — then the elephant object also exists in the false superficial, because it is the object of a consciousness of faulty organs.

So the negatees are not different.

Moot-points 34–36 (pp. 236–238 [Tib. 165–167]) — address Tsongkhapa’s exotic doctrine that dream-form is a “form of the experiential medium of (mental) phenomena” (one of the five dharmāyatana-rūpa in Abhidharma). Several sub-claims.

MP 34 (pp. 236–237) — Tsongkhapa: “the three factors of the four (ear to body) are false because they appear when they do not exist; the three factors of the mind are false in a different way (they exist in dream but appear as if having intrinsic reality).” Gorampa rejects: this is a covert acceptance of conventional existence of mental-consciousness in dream, which Candrakīrti denies. He also notes Bcom Ldan Rig Ral’s earlier ill-considered attempt to refute this same position from a different angle.

MP 35 (p. 237) — Tsongkhapa: when Bhāviveka says the form-in-dream example “is not established,” he is implicitly accepting that dream-form is established by intrinsic identity. Gorampa: the autocommentary’s meaning is the opposite — dream-object and dream-consciousness equally do not exist conventionally, so the example fails for both sides. Tsongkhapa is “casting aspersion on the great Indian savant” by making Bhāviveka more naive than ordinary persons who already call dream-elephants unreal.

MP 36 (p. 238) — Tsongkhapa: dream-forms are imaginatively-constructed (one of five dharmāyatana-rūpa sub-types) because in dream there are no sense-consciousnesses, so the five appear in mental consciousness alone. Gorampa: the same logic forces sound, smell, etc., to be experiential-medium-of-mental-phenomena — but this is not the Pure Science category Tsongkhapa is invoking; the system collapses.

Moot-points 37–39 (pp. 247–254 [Tib. 169–177]) — Tsongkhapa’s elaborate counter-position on the never-satisfied spirits’ “pus” perception. Multiple sub-claims.

MP 37 (p. 247) — Tsongkhapa: the form-in-dream that is the object of a faulty visual consciousness is a form of the experiential medium of (mental) phenomena. Gorampa: this gets the Pure Science arrangements mixed up; either dream-form is a form of the experiential medium of phenomena (a Pure-Science object) — but then the visual-consciousness of the dream becomes mental-consciousness from the waking-state perspective, since the reason is the same.

MP 38 (p. 253) — Tsongkhapa explains the autocommentary’s “match with the previous reply” sense as the content matching (illusions, reflections, etc., as parallel examples). Gorampa: the meaning is rather “the procedure of a reply already given is also similar as a reply here” — i.e., redundant, not parallel. Tsongkhapa has “diversified the subject.”

MP 39 (p. 254) — Tsongkhapa’s elaborate doctrine that the never-satisfied spirits’ pus is an experiential-medium-of-phenomena imaginative-construction form, with the mantra-and-iron example, the “different parts of one stream” rationalisation, and the Suhṛllekha “even the moon is hot in summer” passage. Gorampa runs through six damaging consequences:

1. The example fails: the mantric mind doesn’t make a new tangible-object arise; it merely renders the existing one non-burning.
2. Parity-of-validating-cognition consequence: the visual consciousness of one with cataract and one without would not differ in being pramāṇa or not — but obviously they do.
3. Object-side parity consequence: for hell-denizens, the stream-of-water appearing as fire would consequently not be a part of the stream of water (because it is fire); for gods, it would not be part (because it is space); the conch seen as yellow would not be the colour of the conch — and Tsongkhapa has accepted these consequences indirectly by accepting the never-satisfied-spirit case.
4. Illusion-mantra consequence: horses and elephants in the small clay vessel of the magician’s illusion would on the strength of mantras and drugs actually arise as real horses and elephants.
5. Sharp/non-sharp-from-distance consequence: the single form of a vase seen at close range and from afar would entail two objective forms arising anew.
6. Multifarious-flattening consequence: tangible-objects of all four elements would exist as the tangible-objects of each element; all five colours as colours of each colour; effigy-as-newly-arisen-man, etc. — flattening of all distinctions.

The moot-point culminates in the apostrophe: “Geshe Bio Ba, please do not spread such a new form of substantivism by telling students that you explain the Middle, or one (Middle)!” This is the third explicit naming of Tsongkhapa.

Moot-points 40–42 (pp. 266–268 [Tib. 184–187]) — apperceptive self-consciousness (svasaṃvitti) at MA VI.73–76. Multiple sub-claims.

MP 40 (p. 266) — opponent: “the reason of recollection establishes neither a substantially-established svasaṃvitti nor a conventional svasaṃvitti.” Gorampa: this misses Candrakīrti’s argumentative pattern — the master is making a bare invariable-concomitance point, namely that conventional recollection does not necessarily prove conventional svasaṃvitti, even though in the Centrist system conventional svasaṃvitti is accepted. The opponent has confused the failure of the proof with the failure of the conclusion.

MP 41 (p. 268) — opponent: from the autocommentary’s “both are not different” (regarding experience and recollection), the experienced object and the recollected object are a single essence. Gorampa: the same logic would then force the recollecting subject and experiencing subject to be a single essence — which the opponent does not accept. Conventional categorical differences obtain even where ultimate-analysis difference fails.

MP 42 (p. 268) — opponent: the references from the Root Wisdom, Vigrahavyāvartanī, and Lucid Exposition (which refute svasaṃvitti as withstanding rational analysis) refute all conventional svasaṃvitti. Gorampa: this is wrong, and produces three damaging consequences:

1. From Root Wisdom VII.8–12 (the light-illumines-itself analogy): if it refutes conventional self-illumination, then darkness cannot even conventionally be dispelled (since the same passage refutes both).
2. From Vigrahavyāvartanī: if it refutes the validating cognitions establishing themselves, then anything within the sphere of validating cognition is conventionally totally non-existent.
3. From Lucid Exposition: if it refutes the mind being found as object of experience, then the very mind, as object of experience, does not even conventionally exist.

The Laṅkāvatāra sword-cannot-cut-its-own-blade analogy is also misapplied: simulation of examples in the context of rational analysis frequently occurs (e.g., Āryadeva’s lotus-in-the-sky), and if read at the conventional level produces absurdities (a lotus in the sky would conventionally exist, because unity and plurality conventionally exist).

Moot-point 43 (p. 278 [Tib. 192]) — addresses the Cittamātra “alone” (mātra) interpretation. Opponent insists “alone” excludes external objects but admits form, sound, etc., as mind-internal. Gorampa points to the detailed earlier refutations in MA VI.45–82, which already rule out this reading.

MA VI.120–165 — the personal selflessness section (MPs 44–50)

The personal selflessness section walks through the sevenfold chariot analysis (refutation of self as different from / identical with / supporting / supported / possessing / configuration / mere-conglomerate of the aggregates).

Moot-point 44 (p. 305 [Tib. 209]) — Tsongkhapa’s reading of the Tarkajvālā on the relation of mind-consciousness to self. Tsongkhapa: Bhāviveka’s “the consciousness is the self because the consciousness takes rebirth” makes the skandhas the characteristic basis of the self. Gorampa: this would entail Bhāviveka holding the Sammitīya identity-of-self-and-aggregates view — which Bhāviveka does not hold. The aggregates are accepted as designative base for Bhāviveka, not characteristic base. The opponent has confused the two roles, and a parallel confusion would force the eight substantial atoms in lower-school Substantivist systems to be the characteristic base of a vase (which no school holds). cf. 17-the-selflessness-of-persons for Tsongkhapa’s positive position on the self as mere designation on the aggregates and the careful distinction between innate “I”-grasping and satkāyadṛṣṭi. Gorampa’s MP 44 is a sharper line-drawing than Tsongkhapa actually requires.

Moot-point 45 (p. 309 [Tib. 211]) — opponent: Candrakīrti’s seven absurd consequences (MA VI.127–129) do not apply to “bare diversity-or-essential-oneness,” only to one-with-absolutely-no-difference. Gorampa: this destroys the main pillar of the Nāgārjuna–Āryadeva system, which accepts neither single-essence nor different-essence of phenomena established in dependence upon each other. The Sautrāntika on this issue agree with Gorampa — they regard produced and impermanent as essentially one but cannot admit them as a single unit with absolutely no differentiation.

Moot-points 46–49 (pp. 319–326 [Tib. 218–225]) — address the difference between intellectual and instinctual self-habits and the structure of the twenty views concerning the destructible collection (satkāya-dṛṣṭi).

MP 46 (p. 319) — opponent: at the time of the realisation that the intellectual self does not exist, the realisation of the non-existence of the instinctual self is not possible (because that intellectual self is not the instinctual self). Gorampa: this generalises absurdly — by the same logic, the refutation of arising via the four alternatives would not debar the arising which is the object of the instinctual truth-habit (citing Rong Ston). The point is: all schools that posit an intellectual self accept that, when the instinctual self is rationally sought, it is simply the intellectual self. Refuting the intellectual self entails refuting the instinctual self.

MP 47 (p. 321) — opponent: a qualifier “in terms of an intrinsic reality” must be added to “the self does not exist as the supported in the aggregates or vice versa,” lest the conventional be destroyed. Gorampa: this contradicts Candrakīrti’s earlier refutations of Bhāviveka’s qualifier-insertion at the time of refuting self-arising; the same reasonings apply here.

MP 48 (p. 322) — opponent: a parallel qualifier-insertion for the self-which-possesses-the-aggregates. Gorampa: same fault.

MP 49 (p. 326) — opponent’s reading of MA VI.145c “the basic view (concerning a) destructible (collection) which along with the twenty is given up by the Stream-Enterer is also intellectually constructed” — making a basic satkāya-dṛṣṭi into an intellectual construct, separate from and supported by the twenty peaks. Gorampa: this is incompatible with Rong Ston, with the autocommentary’s diamond-mountain image, and with the opponent’s own claim that the basic view is given up with the twenty.

Moot-point 50 (p. 335 [Tib. 228]) — corrects a misreading of the chariot analysis at MA VI.155 on shape-as-chariot. Opponent: the designative-things exist as independent substances; even in the conglomerate-and-shape context, a conglomerate-regarded-as-designatively-existent is the designative-base of a shape. Gorampa: this is inconsistent with the autocommentary, which has the opponent there (whom Candrakīrti refutes) accepting substantial existence of external components. The chapter closes with the inexpressible-self refutation against the Vatsīputrīya position (MA VI.146–149) and the establishment of the dependently-designated person.

MA VI.179–223 — the explanation of emptiness (MPs 51–52)

Moot-point 51 (p. 353 [Tib. 238]) — corrects an opponent’s reading of “comprehensiveness lacking in the hearers’ cultivation of objective selflessness.” Opponent: it lacks comprehensiveness “in terms of number and time.” Gorampa derives the consequence that on the opponent’s reading, hearer-arhats would not have a remedy for the cognitive obscuration — because the opponent has elsewhere held there is no remedy for the cognitive obscuration on the seven impure grounds. Either a vast-time cultivation is needed for emotional-affliction elimination, or it is not — and either horn damages the position. cf. 19-enumerations-of-emptiness — Tsongkhapa’s actual treatment of svabhāva and the sixteen-emptinesses programme accepts the “comprehensiveness in number and time” account, which Gorampa is here directly attacking.

Moot-point 52 (p. 355 [Tib. 240]) — Pa Tshab vs Nag Tsho translation dispute over MA VI.182 (“not being stable” vs “not being destroyed”) and on the implications of the Sanskrit kudeshta (“piled up, collected, produced”). Gorampa rules in favour of Pa Tshab. (The opponent here is preferring Nag Tsho — not Tsongkhapa specifically, though the apparatus suggests the dGongs pa rab gsal sided with Nag Tsho’s reading; Gorampa is here defending the Pa Tshab translation lineage of the Sakya tradition.) The chapter ends with the qualities obtained by this procedure: understanding of the ultimate sense (MA VI.224), of the superficial (VI.225), and of the pair-yoking of both (VI.226).

The Seventh Ground (Gone Afar)

Brief. The bodhisattva enters and rises from the meditative equipoise of cessation in a single moment of mind — a Daśabhūmika statement. The transcendence of beneficial expediency (upāya-kauśalya) predominates; Gorampa cites Maitreyanātha’s Madhyāntavibhāga on the four-fold subdivision of wisdom into expediency, prayer, power, and spontaneous wisdom, and Haribhadra on “four transcendences are included in the transcendence of wisdom.”

The Eighth Ground (Unwavering)

Moot-points 53–55 cluster here.

Moot-point 53 (p. 372 [Tib. 251]) — Tsongkhapa’s reading of the Daśabhūmika’s “Son of the lineage! Well done, well done!” passage on rising from the non-conceptual wisdom. Tsongkhapa: even hearer-arhats and self-buddha-arhats “attain the non-conceptual spontaneous wisdom which directly perceives the ultimate Reality” and so equally are admonished by the Buddhas to amass the Buddha-power-causing virtues. Gorampa rejects on two grounds:

1. On rising from the meditative balance, the non-conceptual wisdom “would have to cease” — making the Daśabhūmika’s acknowledgement-and-injunction structure incoherent.
2. The deeper disagreement (Hearers and Self-Buddhas possess the non-conceptual wisdom directly perceiving the ultimate) “occurs in systems which fail to differentiate between the views of the Universal Vehicle and those of the Individual Vehicle.” The standard eight-fold typology of nirvāṇa (peak attainment, patience, concentration, stream-entry, returner, etc.) is then walked through, citing Haribhadra’s Nyi khri snang ba.

Moot-point 54 (p. 379 [Tib. 253]) — translation dispute over MA VIII whether “the Bodhisattva does not adopt birth in cyclic existence below the eighth ground.” (Apparatus: this is a translation dispute, not a Tsongkhapa-specific polemic.)

Moot-point 55 (p. 379 [Tib. 253]) — what kind of conceivable birth and death applies up to the tenth ground. (Apparatus: similar translation-tradition dispute.)

The Ninth Ground (Good Intelligence)

Very brief. The four perfect understandings (pratisaṃvid) are taken in the sense of the Daśabhūmika (acquired actually from the ninth ground) rather than the Vaibhāṣika sense (acquired by hearer-arhats) or the Abhisamayālaṃkāra sense (proper to a Buddha). Candrakīrti is read as having pronounced the intermediate one because his concern is to elucidate the Daśabhūmika.

The Tenth Ground (Dharma Cloud)

The bodhisattva is initiated as regent by all Buddhas. The chapter cites the Daśabhūmika on the precious lotus of big jewels equalling one million trichiliocosms, on which the bodhisattva is enthroned, and on the light-rays from the Buddhas’ ūrṇa-koṣa. Transcendence of spontaneous wisdom predominates. The chapter closes with the etymological derivation of “Dharma Cloud” from the rain-falling-from-rain-clouds simile.

The Numerical Superiority of the Grounds

Counts of the qualities of each ground. The first ground attains 100 meditative stabilisations, sees 100 Buddhas, moves 100 world-realms, proceeds to 100 Buddha-fields, illumines 100 world-realms, matures 100 living beings, remains for 100 eons, penetrates 100 eons before/after, opens 100 gates of teaching, manifests 100 bodies, and surrounds each with 100 Bodhisattvas — twelve sets of one hundred, multiplicatively increasing through the seventh ground. The eighth, ninth and tenth grounds gradate by atomic-particle-quantity rather than by simple multiplication.

The Resultant Buddha Ground

Moot-points 56–58 cluster here, all directed at positions that misread the Buddha ground.

Refutation of an “early Centrist pretender”

Gorampa first refutes a position attributed to “somebody who pretends to be an early Centrist” (the apparatus suggests this is not Tsongkhapa but an earlier Tibetan figure — possibly someone in the Pa Tshab–Zhang Thang Sag pa lineage or a now-anonymous Tibetan): the view that on the Buddha ground there is no spontaneous wisdom and that all Buddha qualities — bodies, deeds, appearances — are mere appearances for others while the Buddha himself is “a bare sphere devoid of obscurations.” Three sub-claims of refutation:

1. Effortless-liberation consequence: if residues dissolve without remedies, all beings would be effortlessly liberated.
2. Inconsistency with the Dharmadhātustava waxing-moon image: the steady growth of the understanding from first ground to Buddha ground is incompatible with a Buddha-as-bare-sphere.
3. Self-contradiction over Buddha’s apparent body: is what appears to a path-of-accumulation practitioner the practitioner’s own mind or different from it? Either horn yields absurdity (all Buddha-attributes complete at path-of-accumulation, or an appearance excluded from both Buddha’s and trainee’s appearances).

MA XI.10–13 — refutation of the Geluk dualistic-appearance position

Moot-point 56 (p. 389 [Tib. 261]) — refutes a “later Centrist” — Tsongkhapa’s position that on the Buddha ground there are no dualistic appearances at all because the residues of the reality-habit are entirely abandoned, while phenomenal-omniscience appearances exist but are non-deceptive. Gorampa quotes Tsongkhapa’s position verbatim and produces a sharp dilemma plus several auxiliary claims. (cf. 25-the-resultant-ground for Tsongkhapa’s positive doctrine: “a buddha’s gnosis is one gnosis with two distinct modes of knowing defined by its two distinct objects (ji lta ba and ji snyed pa). The two modes are not two cognitions … although dualistic appearances of object/subject appear in the buddha’s perception of conventional truth, this is not an erroneous dualistic perception.“) Sub-claims:

1. The dilemma: if the same single mind that implements the noumenal omniscience also implements the phenomenal omniscience by reference to factual bases, then dualistic appearances must obtain (since the phenomenal mind sees factual bases); but if a different mind does so, this collides with the opponent’s own claim that a single mind simultaneously cognises the true nature and the factual bases.
2. The opponent’s reply trap: when the opponent tries “at the time of the realization of the noumenal that very mind and the true nature are uniform in experience, like water poured in water” — Gorampa: this entails that “at the time of the realization of the phenomenal the dualistic appearances also vanish” — which makes the phenomenal omniscience itself a noumenal omniscience.
3. Sub-claim on internal consistency: the opponent has accepted the abandonment of all residues of dualistic appearance is concomitant with the non-existence of dualistic appearances; so if dualistic appearances obtain in phenomenal-omniscience perception, the residues have not all been abandoned.
4. Sub-claim on the Philosophical Sixty citation: the consequence is that according to the opponent the spontaneous wisdom of a Buddha simultaneously sees in a direct manner both phenomenal factual bases with arising and ceasing and an absence of arising and ceasing — but this contradicts Nāgārjuna’s “He who imagines that (even the most subtle thing) arises, such an ignorant man does not see what it means to have proceeded from conditions.”

Gorampa then sets out his own positive account (pp. 394–397 [Tib. 265–267]). All three lower holy persons directly perceive non-arising in their meditative balance, but in their post-meditational state phenomenal factual bases with arising and ceasing appear because dualistic-appearance residues remain (they are not however apprehended as real). On the Buddha ground, a single moment of spontaneous wisdom perceives all things and the sphere of truth as uniform in experience: the noumenal, the phenomenal, and the subjective spontaneous wisdom no longer appear as three separate essences. There is no rising from this meditative balance because the Buddha has no mind not established in meditative balance and no temporal sequentiality on the part of that wisdom. Differentiations of “meditative balance” (noumenal aspect), “aftermath” (phenomenal aspect), and “apperceptive self-consciousness” (subjective aspect) are conventional differentiations made in the face of trainees, not real differences.

Moot-point 57 (p. 402 [Tib. 270]) — Pa Tshab vs Nag Tsho translation differences at MA XI.1 on the temporal locus of attainment. (Apparatus: the opponent here is a Tsongkhapa-school commentator preferring Nag Tsho’s translation.) Gorampa: Nag Tsho’s “Having made further efforts towards that prior ground on which the ten powers are generated” is inconsistent with the autocommentary, which states “afterwards effort towards the Buddha ground will be undertaken.” Pa Tshab’s reading is therefore preferable.

The Buddha-bodies apparatus follows the autocommentary’s three-body schema (rather than the four-body Yogācāra schema): the dharmakāya of dissolution-of-conceptual-elaborations, the saṃbhogakāya of perfect enjoyment, and the body in conformity with the causes of these two. The “exalted emanation body” (nirmāṇakāya) is then introduced as a separate manifestation-body that disciplines trainees. The four perfect-knowledge powers (knowing what is the ground and what is not, knowing the maturation of actions, knowing the various propensities, knowing the various classes), and on through the ten powers, are walked through with autocommentary glosses. A note at the fourth power records that “the terms ‘nature’, ‘essence’ and ‘emptiness’ are synonyms.”

MA XI.34 ff. — tathāgatagarbha and Buddha-as-primordial

At MA XI.34 ff. the tathāgatagarbha passage (pp. 435–436 [Tib. 283–284]) emerges. Moot-point 58 (p. 436 [Tib. 285]) — Tsongkhapa: this passage refers to the nirmāṇakāya’s arising rather than the dharmakāya’s; the standard set is a “standard of entry into the essence of enlightenment,” not a time-standard of previous enlightenment. Gorampa: this is incompatible with three points:

1. The autocommentary’s “the cause whereby the exalted Body of Emanation … arises” refers to the dharmakāya as cause of the nirmāṇakāya; the opponent’s reading severs this link.
2. The “as many as the number of atoms” formulation in the basic text is “a way of intellectually conceiving a limit where in reality no delimitation exists” — there is no numerical delimitation of dharmakāya-instances, so no point in negating they are unlimited.
3. The opponent’s treatment makes the basic-text “this secret should not be revealed” prove utterly true in the wrong sense — Tsongkhapa is precisely refusing to reveal the secret that the dharmakāya is primordial.

Gorampa’s positive account stands as the section’s climax: “the sphere of Reality, naturally completely pure, is at present covered by adventitious stains. Therefore, a Buddha is not manifest. However, at the time when the adventitious stains are extinguished, Reality, or Buddha, is directly seen. Thus, there is no beginning of it … no new Buddha to be attained beyond the bare exhaustion of the adventitious stains.” The poor-man-and-treasure analogy from the Uttaratantra nine-examples set is invoked, and the passage is identified as a “secret” not to be revealed without preparation, “because for them it is difficult to develop intensive faith. (Yet), it is stated because in those who in anybody do generate the intensive faith in this, immeasurable merit will have been amassed.” The single-vehicle interpretation that follows (“because with regard to the true nature of all objective phenomena the perceptive procedure is not diverse, there is no transformation from one into another and no division into different classes”) draws together the White Lotus parable on the temporary teaching of two lower Vehicles to those who cannot from the outset be guided by the Universal Vehicle.

The Conclusion

The closing section of MA itself (XI.43+), on the purpose of composing the text. Moot-point 59 (p. 434 [Tib. 290]) — last numbered moot-point. Tsongkhapa: MA’s closing critique of “the other treatises” refers to the Own-Continuum school as well. Gorampa: this is wrong on three grounds.

1. The example and meaning would diverge — “the other treatises” are the substantivist treatises of the Mind-Only school and below, not Centrist treatises.
2. The next conclusion (“Therefore, when some think that what the Sautrāntika and the Vaibhāṣika state as ultimate sense is (stated) as superficial by the Centrists”) cannot be coherently linked to the opponent’s reading.
3. The introductory commentary on the next stanza identifies “exponents of the other treatises” with “those who totally dismiss the excellent system” — the Svātantrika Centrists do not totally dismiss the system; therefore the equation fails.

The chapter then takes up the chronology of Candrakīrti’s relation to Vasubandhu, Dignāga, and Dharmapāla against Atiśa’s reading that Candrakīrti was Nāgārjuna’s direct disciple; Gorampa ratifies “Rje Lama“‘s reading that Birvāpa is the post-attainment name of the saint and need not be a Cittamātrin even if the historical Dharmapāla was.

Colophon

The text was translated and issued by Pa Tshab Nyi ma Grags from the Kashmir manuscripts. Transmission is traced through the four lineages of his foremost disciples — Putoba and Zhang Thang Sag pa Ye shes ‘Byung Gnas Od in Dbus, Gtsang pa Ser po and Rma Bya in Gtsang — and disseminated continuously through these lineages.

Epilogue

Gorampa’s own poetic colophon. Candrakīrti is figured as the moon of the philosophers; Rma Bya and Thang Sag pa as the great earlier successors. The crucial paragraph names the three opponents: “The non-Buddhist traditions which aver an eternal existence, the former Sophists who aver the existence of generalities, and the present Centrists who aver a destroyed existence — (these) three are the roots which nourish the branches of the wrong views” (p. 441 [Tib. 294]). The “present Centrists who aver a destroyed existence” are unambiguously the Geluk. The text was composed at the monastery “Complete Victorious Teaching of the Mighty One” at the request of many aspirants by “the monk Sonam Seng ge.”

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Appendix — Catalogue of claims against Tsongkhapa and other opponents

One row per discrete claim. “Opponent” defaults to “Tsongkhapa” where the apparatus or dGongs pa rab gsal substantiates it; where the source is genuinely indeterminate, the opponent is flagged accordingly. Tsongkhapa-summary cross-references point to the section in tsongkhapa-illuminating-intent-1418-summary where Tsongkhapa’s actual position can be verified.

MP #	MA verse	Opponent	Opponent’s claim	Gorampa’s counter	Page [Tib.]	Tsongkhapa cross-ref
1	I.1 (autocomm.)	unnamed (likely Tsongkhapa-school)	literal “hearer” can be waived for formless-realm Hearers (lake-grown-from-dry-lotus parallel)	formless-realm Hearers had previously obtained path of seeing in desire-realm body and so did “hear”	p. 20 [11]	(first ground)
1 (parity)	I.1 (autocomm.)	as above	applies parity: by the same logic the chief term “hearer” applies even to arhats walking/sleeping	absurd parity refutes the move	p. 21 [11]
2	I.1	Nag-Tsho-school translator	”Buddha” can mean univocally “one who realises Reality” across all three persons	autocommentary restricts to “complete wisdom”; lower foe-destroyers excluded	pp. 22–23 [12]
3a	I.5cd	Tsongkhapa	path-of-accumulation Bodhisattva is not the real Bodhisattva — generation-of-mind there is sugar-cane-rind, not real cane	the new-moon image in Praise of the Sphere of Reality establishes first-ground Bodhisattva as new moon	pp. 30–32 [19–21]	,
3b	I.5cd	Tsongkhapa	Maitreya’s Uttaratantra seed-shell-by-sprout supports same	passage refutes the opponent — sprout-state is post-shell-destruction = post-path-of-seeing	p. 32 [21]
3c	I.5cd	Tsongkhapa	his own commentary on these texts is consistent	direct internal contradiction; opponent’s reading is “frightening like an abyss”	pp. 33–36 [22–24]
3d	I.5cd	Tsongkhapa	sharp-intellect Bodhisattva first ascertains Thatness then generates mind	non-dual wisdom not preceded by compassion + bodhicitta cannot be a Bodhisattva-cause	p. 35 [23]
4	I.4ab	unnamed (early-Geluk?)	second compassion (phenomena) bears the suffering of creation as cognitive aspect	confuses focal-object differentiation with cognitive-aspect	p. 41 [27]
5	I.5cd	Tsongkhapa	”Bodhisattva” means Bodhisattva-of-ultimate-sense; ordinary person not really excluded	the bodhicitta is divided superficial/ultimate but the Bodhisattva designation is not	p. 50 [32]
6	I.7d	Tsongkhapa	Approacher to Stream-Enterer is the eighth (downward count from Foe-Destroyer)	autocommentary places the Abider in Fruit (Stream-Enterer) as the eighth	p. 53 [36]
7.1	I.7d	Tsongkhapa	(positive Gorampa case)	reasoning 1: hearer/self-buddha-arhats need dharma-nairātmya to abandon defilements of three realms	pp. 65–66 [45]
7.2	I.7d	Tsongkhapa	as above	reasoning 2: without dharma-nairātmya the personal selflessness itself cannot be perceived	p. 66 [45]
7.3	I.7d	Tsongkhapa	as above	scriptural reference: Ratnāvalī fire-brand passage	pp. 67–68 [46–47]
7.4	I.7d	Tsongkhapa	as above	scriptural reference: Ratnāvalī nineteen-stanza element-realitylessness sequence	p. 68 [47]
7.5	I.7d	Tsongkhapa	as above	scriptural reference: “form is foam” passage	p. 68 [48]
7.6	I.7d	Tsongkhapa	”superior knowledge of own domain” = cessation only, not dharma-nairātmya	opponent has accepted no Universal/Individual Reality-difference; cannot restrict here	p. 73 [50]	,
7.7	I.7d	Tsongkhapa	abandonment-by-nine-paths-of-cultivation rejected	opponent thereby spurns Ornament of Realisations and Maitreya	p. 74 [51]
7.8	I.7d	Tsongkhapa	on Buddha-ground entering/rising harder because mind & Thatness uniform	derives consequence: Buddha cannot enter/rise at all; intellect mistaking unity is “not penetrating”	p. 75 [52]
7.9	I.7d	Tsongkhapa	”complete vs incomplete” personal selflessness via 16 four-truth aspects (Pure-Science apparatus)	incoherent within Pure-Science tradition itself	pp. 79–80 [56]
7.10	I.7d	Tsongkhapa	as above	direct realisation of 16 aspects requires direct realisation of cessation = ultimate	pp. 81–82 [57]
7.11	I.7d	Tsongkhapa	as above	confuses theory-postulation with personal-continuum description	p. 83 [58]
7.12	I.7d	Tsongkhapa	as above	imports Substantivist categorisation into Centrist system	pp. 83–84 [58–59]
7.13	I.7d	Tsongkhapa	Rong Ston’s reading rejected	”this mere ‘I’ is the designative basis of a person” — no separate substantial designative base	pp. 76–77 [54]
8	I.7d	Tsongkhapa	(sub-claim of MP 7.8)	climax: opponent’s view contradicts Buddha-cognition	p. 66 [46]
9	I.7d	Tsongkhapa	ordinary persons can directly realise 16 aspects without realising emptiness	direct realisation of 16 requires direct realisation of cessation = ultimate	pp. 70–73 [49–51]
9b	I.7d	Tsongkhapa	manifest defilements abandoned by such a non-emptiness path	confuses Pure-Science manifest-defilements with Centrist nescience-with-defilement	pp. 71–72 [50]
10	I.7d	Tsongkhapa	BCA “even nirvana remains difficult” supports incomplete path	passage refers to Uttaratantra uncontaminated-action aggregates, supporting opposite	pp. 75–76 [54]
11.1	I.7d	Tsongkhapa	”comprehensive vs concise” = Universal (many reasonings) vs Individual (one summary)	inverts the keenness/dullness distribution of the tradition	pp. 77–78 [55]
11.2	I.7d	Tsongkhapa	as above	reductio: Foe-Destroyer can abandon reality-habit in 3 lives, Universal cannot in 2 countless eons	p. 78 [56]
11.3	I.7d	Tsongkhapa	as above	violates path-of-logic (one prior reasoning suffices; multiple are for different antagonists)	p. 78 [56]
12.1	I.16	Tsongkhapa	Sanskrit param-am-ita affixation	second-case singular am mishandled	pp. 79–80 [57]	—
12.2	I.16	Tsongkhapa	”preshodar” gloss	misreading	p. 80 [57]	—
12.3	I.16	Tsongkhapa	”after wisdom is adopted” + “is mentioned as transcendence because it is like transcendence”	self-contradictory	p. 80 [58]	—
12.4	I.16	Tsongkhapa	”given up adherence to externals” = Centrist OR Mind-Only	own argument forces it into Mind-Only camp	p. 80 [58]
12.5	I.16	Tsongkhapa	Self-Buddha Reality-realisation thesis	inconsistent with Ornament of Realisations	p. 80 [58]
13	I.16	Tsongkhapa	giving on first ground = mundane transcendence, with three-factor apprehension	first-ground bodhisattva already cognises selflessness directly; reality-apprehension impossible	pp. 88–89 [65]
13b	I.16	Tsongkhapa	”reality-apprehension prevalent on grounds below seventh”	propagates as thematic error throughout Geluk system	p. 89 [65]
14	II.8b	unnamed	Catuḥśatakaṭīkā “auspicious dwells with baneful” supports co-dwelling reading	passage means the contaminated is suffering, not co-dwelling	pp. 98–99 [70]	—
15.1	III	Tsongkhapa	YS-vṛtti cessation-as-ultimate via Asaṅga’s mundane-concentration framework	first-ground Bodhisattva already has all 9 equipoises	pp. 107–108 [73]
15.2	III	Tsongkhapa	separate Pure-Science vs Centrist defilement categories	confuses theory-postulation with mode-of-actual-existence	p. 108 [74]
16	IV	Tsongkhapa	seeds of two self-habits given up but not exhausted on fourth ground	”truly astonishing” — reality-habit on direct-cognition ground is contradiction	pp. 110–111 [75]
17	V	Tsongkhapa	(internal)	accepts cessation-as-ultimate but elsewhere asserts ordinary-person 16-aspect realisation — contradictory	p. 113 [76]
18.1	VI.1 ff.	Tsongkhapa	Svātantrika negatee = “not merely-nominally imputed”, Prāsaṅgika = “not established by appearing to mind”	Bhāviveka does accept external objects as established with intrinsic essence — opponent self-contradicts	pp. 127–139 [87–98]
18.2	VI.1 ff.	Tsongkhapa	as above	Svātantrika treatises do not establish “parts and possessor as single essence” by realityless reasoning	p. 140 [90]
18.3	VI.1 ff.	Tsongkhapa	as above	self-aggregates parity from chariot-parts case forces reductio	pp. 140–141 [90–91]
18.4	VI.1 ff.	Tsongkhapa	as above	”negatee of Consequentialist” claim reduces to mere thesis without proof	p. 141 [91]
18.5	VI.1 ff.	Tsongkhapa	”third option” mind grasping neither extreme	contradicts Prajñāpāramitā “Form is empty engages in marks”	p. 142 [92]
18.6	VI.1 ff.	Tsongkhapa	as above	contradicts Maitreya	p. 143 [93]
18.7	VI.1 ff.	Tsongkhapa	as above	contradicts Nāgārjuna MMK 18 + Āryadeva on four extremes	pp. 143–144 [93–94]
19.1	VI.1 ff.	Tsongkhapa	own-continuum-school must establish things by their own characteristics (in establishing non-arising)	absurd: would equally apply to Consequentialist establishment of non-arising	p. 147 [98]
19.2	VI.1 ff.	Tsongkhapa	acceptance/non-acceptance of own-continuum reasons differentiates schools	Consequentialist also has many reasons-for-others (smoke-fire, etc.)	p. 148 [98]
19.3	VI.1 ff.	(Gorampa positive)	Sakya Paṇḍita on the three traditions of conventional-non-deception	the difference is the reasoning method (prasaṅga vs svatantra) + 6 logical + 3 conventional differences	pp. 145–149 [95–98]
20.1	VI.23	Tsongkhapa	two truths “one in nature aspectively distinct” like produced/impermanent	collapse of truths: nature found by delusive = nature found by authentic	pp. 173–174 [113–114]
20.2	VI.23	Tsongkhapa	as above	collapse of cognitions: no procedural difference	p. 174 [114]
20.3	VI.23	Tsongkhapa	as above	collapse of designative basis: meditative balance perceives basis found by delusive perception	p. 174 [114]
20.4	VI.23	Tsongkhapa	as above	bden grub qualifier mandatory and self-defeating	pp. 174–175 [114–115]
20.5	VI.23	Tsongkhapa	Bodhicittavivaraṇa citation supports single-nature reading	passage epitomises non-existence of separate natures, not single nature	p. 175 [115]
20.6	VI.29	Tsongkhapa	as above	hairs-in-bell-metal: “this text [MA] also negates that the two truths are a single nature”	p. 188 [125]
21	VI.24–25	Tsongkhapa	”authentic/false superficial” terms are Svātantrika; Consequentialist uses “true/false for world alone”	direct primary-text appeal: Atiśa, Zang Thang Sag pa lineage — no such terminological distinction	p. 178 [116]
22.1	VI.26	Tsongkhapa	non-Buddhist three-quality theories don’t even superficially exist; sense-blue must exist conventionally	opponent confuses superficial-truth-of-world with conventional truth	pp. 172–174 [119–120]
22.2	VI.26	Tsongkhapa	as above	parity: appearing-objects of faulty-organ and clear-organ consciousness equally non-exist	pp. 172–173 [120]
22.3	VI.26	Tsongkhapa	as above	opponent’s true/false-superficial division unsustainable	p. 173 [120]
22.4	VI.26	Tsongkhapa	reflections are external objects (Candrakīrti says they generate consciousness)	inconsistent with opponent’s earlier denial of dream sense-consciousness	p. 174 [121]
22.5	VI.26	(Gorampa positive)	—	“the whole false superficial is superficial truth, but not conventional truth”	p. 180 [118]
23	VI.27	Tsongkhapa	”validating rational cognition” applies to post-meditational ārya cognition	pramāṇa is inference based upon reason; cannot apply to ārya equipoise	p. 175 [121]
24.1	VI.28	Tsongkhapa	saṃvṛti applies only to subjective truth-habit	applies also to objective compositional factors that obscure post-meditational equipoise	pp. 184–185 [122]
24.2	VI.28	Tsongkhapa (named: “Geshe Bio (Bzang Grags pa)“)	eighth-ground-only-arhat thesis	”casts aspersion on Universal Vehicle”; Hearers can eliminate truth-habit in 3 lives, Mahāyāna cannot in countless eon	pp. 185–186 [122–123]	,
25	VI.32–33	Tsongkhapa	absolute negation of one inconsistent thing positively establishes the other (med dgag)	“a seed exists at the time of its sprout, because it is not non-existent”	pp. 182–183 [126–127]
26.1	VI.34	Tsongkhapa	opponent of MA VI.34 ff. is a covert Svātantrika	autocommentary: Svātantrikas don’t accept ultimate-sense arising	p. 187 [130]
26.2	VI.34	Tsongkhapa	Mind-Only does not see emptiness as “repudiation of other-powered”	misses autocommentary’s structural point about discrepancy of true-nature and grasping pattern	p. 187 [130]
27.1	VI.34	unnamed pseudo-Centrist (not Tsongkhapa)	empty-of-vase = totally non-existent vase	mind comprehending vase as empty already conceives vase as existing	p. 189 [132]
27.2	VI.34	as above	as above	what is the supposed “essence of vase” the opponent imagines is the negatee?	p. 189 [132]
27.3	VI.34	as above	as above	accepts vase-empty-of-essence ≠ vase, contradicting his own framework	p. 189 [132]
28.1	VI.39 ff.	Tsongkhapa (named: “Geshe Tsong Ba”)	destruction-as-entity (zhig pa dngos po) — implicative negation	consequence: arising from what is different (action and result rent asunder)	pp. 199–222 [138–149]
28.2	VI.39 ff.	as above	as above	consequence: generation without contact	pp. 217 [145]
28.3	VI.39 ff.	as above	as above	parity-of-contradiction with general-basis, retentiveness, attainment	p. 217 [146]
28.4	VI.39 ff.	as above	as above	graver fault: zhig pa dngos po is heterodox-Vaiśeṣika tenet	p. 218 [146]
28.5	VI.39 ff.	as above	as above	space filled with destructions of destructions	p. 218 [147]
28.6	VI.39 ff.	as above	as above	impossibility of dependence of uncreated; svabhāvakāya would be created	p. 219 [147]
28.7	VI.39 ff.	as above	as above	further fruition apart from fruition; infinite regress	p. 220 [148]
28.8	VI.39 ff.	as above	as above	identity-or-difference dilemma kills the entity	p. 220 [148]
29	VI.39+	Tsongkhapa	accepting general basis entails Cittamātra (no externals)	parity: same applies to bare acceptance of mind	pp. 222–223 [156–157]
30	VI.39+	Tsongkhapa	general-basis acceptance incompatible with action-result	not the substantially-real Cittamātra basis; conventional acceptance allowed	p. 224 [158]
31	VI.39+	Tsongkhapa	”load carrier is the person” requires “substantially existent” qualifier	”rabbit horns tied with turtle hairs”; absurd qualifier-insertion strategy	p. 226 [159]
32	VI.43–44	Tsongkhapa	School of Eastern Mountain has full dharma-nairātmya in Hearer canon	autocommentary explicitly denies; opponent’s own oeuvre internally inconsistent	p. 227 [160]
33	VI.49	Tsongkhapa	dream subject/object negatees are different (parity broken)	dream consciousness must proceed by true or false superficial — either horn forces parity	p. 233 [163]
34	VI.51–52	Tsongkhapa	three factors of mind in dream “false because exist but appear as if real”	covert acceptance of conventional dream mental-consciousness	pp. 236–237 [165]
35	VI.51–52	Tsongkhapa	Bhāviveka accepts dream-form by intrinsic identity	autocommentary: dream-object/consciousness equally non-exist; aspersion on Bhāviveka	p. 237 [166]
36	VI.51–52	Tsongkhapa	dream-form is dharmāyatana-rūpa imaginative-construction	logic forces sound, smell etc. into same category — but not the Pure-Science sense	p. 238 [166–167]
37	VI.66–67	Tsongkhapa	dream form-as-object is dharmāyatana-rūpa	gets Pure-Science arrangements mixed up; visual-consciousness-of-dream becomes mental	p. 247 [169]
38	VI.71	Tsongkhapa	autocommentary’s “match” = content-parallelism with illusions/reflections	”match” means “same procedure of reply”; redundancy not parallelism	p. 253 [175]
39.1	VI.71	Tsongkhapa	mantra-and-iron example: same tangible-object becomes non-burning anew	the mantric mind doesn’t make a new tangible-object arise	pp. 264–266 [177–179]
39.2	VI.71	Tsongkhapa	as above	parity-of-validating-cognition consequence: cataract vs clear visual pramāṇa would be equal	p. 266 [179]
39.3	VI.71	Tsongkhapa	as above	object-side parity: hell-fire would not be part of stream-of-water; conch-yellow not the conch’s colour	pp. 266–267 [179]
39.4	VI.71	Tsongkhapa	as above	illusion-mantra: clay-vessel horses become real horses	p. 268 [180]
39.5	VI.71	Tsongkhapa	as above	sharp/from-distance: vase yields two objective forms	p. 268 [180]
39.6	VI.71	Tsongkhapa (named: “Geshe Bio Ba”)	as above	multifarious-flattening: tangible-objects of all elements as each element; effigy-as-newly-arisen-man	pp. 268–269 [181]
40	VI.73	Tsongkhapa	recollection-reason proves neither substantial nor conventional svasaṃvitti	opponent confuses failure of proof with failure of conclusion; Centrist accepts conventional svasaṃvitti	p. 266 [185]
41	VI.73–75	Tsongkhapa	experienced object & recollected object are single essence	parity: would force recollecting subject & experiencing subject single essence	p. 268 [187]
42.1	VI.73	Tsongkhapa	Root Wisdom light passage refutes conventional svasaṃvitti	consequence: darkness cannot even conventionally be dispelled	p. 268 [187]
42.2	VI.73	Tsongkhapa	Vigrahavyāvartanī refutes conventional svasaṃvitti	consequence: anything within pramāṇa is conventionally non-existent	p. 268 [187]
42.3	VI.73	Tsongkhapa	Lucid Exposition mind-not-found-as-object refutes conventional svasaṃvitti	consequence: very mind, as object of experience, conventionally non-exists	p. 269 [187]
42.4	VI.73	Tsongkhapa	Laṅkāvatāra sword-cannot-cut-blade analogy	parity: would force conventional non-existence of lotus-in-the-sky (Āryadeva)	p. 269 [188]
43	VI.84	Tsongkhapa	”alone” (mātra) excludes externals but admits internal form, sound	ruled out by detailed earlier refutations	p. 278 [192]
44	VI.120 ff.	Tsongkhapa	Bhāviveka makes skandhas the characteristic basis of self	would entail Bhāviveka holding Sammitīya identity-view	p. 305 [209]
45	VI.127	Tsongkhapa	seven absurd consequences apply only to “absolutely-no-difference identity”	destroys Nāgārjuna–Āryadeva neither-single-nor-different principle	p. 309 [211]
46	VI.140	Tsongkhapa	refutation of intellectual self does not entail refutation of instinctual self	parity (per Rong Ston): refutation of intellectual arising-via-four entails refutation of instinctual	p. 319 [218]
47	VI.142	Tsongkhapa	qualifier “in terms of intrinsic reality” needed for support/supported negation	contradicts Candrakīrti’s earlier rejection of Bhāviveka qualifier-insertion	p. 321 [220]
48	VI.143	Tsongkhapa	parallel qualifier-insertion for self-which-possesses-aggregates	same fault	p. 322 [220]
49	VI.145c	Tsongkhapa	basic satkāya-dṛṣṭi is intellectual construct separate from twenty peaks	inconsistent with autocommentary diamond-mountain image; opponent’s own claim makes basic-view crushed with the twenty	p. 326 [223]
50	VI.155	Tsongkhapa	designatively-existent things exist as independent substances; conglomerate-as-designative-base of shape	inconsistent with autocommentary, which has opponent accepting substantial external components	p. 335 [228]
51.1	VI.179	Tsongkhapa	hearers’ dharma-nairātmya cultivation lacks comprehensiveness “in number and time”	inconsistent with view that 7 impure grounds have no remedy for cognitive obscuration	p. 353 [238]
51.2	VI.179	Tsongkhapa	as above	dilemma: vast-time cultivation is either needed for emotional-affliction elimination (so hearers have it) or not (so what is it for on impure grounds?)	p. 353 [238]
52	VI.182	Tsongkhapa-school (preferring Nag Tsho)	“not being stable” = unstable/impermanent intrinsic-reality	Pa Tshab’s kudeshta = “piled up, produced” is correct; intrinsic-reality is non-produced	pp. 355–356 [240]
53.1	VIII.1	Tsongkhapa	hearer/self-buddha-arhats have non-conceptual wisdom directly perceiving ultimate; Daśabhūmika “Well done” applies to them	non-conceptual wisdom would have to cease on rising; Daśabhūmika structure incoherent	p. 372 [251]
53.2	VIII.1	Tsongkhapa	as above	systems failing to differentiate Universal vs Individual Vehicle views	p. 372 [251]
54	VIII	(translation dispute)	“Bodhisattva does not adopt cyclic existence below 8th ground” reading	translation-tradition dispute, not Tsongkhapa polemic	p. 379 [253]
55	VIII	(translation dispute)	conceivable birth and death up to 10th ground	translation-tradition dispute	p. 379 [253]
56.0	XI prelim	”early Centrist pretender” (not Tsongkhapa)	Buddha = bare sphere; no spontaneous wisdom; appearances only-for-others	three consequences: effortless-liberation; Dharmadhātustava waxing-moon contradicted; self-contradiction over Buddha-body	pp. 386–388 [258–260]
56.1	XI.10–13	Tsongkhapa	single mind cognises noumenal & phenomenal; no dualistic appearance in Buddha; phenomenal appearances non-deceptive	dilemma: same-mind ⇒ dualistic appearances; different-mind ⇒ contradicts opponent’s single-mind claim	pp. 389–391 [261–263]
56.2	XI.10–13	Tsongkhapa	as above	”uniform like water in water” reply entails phenomenal also vanishes ⇒ phenomenal omniscience = noumenal	p. 401 [263]
56.3	XI.10–13	Tsongkhapa	as above	residue-elimination concomitant with non-existence of dualistic appearance — opponent’s own commitment	p. 401 [263]
56.4	XI.10–13	Tsongkhapa	as above	Philosophical Sixty contradiction: simultaneous arising-and-no-arising perception	p. 402 [264]
57	XI.1	Tsongkhapa-school (preferring Nag Tsho)	“Having made further efforts towards prior ground on which ten powers are generated”	Nag Tsho reading inconsistent with autocommentary’s “afterwards effort towards Buddha ground”	p. 402 [270]
58.1	XI.34	Tsongkhapa	passage refers to nirmāṇakāya arising, not dharmakāya	autocommentary “cause whereby Emanation Body arises” requires dharmakāya as cause	p. 436 [285]
58.2	XI.34	Tsongkhapa	as above	”as many as atoms” is intellectual limit-conceiving where no delimitation exists; numerical standard meaningless	p. 437 [285]
58.3	XI.34	Tsongkhapa	as above	reading makes “this secret should not be revealed” prove utterly true in the wrong sense	p. 438 [286]
59.1	concl. 2	Tsongkhapa	”other treatises” includes Own-Continuum school	example/meaning diverge; “other treatises” are Mind-Only-and-below	p. 434 [288]
59.2	concl. 2	Tsongkhapa	as above	next conclusion “what Sautrāntika/Vaibhāṣika state as ultimate is Centrist superficial” cannot link to Svātantrika	p. 434 [288]
59.3	concl. 2	Tsongkhapa	as above	”those who totally dismiss the excellent system” — Svātantrika does not totally dismiss	p. 434 [289]