“Visions of Unity: The Golden Paṇḍita Shakya Chokden’s New Interpretation of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka” — Komarovski, Yaroslav, 2011.
Thesis / main argument
Komarovski presents Shakya Chokden’s (1428–1507) unique interpretation of the nature and relationship of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka as two equally valid forms of “Great Madhyamaka.” Shakya Chokden reclassifies Alīkākāravāda (False Aspectarian) Yogācāra as a subdivision of Madhyamaka on a par with Niḥsvabhāvavāda, while equating Satyākāravāda (True Aspectarian) Yogācāra with Cittamātra. The grand unity he proposes rests on the claim that despite radically different conceptual articulations, both Alīkākāravāda and Niḥsvabhāvavāda lead to the same direct meditative experience of ultimate reality — non-dual primordial mind (ye shes).
Key claims
- Alīkākāravāda = Madhyamaka: The standard identification of Madhyamaka exclusively with Niḥsvabhāvavāda is too narrow. Alīkākāravāda Yogācāra is an equally valid form of Madhyamaka, not Cittamātra (pp. 8–9, 119, 140)
- Two valid divisions of Madhyamaka: The genuine division of Madhyamaka is Niḥsvabhāvavāda / Alīkākāravāda (= self-emptiness / other-emptiness), NOT Prāsaṅgika / Svātantrika. The latter distinction is methodological, not philosophical — Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika share the same ultimate view and the same account of conventional phenomena (pp. 117, 137–139)
- Self-emptiness literally = phenomena empty of themselves: Shakya Chokden insists on the literal reading: a pot being empty of the pot. He charges that Tsongkhapa’s version — phenomena empty of a separately identified object of negation (“true establishment”) — is actually other-emptiness in disguise (pp. 125–127)
- Tsongkhapa’s self-emptiness is covert other-emptiness: In Tsongkhapa’s system, the basis of negation (conventionally existent phenomena) is empty of an object of negation other than itself (nonexistent “true establishment”) — structurally identical to the Yogācāra formula of dependent natures empty of imaginary natures (pp. 126–127)
- Dolpopa’s other-emptiness criticised: Dolpopa errs by taking the thoroughly established nature as the basis of emptiness (empty of dependent and imaginary natures), rather than the mainstream Yogācāra formula where the dependent natures are the basis, empty of imaginary natures (pp. 131–135)
- Niḥsvabhāvavāda superior in reasoning, Alīkākāravāda superior in identifying ultimate reality: Niḥsvabhāvavāda provides the most effective reasoning for severing conceptual proliferations; but Alīkākāravāda provides a better identification of what is actually experienced in meditative equipoise — primordial mind (pp. 273–274)
- Primordial mind as the bridge: Non-dual primordial mind is the ultimate reality in all Mahāyāna systems — sūtric and tantric. Alīkākāravāda is much closer to Tantric Madhyamaka than Niḥsvabhāvavāda, because both identify the object of meditative experience as primordial mind (pp. 255–264)
- Ultimate reality is impermanent: Shakya Chokden holds that ultimate reality as experienced in Madhyamaka is an impermanent phenomenon — a claim controversial by any standard (p. 6)
- Conventional existence = nonexistence: In the Niḥsvabhāvavāda system, if something exists it has to be true (bden); conventional existence entails nonexistence (pp. 99–100)
- Lower tenets are soteriologically valid: Negations made by lower tenet systems are accepted by higher ones. Even the Vaibhāṣika understanding of the selflessness of persons is sufficient for liberation. The “matryoshka” principle: higher tenets absorb negations from lower ones but reject their positive assertions (pp. 110–115)
- Both self-emptiness and other-emptiness simultaneously: Shakya Chokden advocates a “polygamous marriage” — he never abandoned self-emptiness but expanded Madhyamaka to include Alīkākāravāda other-emptiness. He is a proponent of other-emptiness “no more and no less than self-emptiness” (pp. 107–108)
- Third dharmacakra as source of definitive meaning for meditation: Both Alīkākāravāda and Tantric systems treat the explicit teachings of the third dharmacakra as providing the definitive view that is incorporated into meditative experience, while the second dharmacakra provides reasoning that severs proliferations (pp. 257–258)
Methodology
Komarovski adopts a sympathetic-reconstructive method, treating Shakya Chokden’s system as an integrated whole and drawing on approximately fifty of his works (especially those from his early fifties onward, 1477–1507). Komarovski is trained in both Sakya and Nyingma traditions (at Dzongsar Institute under Khenchen Künga Wangchuk, and at Pelyül Chökhor Ling) as well as Western academic methodology. He explicitly chooses not to compare Shakya Chokden with Tsongkhapa or Dolpopa in detail, but to present the system on its own terms.
Connections
- Agrees with Mipham and Ninth Karmapa on the insignificance of the Prāsaṅgika/Svātantrika distinction as a philosophical (vs methodological) divide
- Agrees with Dolpopa and Tāranātha that other-emptiness is a valid Madhyamaka position, but criticises their formulation of what the basis of emptiness is
- Opposes Tsongkhapa on the object of negation, on conventional existence, and on the meaning of self-emptiness
- Opposes Gorampa on the scope of Madhyamaka (Gorampa limits it to Niḥsvabhāvavāda; Shakya Chokden expands it)
- Aligns with Śāntarakṣita (via Haribhadra): treats Śāntarakṣita as a Yogācāra Mādhyamika who uses Niḥsvabhāvavāda reasoning for severing proliferations but identifies the object of meditative experience as primordial mind
- Ruegg’s analysis is partly anticipated: the S-P distinction is methodological, not philosophical. But Shakya Chokden goes further than Ruegg by replacing it with a different division entirely
- Relevant to Burton’s nihilism charge: Shakya Chokden would classify Burton’s reading as the predictable result of engaging only with Niḥsvabhāvavāda reasoning without the complementary Alīkākāravāda identification of what is experienced — exactly the framework-absence this wiki diagnoses