Companion to tsongkhapa-illuminating-intent-1418. For thesis, key claims, methodology, critical notes, and paper-relevance tagging see the source page.
Illuminating the Intent (དགོངས་པ་རབ་གསལ) is Tsongkhapa’s verse-by-verse exposition of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra (Entering the Middle Way, དབུ་མ་ལ་འཇུག་པ་), completed in 1418, the year before his death. The work is structured as a “three-layered” commentary: it glosses each of Candrakīrti’s ~330 root stanzas, follows Candrakīrti’s own autocommentary line by line, and then adds substantial independent sections (spyi don) where Tsongkhapa reframes the central philosophical issues — most extensively in Chapter 9 (“Identifying the object of negation”) and Chapter 11 (“The two truths”). The text follows Candrakīrti in mapping Madhyamaka philosophy onto the ten bodhisattva grounds drawn from the Daśabhūmika Sūtra. The sixth ground, on the perfection of wisdom (ཤེར་ཕྱིན་), forms by far the longest part — twelve of twenty-five chapters in Jinpa’s edition — and contains Tsongkhapa’s mature account of emptiness (སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་), the two truths (བདེན་པ་གཉིས་), the Prāsaṅgika–Svātantrika distinction, and the critique of Cittamātra. The translator’s introduction itself constitutes a major contemporary essay on Tsongkhapa’s Madhyamaka and is summarised first below.
Introduction (Thupten Jinpa)
Jinpa’s introduction provides historical context (Tsongkhapa 1357–1419, the founder of what became the Geluk tradition; Illuminating the Intent as the principal Madhyamaka textbook in Geluk monastic colleges to this day), the textual genealogy (Tsongkhapa reading Candrakīrti reading Nāgārjuna reading the Perfection of Wisdom sūtras), and an extended philosophical orientation to Tsongkhapa’s project.
Jinpa lists six distinctive Candrakīrtian positions inherited from Indian and Tibetan tradition — rejection of formal inference, rejection of Dignāga–Dharmakīrti epistemology, the inaccessibility of ultimate truth to thought and language, a uniquely conventionalist reading of conventional truth, the “no thesis” claim, and the possible cessation of mind in buddhahood — and notes that Tsongkhapa offers a “more nuanced reading” than either Candrakīrti’s enthusiasts (who embrace all six unreservedly) or his critics (like Chapa Chökyi Sengé). Tsongkhapa, on Jinpa’s reading, is not seen as rejecting epistemology and not seen as denying knowledge of ultimate truth.
Jinpa identifies eleven elements of Tsongkhapa’s integrated Madhyamaka programme (pp. 30–34): (1) carefully identifying the object of negation; (2) distinguishing conventional from ultimate analysis; (3) clarifying what “ultimate” means in “no ultimate existence”; (4) the conceptual distinction between existence and intrinsic existence (རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་གྲུབ་པ་), the latter rejected even on the conventional level; (5) defining emptiness as a non-implicative negation (མེད་དགག་, prasajya-pratiṣedha); (6) interpreting emptiness as dependent origination; (7) the inferential accessibility of ultimate truth despite its ineffability; (8) refusing to denigrate conventional truth; (9) treating the Prāsaṅgika–Svātantrika divide as substantive philosophical disagreement, not a methodological quirk about syllogism; (10) distinguishing three senses of svalakṣaṇa — defining characteristic, Dignāgan unique particular, and intrinsic characteristic; (11) developing a distinctively Prāsaṅgika ontology, epistemology, and soteriology.
Jinpa also surveys the framing question of what is at stake: for Tsongkhapa Madhyamaka is not speculative metaphysics but a therapeutic deconstruction of the innate ignorance (མ་རིག་པ་) of intrinsic existence. He gives an extended quote from Tsongkhapa’s response to opponents who confuse “established by valid cognition” with “objectively established”: valid cognition cognises objects, it does not constitute them as truly existent (cf. pp. 27–29).
The polemical context is mapped: Tsongkhapa’s targets include certain Tibetan readings of Candrakīrti that lead to nihilism (no positions, no knowledge of ultimate, no buddha’s gnosis at conventional truth), Chapa’s alternative critique of Candrakīrti, and Dölpopa’s gzhan stong (extrinsic emptiness, གཞན་སྟོང་). The reception is also surveyed: Taktsang’s “eighteen heavy loads of contradiction,” critiques from Gorampa and Shākya Chokden of via negativa nihilism, and the long debate over reflexive awareness (རང་རིག་, svasaṃvitti) and foundation consciousness (ཀུན་གཞི་རྣམ་ཤེས་, ālayavijñāna).
1. Preliminaries
This chapter glosses the salutation verses and opening framing of Madhyamakāvatāra. Tsongkhapa explains the title — Madhyamakāvatāra is an “entering” of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā — and identifies the two senses in which Candrakīrti’s text “enters” the Treatise: from the standpoint of the profound (an interpretation of MMK uniquely compatible with rejection of consciousness-only) and from the standpoint of the vast (the path-stages drawn from the Ratnāvalī, the ten grounds, the buddhahood result).
Tsongkhapa offers an extended exposition (pp. 47–55) of compassion (སྙིང་རྗེ་) as Candrakīrti’s chosen object of salutation. He reads Candrakīrti’s three analogies — compassion as the seed at the beginning, the moisture in the middle, and the ripened fruit at the end — as showing compassion’s centrality across the entire path, not merely as initial motivation. Three types of compassion are differentiated by their focal object (sentient beings, phenomena, no reference) rather than by their cognitive aspect (which is uniformly the wish that beings be free from suffering): on his account, the second compassion takes as object sentient beings qualified by impermanence/momentariness, the third takes them as qualified by emptiness of intrinsic existence. He criticises certain Tibetan commentators who confuse the focal object with the cognitive aspect, an error that would oddly require a single moment of compassion to bear two contradictory cognitive aspects.
Tsongkhapa explains “nondual awareness” (གཉིས་མེད་ཀྱི་ཡེ་ཤེས་) in the salutation as the wisdom free of the two extremes of “thingness and no-thingness,” not — as some claim — awareness of the absence of subject-object duality. He links the three causes of bodhisattvas (compassion, awakening mind, nondual awareness) to Nāgārjuna’s Ratnāvalī and shows how compassion is itself the root of the other two.
The image of beings as “buckets on a waterwheel” turning under karma and afflictions is unpacked through six features (bound by ropes, propelled by consciousness, revolving from the peak of existence to Avīci, descending effortlessly but ascending only with great effort, with no fixed sequence among afflictions, daily assailed by three types of suffering). This sets up two methods for generating compassion: viewing beings as kin (Candrakīrti, Candragomin, Kamalaśīla) and recognition of shared sentient nature (Śāntideva).
2. General Presentation of the Grounds
Tsongkhapa defines what is meant by a bodhisattva-bhūmi (ས་, ground/level) and overviews the path-architecture in Nāgārjuna’s tradition, drawing extensively on the Daśabhūmika Sūtra and Ratnāvalī. He situates the ten bodhisattva grounds within the broader fivefold path-structure (paths of accumulation, preparation, seeing, meditation, no-more-learning) and explains that the first ground begins on the path of seeing with direct realization of emptiness. The chapter clarifies the relation between grounds and perfections — each ground is associated with a particular perfection that becomes excellent at that level, though all perfections are practiced from the first.
3. The First Ground, Perfect Joy
Glossing chapter 1 of the root text, Tsongkhapa frames the first ground around generosity (སྦྱིན་པ་). His most substantive independent contribution (pp. 82–106) concerns whether realization of the emptiness of intrinsic existence is indispensable for nirvāṇa or only for buddhahood — a question on which Candrakīrti differs from many other commentators. Tsongkhapa argues at length, drawing on a key section of Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra (chapter 9), that the realization of selflessness of phenomena is required even for the liberation of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. This is consonant with Candrakīrti, who holds that all three vehicles’ āryas realize the lack of intrinsic existence, though only bodhisattvas systematise it through reasoning. The selflessness of persons in Candrakīrti’s reading is therefore broader than the merely substantialist self-rejection of the Abhidharma — a key point that has implications for how the Mahāyāna/Hīnayāna distinction is drawn.
4. The Second Ground, The Stainless
The second ground is the perfection of morality (ཚུལ་ཁྲིམས་, śīla). Tsongkhapa works through Candrakīrti’s verses on the ten paths of virtuous and non-virtuous action, treating the bodhisattva’s natural transcendence of ethical lapse on this ground.
5. The Third Ground, The Luminous
The third ground is the perfection of forbearance (བཟོད་པ་, kṣānti), the antidote to anger. Tsongkhapa devotes significant space (pp. 133–37) to two technical questions: what kind of virtue is destroyed when anger arises, and what exactly is meant by “destruction” — i.e. how can a moment of anger destroy aeons of accumulated merit? Conversely, he examines the mechanism by which negative karma is purified through declaration and confession (pp. 139–40). This is one of the few places where Tsongkhapa engages the technicalities of karmic theory in this work.
6. The Fourth Ground, The Radiant
A short chapter on the fourth ground, where the perfection of diligence (བརྩོན་འགྲུས་, vīrya) becomes excellent. Tsongkhapa glosses Candrakīrti’s image of the bodhisattva’s wisdom flame on this ground burning brighter than the sun.
7. The Fifth Ground, Hard to Conquer
The fifth ground is the perfection of meditative absorption (བསམ་གཏན་, dhyāna). Tsongkhapa briefly treats how the bodhisattva on this ground masters absorption sufficient to enter the sixth ground; he flags this as preparation for the long Wisdom chapter to follow.
8. Introducing the Sixth Ground
Tsongkhapa opens Part II of the volume — twelve chapters covering the sixth ground alone, since the sixth ground is the perfection of wisdom (ཤེས་རབ་, prajñā) and contains all of Candrakīrti’s substantive Madhyamaka philosophy. The chapter introduces the praise of the perfection of wisdom and the “ten perfect equanimities” by which the bodhisattva enters the sixth ground (drawn from the Daśabhūmika): non-signs, no defining characteristics, no birth, unborn, void, primordial purity, freedom from elaborations, absence of affirmation/rejection, resemblance to seven similes (illusion, dream, mirage, echo, moon-in-water, mirror, conjuration), and absence of duality of real/unreal. Tsongkhapa reduces these to a small number of mutually-implicative formulations all equivalent to the absence of existence by intrinsic characteristic. He notes that Asaṅga’s Bhūmis and the Daśabhūmika commentary differ from Candrakīrti’s reading and that he will follow Candrakīrti.
9. Identifying the Object of Negation
This is one of the two most philosophically dense chapters of the work and contains Tsongkhapa’s signature methodological contribution. He insists that without a precise identification of what is to be negated (དགག་བྱ་), the view of emptiness will inevitably “go astray” — sliding either into nihilism (negating too much, including conventional reality) or into residual essentialism (negating too little). He cites Śāntideva: “Without touching upon the imputed entity, the absence of its reality cannot be grasped” (BCA 9.140).
The crucial move is that the target of negation is not merely the philosophically constructed grasping of tenet-systems (acquired grasping) but the innate grasping at true existence (ལྷན་སྐྱེས་, sahaja) that has persisted since beginningless time and is found in beings whether or not their minds have been “tempered by philosophical tenets.” Negation directed only outward at others’ positions is “scant benefit”; the work must be done within one’s own mind.
Tsongkhapa then offers what is, by his own reckoning, a uniquely structured account: he presents the Svātantrika identification of the object of negation first, as great skilful means for those not yet capable of the subtler view, and only then the Prāsaṅgika identification. This graduated pedagogical commitment is itself a hermeneutical thesis.
For Svātantrika, drawing on Kamalaśīla’s Madhyamakāloka: true existence is “existence through a thing’s own objective mode of being and not posited in dependence on being perceived by cognitions or posited by virtue of the power of cognitions” (p. 110). Two senses of “ultimate” must be distinguished: (a) rational cognition of suchness through hearing/reflection/meditation — phenomena are established by such cognition; (b) existence through a thing’s own objective mode of being independent of cognition — phenomena are not established in this sense. Innate grasping operates only in the second sense. Failing to draw this distinction, Tsongkhapa says, has produced two opposite errors: (i) holding ultimate truth to be unknowable; (ii) holding it to be truly existent. The magical-illusion analogy is unpacked: three types of spectator (magician with unaffected eyes seeing only the basis; affected spectators seeing and apprehending an elephant; unaffected spectators seeing nothing) are mapped onto the cognitions of buddhas, deluded beings, and unaffected witnesses respectively.
For Prāsaṅgika, the negation is subtler. Phenomena are posited through the power of conceptualization (རྟོག་པས་བཏགས་པ་). Citing the Upālipariprcchā (“Through conceptualization the world is imputed”), the Yuktiṣaṣṭikā, the Catuḥśataka, and especially the Ratnāvalī, Tsongkhapa argues that all phenomena, persons and dharmas alike, are like a snake imputed on a coiled rope: there is no objective basis on the part of the rope (in aggregate or in parts) that constitutes a snake. Likewise, when “I am” arises in dependence on the aggregates, there is no basis among the aggregates — collected serially or simultaneously, in parts or in whole — that can be identified as the “I”; nor is there anything distinct from the aggregates that could serve as that basis. Therefore the “I” is posited through mere conception in dependence on the aggregates.
But Tsongkhapa is emphatic about a critical disanalogy between rope-snake and conventional phenomena like a vase: although both are conceptually imputed, they differ totally in whether they exist, are functionally efficacious, and remain essential for everyday transaction; their conventional usage in the rope-snake case is invalidated by other valid cognition, while in the vase case it is not. This — the way “everyday transactions remain tenable in this world posited through conceptualization” — represents, in Tsongkhapa’s words, “a unique tradition of interpreting the noble Nāgārjuna” by Buddhapālita, Śāntideva, and Candrakīrti, and is “the most difficult point of the final view of the Middle Way.”
He then enumerates the six synonyms for the object of negation under Prāsaṅgika: (1) true existence (བདེན་གྲུབ་), (2) ultimate existence (དོན་དམ་པར་གྲུབ་པ་), (3) absolute/real existence, (4) existence by virtue of essential nature (ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་གྲུབ་པ་), (5) existence through intrinsic characteristic (རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་གྲུབ་པ་), and (6) intrinsic existence (རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་གྲུབ་པ་). Svātantrika rejects only the first three but accepts the latter three on the conventional level; Prāsaṅgika rejects all six. Tsongkhapa pre-empts the charge that he has narrowed negation to “true existence” alone — the broader synonymy is precisely meant to head this off. The objects of innate identity-view are clarified: the focal object of innate “I”-grasping is the mere “I”, the person; the focal object of innate “mine”-grasping is the mere “mine”; in both cases the apprehended aspect is intrinsic existence. He distinguishes innate identity-view from grasping at the self-existence of persons-in-others’ continua, which is grasping at the selfhood of persons but not identity-view.
10. Refuting Arising from Self and Other
Working through MMK’s opening tetralemma (Not from itself, not from other, not from both, not without cause — MMK I.1) as quoted by Candrakīrti at MA 6.8a, Tsongkhapa first establishes that the proposition is to be read as “things never anywhere arise from any of the four” — never, anywhere, and under any philosophical standpoint. The negation is non-implicative (མེད་དགག་). He defends at length, against critics who claim Prāsaṅgika has “no thesis,” that Madhyamaka does establish the absence of intrinsic arising — citing Vigrahavyāvartanī and Prasannapadā — even while denying that anything is established with intrinsic existence. The Prāsaṅgika “no thesis” claim concerns positions held with intrinsic existence, not theses simpliciter.
A long section refutes self-arising (Sāṃkhya) and other-arising (Buddhist essentialists). The refutation of arising from other (MA 6.14–21) is central. Tsongkhapa stresses that for Prāsaṅgika, cause and effect being distinct entities is acceptable on the conventional level, but this does not amount to “arising from other” in the technical sense, which requires the other to be intrinsically other. The Pratītyasamutpāda Sūtra’s account of dependent origination is the alternative.
11. The Two Truths
The second philosophically dense chapter. Tsongkhapa treats MA 6.22–32 — Candrakīrti’s response to the worldly objection that arising-from-other is established by ordinary perception, requiring as preliminary an account of the two truths.
Glossing 6.23 (“All entities bear dual natures…”), Tsongkhapa argues that the two truths are two natures of a single entity, not two different entities or two perspectives on the same thing such that what is conventional for the ordinary becomes ultimate for the ārya. A sprout has both a conventional nature (its arising, persisting, ceasing) and an ultimate nature (its emptiness of intrinsic existence). These two natures are identical in nature (ངོ་བོ་གཅིག་) but distinct conceptual identities (ལྡོག་པ་ཐ་དད་), like “being produced” and “being impermanent” — they are not separable but are conceptually distinguished. He cites the Bodhicittavivaraṇa attributed to Nāgārjuna in support.
Against those who claim that ultimate truth is not an object of knowledge in Candrakīrti’s system — citing Candrakīrti’s own line that the ultimate is “not established through its own essence” — Tsongkhapa firmly rejects this reading. His response is that the gloss “not established by its own essence” is exactly designed to head off the objection: just because ultimate truth is obtained by meditative equipoise does not mean it is truly existent. To say that being-an-object-of-knowledge entails true existence is to confuse “being established by valid cognition” with “being objectively established independent of cognition.” Those who infer from Candrakīrti’s caveats that the ultimate is unknowable, Tsongkhapa says, “allow the tradition of the learned ones to be defiled.”
Quoting BCA 9.2 (“The ultimate is not an object of intellect; the intellect is said to be conventional”), Tsongkhapa argues this passage does not deny that ultimate truth can be cognised at all; it denies that it is cognised in the dualistic-grasping mode of ordinary intellect. The two-truths division is exhaustive — there is “no third truth” (citing Meditation on the Definite Revelation of Suchness) — by direct opposition: deceptive vs. nondeceptive admit no third option. He defends the use of bivalent reasoning (one or many, exists or not) within Prāsaṅgika against critics who claim Prāsaṅgika rejects all direct opposites.
Within conventional truth, Tsongkhapa reads MA 6.24–25 as drawing the worldly distinction between veridical conventional cognitions (clear senses) and distorted conventional cognitions (impaired senses) — true and false from the perspective of the ordinary world. From the ārya perspective, however, both are equally erroneous in projecting intrinsic characteristic. This dual-perspective handling is one of his more delicate moves: it preserves the world’s epistemic distinctions (water vs. mirage) without granting them ontological force.
He elaborates “deferring to the world” (cf. Candrakīrti’s “ask the world, not me” at Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti) as not abdication to the lowest common denominator but as appeal to unanalysed conventional cognition (མ་དཔྱད་པའི་ཤེས་པ་), which is shared by reflective philosophers and cowherds alike and which provides three criteria for conventional existence: (a) acknowledged by conventional cognition; (b) not invalidated by other conventional valid cognition; (c) not invalidated by ultimate analysis.
The chapter ends with an extended treatment of MA 6.30–31 on the inaccessibility of ultimate truth to language and ordinary thought — which Tsongkhapa parses carefully: ultimate truth is inaccessible in a particular mode (perceiving signs and dualistic appearances), but it remains inferentially knowable and directly experienced in non-conceptual gnosis.
12. The Merits of Negation
Tsongkhapa reads MA 6.33–36 in a structurally innovative way that he himself acknowledges to be unique to him. Where his teacher Rendawa and his colleague Lochen Kyabchok Palsang had read these stanzas as a section on the benefits of dependent origination preventing the extremes, Tsongkhapa groups 6.34–36 together as presenting three (or four) unwanted consequences of accepting existence-through-intrinsic-characteristic — i.e. the Svātantrika position. The three consequences:
(1) The wisdom realising emptiness would become the cause for annihilating conditioned things (6.34). If a thing’s intrinsic characteristic arose dependently and existed by way of its own essence, then a yogi directly perceiving emptiness (who does not perceive that thing at the moment of equipoise) would destroy it by his cognition — making meditative equipoise into a “hammer to a vase.” This is absurd, so things do not exist through intrinsic characteristic.
(2) Conventional truths would be able to withstand ultimate analysis (6.35). If a sprout existed by intrinsic characteristic, ultimate analysis (which seeks the inherent nature) would find the sprout, and the ultimate would be discoverable on the conventional. The Svātantrika “domain confusion” is therefore exposed: ultimate analysis and conventional analysis must operate in different domains.
(3) Ultimate arising would remain unnegated (6.36). If intrinsic characteristic on the conventional is conceded, then ultimate arising slips back in via the back door — since “intrinsic characteristic” is what ultimate arising means.
Tsongkhapa is explicit that Bhāviveka is the target. He also takes up MA 6.39–43, Candrakīrti’s refutation of ālayavijñāna, and presents his own account of how karma operates in Madhyamaka without a foundation consciousness — through the persistence of imprints on the mere conceptual continuum, not on a substantially-real bearer.
A long polemical aside addresses extrinsic emptiness (gzhan stong): Tsongkhapa argues that “X is empty of X” — a vase being empty of vase — does not make a vase non-existent, because what is being negated is intrinsic existence of vase in the vase, not the vase itself. He rejects the gzhan stong claim that “vase being empty of vase” must be nihilistic emptiness while “vase being empty of true existence but not of itself” is the proper view. For Tsongkhapa this distinction collapses on examination, because emptiness is the absence of intrinsic existence in the basis itself, and only this kind of emptiness can effectively undo the innate grasping.
13. Refuting the Cittamātra Standpoint
The first of three chapters refuting Cittamātra (MA 6.45–97). Tsongkhapa lays out the Cittamātra standpoint in its own words: the bodhisattva on the sixth ground realises suchness as “consciousness only,” apprehending no objects and therefore no subjects; ālayavijñāna (foundation consciousness) is the seed-store from which the dependent (paratantra) arises like waves from the ocean; the dependent nature has three characteristics — (1) it arises in the absence of external reality, (2) it actually exists intrinsically, (3) it is beyond the scope of conceptual elaboration in the ultimate sense.
Tsongkhapa offers a substantial discussion (with reference to Asaṅga’s Mahāyānasaṃgraha and Vasubandhu’s Viṃśatikā) on whether Cittamātra also accepts material form: he concludes that the Cittamātra “no external reality” claim is qualified — external to consciousness — but that material form (eyes, sense-objects) is accepted as inner, dependent on consciousness. Otherwise everyday discourse becomes impossible.
The substantive refutation begins with an analogy critique: Cittamātra defends consciousness-only by appeal to dream-consciousness, hair-floaters from cataracts, etc. Tsongkhapa works through Candrakīrti’s verse-by-verse demolition: dream consciousness is itself a false instance, so it cannot serve as a model for waking consciousness without conceding that waking consciousness is equally false; if one is not, then the analogy fails; if both are, then Cittamātra’s “consciousness has intrinsic existence” collapses.
14. Refuting the Proof of Intrinsic Existence of Dependent Nature
Tsongkhapa works through Candrakīrti’s refutation of two key Cittamātra/Yogācāra concepts:
Reflexive awareness (svasaṃvitti, རང་རིག་). Cittamātra’s argument is that subsequent recollection requires reflexive awareness — only a self-cognising mind could store its own occurrence for later retrieval. Tsongkhapa lays out two distinct Madhyamaka accounts of recollection (pp. 345–49) that do not require reflexive awareness: memory operates through the previously-perceived object re-emerging in dependence on the previous moment of cognition, not through an internal duplicate of cognising-cognising-itself. This is one of Tsongkhapa’s most technically demanding sections.
Manas/mental cognition (pp. 351–57). Tsongkhapa engages Candrakīrti’s specific definition of manas and discusses how Madhyamaka can give a coherent epistemological account without the apparatus of reflexive awareness or ālayavijñāna. He insists Candrakīrti is not anti-epistemology — he is rejecting foundationalist epistemology that posits objectively existing unique particulars (Dignāgan svalakṣaṇa) as the basis of perception.
15. How to Read the Sutras
This is the chapter most directly relevant to hermeneutics and the framework question. Tsongkhapa works through MA 6.84–88, Candrakīrti’s reading of the Daśabhūmika’s “this triple world is mind only” (སེམས་ཙམ་). The Cittamātra (Asaṅga in Mahāyānasaṃgraha; Vasubandhu in Viṃśatikā-vṛtti) reads this as scriptural authority for the rejection of external reality. Candrakīrti, following Bhāviveka, argues that the word “only” (ཙམ་) does not reject external reality but rather rejects some other creator: the verse rejects an eternal self, primal substance, or divine creator and asserts that mind alone is the agent of the world. The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra is invoked in support, with its catalogue of would-be agents (person, continuum, aggregates, conditions, atoms, primal substance, Īśvara) all reduced to mind.
Tsongkhapa then shows how the same word “only” indicates the primacy of mind among the twelve links — the mind being foremost among the conditions of saṃsāra — without denying external reality. The Buddha’s intent is therapeutic and pedagogical: a teaching about agency and karma, not an ontology of consciousness-only.
This chapter is particularly significant for hermeneutics: it shows Tsongkhapa explicitly distinguishing provisional (drang don, ནེ་ཡ་ཨརྠ་, neyārtha) from definitive (nges don, ནིཏྱརྠ་, nītārtha) teachings, with Candrakīrti’s reading of “mind only” as a Mahāyāna hermeneutical gesture: the sūtra’s literal meaning is provisional, the definitive meaning is found by reading it within the larger framework of the two truths and the Three Turnings of the Wheel. He references his own Essence of True Eloquence (1407) for the systematic hermeneutical apparatus.
16. Refuting Arising from Both and from No Cause
Tsongkhapa works through MA 6.98–113, the third and fourth horns of the tetralemma. Arising from both self and other (Jaina) inherits the defects of both. Arising without cause (Cārvāka materialism, also some Indian sceptics) is refuted by the regularities of cause and effect: if effects arose without causes they would arise everywhere or nowhere, all the time or never. He then works through Candrakīrti’s response to objections raised against the tetralemma refutation as a whole — including the Sāṃkhya counter that the tetralemma is itself a position and so falls under its own scope, to which Candrakīrti’s answer is that the refutation of intrinsic arising does not assert any other intrinsic mode of arising.
17. The Selflessness of Persons
Working through MA 6.120–65, this chapter contains Tsongkhapa’s most extensive treatment of the pudgala-nairātmya. The key questions he poses: what exactly is the focal object grasped in the innate identity-view? Are the physical and mental aggregates the focus, or is it a sense of self projected onto the aggregates?
Tsongkhapa distinguishes carefully between innate grasping at the self of persons (which has the mere “I” as focal object) and innate identity-view (འཇིག་ལྟ་, satkāyadṛṣṭi) — the former is broader and includes grasping at the “I” of others’ continua, while the latter operates only on one’s own “I” and “mine.” Both share the same cognitive aspect (apprehending the object as existing through intrinsic characteristic) but differ in focal object. The focal object of the “mine”-grasping identity-view is the mere “mine”, not eyes or body parts that may be mine.
Candrakīrti’s classical refutations are then worked through: the Sāṃkhya self (permanent, non-creator, devoid of qualities, inert) is refuted as “like a barren woman’s child” — devoid of arising and so devoid of being a possible focal object of innate “I”-grasping. Vaiśeṣika and Vedānta variations are dismissed as merely cosmetic differences. The aggregates themselves are rejected as the self (against Buddhist essentialists). The “support/supported” relations are rejected, and the substantial-but-neither-identical-nor-different option (Vātsīputrīyas/Sammitīyas) is refuted via the chariot analogy of MA 6.151 (the seven-fold reasoning: the chariot is not its parts, not other than them, not the support of them, not supported by them, does not own them, is not the mere collection, is not the configuration). The conclusion is that the self is a mere dependent designation on the aggregates, and the benefit of so positing it is that it easily dispels grasping at extremes.
18. Extending the Analysis
Tsongkhapa works through MA 6.166–78, where Candrakīrti generalises the chariot analysis to all phenomena: vases, cloths, rivers, forests, sentient beings, and ultimately every dharma whatsoever is established as a mere dependent designation. The chapter also handles Candrakīrti’s “no-thesis” verses (6.173–76) and Tsongkhapa’s careful interpretation: Madhyamaka has no autonomous thesis (rang rgyud kyi dam bca’), no thesis grounded in commonly-established subjects with intrinsic characteristic; but it does formulate theses for the purposes of refuting opponents and even establishes its own conclusions as non-implicative negations.
19. Enumerations of Emptiness
Tsongkhapa closes the sixth-ground material by working through MA 6.179–223, Candrakīrti’s enumeration of the sixteen emptinesses (and their fourfold summary): emptiness of the inner, outer, both inner and outer, emptiness, great immensity, ultimate, conditioned, unconditioned, beyond extremes, beginningless and endless, non-discardable, intrinsic nature, all phenomena, defining characteristics, unobservable, and absence of entity.
His most consequential discussion (pp. 490–94) is on svabhāva itself. Quoting MMK XV.2 (“intrinsic nature is unfabricated and not dependent on something else”), Tsongkhapa distinguishes two senses of svabhāva: (1) something intrinsic in things, an essence by which they obtain existence and identity — this is categorically rejected; (2) the absence of intrinsic existence — emptiness — which is, in an objective sense, the only true nature things have, and this sense is accepted. Without this second sense being accepted, there is nothing for the realization of emptiness to land on, and “true release from grasping” becomes impossible.
This is the concession that appears, to critics like Gorampa, to undo the whole Madhyamaka project — by holding back a “true nature” that the analysis fails to deconstruct. Tsongkhapa’s defense is that the svabhāva as emptiness is itself not truly existent (it is a non-implicative negation, itself empty of intrinsic existence — the famous “emptiness of emptiness”), so the concession is not a relapse into essentialism.
Each of the sixteen emptinesses is glossed verse-by-verse with reference to specific bases. The fourfold reduction is then explained: emptiness of entity, of non-entity, of intrinsic nature, of other-derived entity. The chapter concludes the sixth-ground material with the observation that all enumerations of emptiness are pedagogical: they exist only to address the diverse needs of trainees, since emptiness itself is a single non-implicative negation.
20. The Seventh Ground, Gone Afar
A short chapter on the seventh ground, where the perfection of skill-in-means (ཐབས་, upāya) becomes excellent. Tsongkhapa briefly glosses Candrakīrti’s verses on how the bodhisattva at this ground develops the capacity to enter and exit cessation in an instant.
21. The Eighth Ground, The Immovable
A very short chapter on the eighth ground, perfection of aspiration (སྨོན་ལམ་, praṇidhāna). Tsongkhapa notes that Candrakīrti’s treatment is brief and does not need elaboration; the bodhisattva at this ground has attained “irreversibility” (ཕྱིར་མི་ལྡོག་པ་).
22. The Ninth Ground, Perfect Intellect
A very short chapter on the ninth ground, perfection of power (སྟོབས་, bala). Tsongkhapa briefly glosses Candrakīrti’s verses on the four perfect knowledges (pratisaṃvid) attained at this ground.
23. The Tenth Ground, Cloud of Dharma
A short chapter on the tenth ground, perfection of gnosis (ཡེ་ཤེས་, jñāna). Tsongkhapa glosses Candrakīrti’s image of the bodhisattva on this ground receiving consecration (abhiṣeka) from buddhas of the ten directions, like a great cloud of dharma raining down on the world.
24. Qualities of the Ten Grounds
Tsongkhapa works through Candrakīrti’s catalogue of the qualities each ground confers (the twelve sets of one hundred attainments at the first ground multiplying through the tenth, etc.). This is largely scholastic exposition with little independent intervention.
25. The Resultant Ground
The final chapter of the work, treating MA chapter 11 — the resultant ground of buddhahood — and containing some of Tsongkhapa’s most philosophically charged claims.
The opening section (MA 11.10–11) explains that the bodhisattva first attains buddhahood in Akaniṣṭha and at that moment attains the gnosis that knows everything in a single instant. This sets up the central question Tsongkhapa addresses (pp. 533–38): how can a buddha’s gnosis know both ultimate truth (the way things really are, ཇི་ལྟ་བ་) and conventional truth (things in their diversity, ཇི་སྙེད་པ་) within a single moment, without dualistic appearance?
Candrakīrti raises the objection (MA 11.12) that if ultimate reality is the cessation of all elaborations and intrinsic arising, then no mind can perceive it — there can be no aspect for the mind to bear. Tsongkhapa reads Candrakīrti’s response (MA 11.13) as conceding the point at the level of intrinsic reality but affirming it at the level of convention: just as in ordinary cognition the mind takes on the aspect of its object, so the mind takes on the aspect of suchness — by being itself unborn, fusing with the unborn object “as water poured into water.” Cognition of ultimate truth is therefore only “designatedly” cognition; it is not cognition in the dualistic-appearance sense, but it is real cognition all the same.
Tsongkhapa explicitly rebukes “those who say that in this system there is no nonconceptual gnosis realizing the ultimate truth” — they “denigrate the supreme realization of the āryas.” This is a direct rebuttal of certain Tibetan readings of Candrakīrti as denying ultimate-truth cognition.
The most consequential move follows: at buddhahood, equipoise and post-equipoise are no longer alternating states. The buddha continuously abides in equipoise on ultimate truth and yet perceives all of conventional reality. Tsongkhapa cites the Satyadvayāvatāra and Ratnagotravibhāga: a buddha’s gnosis is one gnosis with two distinct modes of knowing defined by its two distinct objects (ji lta ba and ji snyed pa). The two modes are not two cognitions: residual imprints of dualistic perception have been eradicated, so although dualistic appearances of object/subject appear in the buddha’s perception of conventional truth, this is not an erroneous dualistic perception (the buddha’s gnosis is mirroring the deluded perception of the trainee, not generating its own delusion).
Tsongkhapa explicitly rejects the alternative — defended by some — that a buddha’s gnosis sees only emptiness, with conventional truth being the perspective of trainees alone. The cost of this view, for Tsongkhapa, is that the buddha would then not be omniscient: the ten powers, defined in terms of knowledge of specific facts, would become incoherent. He insists that maintaining a coherent account of how a buddha’s gnosis perceives diversity after rejecting intrinsic existence “is a formidable but crucial challenge for Madhyamaka.”
The remainder of the chapter glosses the buddha bodies — dharmakāya (the gnosis fused with ultimate truth, “burning away the tinder of all objects of knowledge”), saṃbhogakāya (sustained by merit, the source of teaching to bodhisattvas), and nirmāṇakāya (emanation body, including the “causally concordant” emanations) — and addresses the perennial objection that a buddha free of all conceptualization cannot teach: Candrakīrti’s potter-wheel analogy (MA 11.15–16) is unpacked. The wheel set in motion by long prior labour spins on without continuous effort; likewise, the buddha’s enlightened deeds proceed spontaneously through the maturation of the trainees’ merit and the buddha’s prior bodhisattva aspirations, without requiring moment-by-moment intentional effort.
The work closes with verses on the unity of the vehicle, the time of manifest awakening, and the buddha’s ten powers and unique qualities, with Tsongkhapa’s customary careful textual attention to alternative Tibetan translations (favouring Naktso over Patsab in some passages, the reverse in others) and his use of Jayānanda’s commentary as a foil.