Position summary
Burton argues that Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of emptiness, when read in its Abhidharma context, entails nihilism contrary to Nāgārjuna’s own intentions. Universal absence of svabhāva means all entities are entirely conceptually constructed (prajñaptimātra). Since conceptual construction requires both an unconstructed material basis and an unconstructed constructing agent, and since Nāgārjuna denies any unconstructed existent, nothing can exist. Nāgārjuna is an unwitting nihilist. Burton rejects the sceptical interpretation (Nāgārjuna does claim knowledge) and the mystical interpretation (Nāgārjuna’s knowledge is not trans-rational gnosis). He favours the view that Nāgārjuna intended an ontological critique of svabhāva — but argues this critique, taken to its logical conclusion, destroys the entities it was meant to preserve.
Hermeneutical approach
Deliberately disengages from the later commentarial tradition. Reads Nāgārjuna as a second-century Indian Buddhist operating in an Abhidharma context, and is “careful not to import what are actually later Mādhyamika concepts, terminology, and arguments, attributing them naively to Nāgārjuna.” While he references Candrakīrti, Tsongkhapa, mKhas grub rje, Gorampa, and the Eighth Karmapa, he treats them as later interpreters whose readings may diverge from Nāgārjuna’s own positions. Applies analytic philosophical categories (scepticism, nihilism, the given, solipsism) and assumes a trans-historical rationality. Written as a doctoral thesis under Paul Williams at Bristol.
Key claims
- Universal absence of svabhāva = prajñaptimātra (all entities entirely conceptually constructed) (burton-emptiness-appraised-1999)
- Prajñaptimātra requires unconstructed basis and constructor; without these, nihilism follows (burton-emptiness-appraised-1999)
- Nāgārjuna is not a sceptic — he claims to know emptiness (burton-emptiness-appraised-1999)
- Candrakīrti’s identification of emptiness as the actual svabhāva of entities is an innovation, not straightforwardly present in Nāgārjuna (burton-emptiness-appraised-1999)
- Even a non-nihilistic reading leaves Nāgārjuna guilty of “excessive ontological parsimony” (burton-emptiness-appraised-1999)
Tenpa’s assessment
Burton is the paper’s most important “exhibit” for Section 5.2 and 6.2. His reading demonstrates with unusual clarity what happens when the hermeneutical framework is deliberately removed: the reader arrives at nihilism. This is not because Burton is an unsympathetic reader — he is a Buddhist practitioner who takes Nāgārjuna seriously as a philosopher — but because he has methodologically excluded the interpretive resources (Two Truths as pedagogy, provisional/definitive teachings, the commentarial tradition) that every traditional interpreter uses to avoid this conclusion. His nihilism argument has genuine philosophical force and should be engaged with seriously, not dismissed. What the paper should show is that the nihilistic reading is a predictable consequence of framework-removal, not a discovery about Nāgārjuna’s actual philosophy.
Related scholars
- Westerhoff — directly responds to Burton’s nihilism charge in On the Nihilist Interpretation of Madhyamaka
- Paul Williams — Burton’s doctoral supervisor, shares the nihilism concern; Burton acknowledges substantial debt to Williams’ interpretation
- Kalupahana — Burton explicitly rejects Kalupahana’s reading but both remove the Mahāyāna framework
- Tsongkhapa — Burton acknowledges the dGe lugs pa “emptiness of emptiness” solution as “the most ingenious attempted solution” to the nihilism paradox
- Gorampa — mentioned as holding the “trans-rational gnosis” interpretation
- Eighth Karmapa — mentioned as holding the nature of things to be “quite ‘other’ than the conceptualisable world”