Emptiness Appraised

“Emptiness Appraised: A Critical Study of Nāgārjuna’s Philosophy” — Burton, David, 1999.

Thesis / main argument

Burton argues that Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of emptiness, understood in its Abhidharma context, entails nihilism despite Nāgārjuna’s claim to tread the Middle Path. The core argument: universal absence of svabhāva, read through the Abhidharma framework, means not merely that all entities dependently originate but that all entities are entirely conceptually constructed (prajñaptisat). If nothing unconstructed exists out of which conceptual constructions can be formed, and no unconstructed agent exists to do the constructing, then nothing whatsoever can exist. Nāgārjuna is thus an unwitting nihilist. Burton also argues that Nāgārjuna’s arguments against the Nyāya pramāṇa theory fail to establish that there are no mind-independent entities.

Key claims

• Burton identifies three interpretations of Nāgārjuna: (1) sceptic (no knowledge possible), (2) mystic (trans-rational gnosis of an unconceptualisable reality), (3) ontological critique of svabhāva with knowledge of emptiness possible. He favours (3) as closest to Nāgārjuna’s own intention (Ch 1, pp. 2–4)
• Nāgārjuna is not a sceptic: he emphatically claims knowledge of emptiness, unlike the classical sceptics who suspend all judgement (Ch 2)
• The Abhidharma notion of svabhāva is not “independent existence” simpliciter but “unanalysable, more-than-conceptually-constructed existence” (dravyasat). Abhidharma dharmas possess svabhāva yet dependently originate — these are compatible for the Abhidharmika (Ch 4, pp. 90–93)
• Burton rejects the view that Nāgārjuna simply redefined svabhāva: Nāgārjuna operates within Abhidharma terminology, and his denial that entities have svabhāva means they are prajñaptisat — entirely conceptually constructed (Ch 4, pp. 93–95)
• Evidence for prajñaptimātra in Nāgārjuna’s writings: dependence on parts (RV I, 71, 81); use of saṃvṛti/saṃvṛta to denote all entities (AS 6, 44); vyavahāra as synonym for lokasaṃvṛtisatya (MMK XXIV, 8-10); terms kalpanā, vikalpa, parikalpa, nāmamātra; non-origination of dependently originating entities; comparisons with dreams, illusions; analysis of MMK XXIV, 18 (prajñaptir upādāya) (Ch 4, pp. 95–104)
• The nihilistic consequences: if all entities are conceptual constructs, there must be something unconstructed out of which they are constructed and someone unconstructed who does the constructing. Without these, conceptual construction cannot take place. Since Nāgārjuna denies both, nothing can exist (Ch 4, pp. 109–110)
• Solipsism problem: if the enlightened Mādhyamika sees all entities (including other people) as conceptual constructs, a public world is impossible, and the bodhisattva ideal of compassion becomes incoherent (Ch 4, pp. 107–109)
• Burton considers an alternative reading — Nāgārjuna attacks only the Vaibhāṣika theory that saṃskṛta dharmas exist permanently sasvabhāvamātra — but finds it textually implausible on three grounds (Ch 4, pp. 111–116)
• Even if Nāgārjuna avoids nihilism, his equation of analysable existence with conceptually constructed existence is “excessive ontological parsimony” — it is implausible that trees, mountains, etc. are merely conceptual constructs (Ch 4, pp. 114–116)
• The Appendix argues that Candrakīrti’s claim (PP 264–265, YŚV 25) that the actual svabhāva of entities is their lack of svabhāva is a philosophical innovation, not straightforwardly present in Nāgārjuna’s own texts (pp. 213–218)
• Burton also examines and rejects a zhentong reading of AS 44–45b as implausible given the rest of the text’s emphasis on absence of svabhāva (pp. 218–219)
• Nāgārjuna’s arguments against Nyāya realism in the VV/VVC and Vaidalyaprakaraṇa fail to establish that there are no mind-independent entities (Ch 15, p. 210)
• (Ch 3) Two ways to resolve the non-conceptuality verses. Nāgārjuna says both that reality is the absence of svabhāva (conceptual, expressible) and that reality is niṣprapañca / nirvikalpa (non-conceptual, inexpressible — MMK XVIII.7, 9; LS; AS). Burton offers two incompatible resolutions: interpretation (1) equivocates on “reality” (reality₁ = the conceptualisable absence of svabhāva; reality₂ = an unconceptualisable ultimate known only by non-conceptual gnosis); interpretation (2) denies any reality₂ and reads the non-conceptuality language as describing the meditative experience of knowing the absence of svabhāva (Ch 3, pp. 47–53). Burton holds (2) is closer to Nāgārjuna’s intention, but argues both face serious difficulties (pp. 81–83)
• (Ch 3) reality₁/reality₂ mapped onto Bhāvaviveka’s two ultimates. Burton ties interpretation (1) to Bhāvaviveka’s paryāya / aparyāya-paramārtha (རྣམ་གྲངས་པའི་དོན་དམ་ / རྣམ་གྲངས་མ་ཡིན་པའི་དོན་དམ་): the specifiable ultimate, expressible by the thesis “all entities lack svabhāva”, versus the unspecifiable ultimate “beyond conceptual diffusion” and “beyond the extremes of existence and non-existence” (pp. 50–51) — the same two-ultimates structure used by Mipham and Gorampa
• (Ch 3) Mipham named as a proponent of interpretation (1). Following Williams, Burton cites Mipham (with Jizang and the Tibetan yod min med min position) as holding that going beyond x and not-x “forces the mind to a new level… the gnosis which is the calming of all verbal differentiations” — and makes Mipham’s gnosis-reading the chief target of his critique of interpretation (1) (pp. 51, citing Williams 1998b)
• (Ch 3) The critique of interpretation (1). An unconceptualisable reality apprehended by non-conceptual knowledge is, Burton argues, philosophically untenable: the assertion is self-refuting (it conceptualises the unconceptualisable); it makes the two truths an unbridgeable chasm (if the ultimate is unconceptualisable, conceptual conventions cannot be shown “closer” to it, yielding relativism — pp. 57–60; he reads Candrakīrti on MMK XXIV.9 / PP 494 as failing to meet this); it is Hegel’s “night in which all cows are black” — a contentless reality known by a knowledge that discriminates nothing (pp. 62–63, with Dummett, S. Katz and Bagger on the impossibility of unmediated/non-conceptual experience); and it carries an ethical risk — a teacher claiming inexpressible realisation is “unaccountable… a recipe for despotism” (p. 65)
• (Ch 3) Interpretation (2)‘s three senses of “non-conceptual”. Cashing out the non-conceptuality language without a reality₂, Burton distinguishes knowledge by acquaintance (vs theoretical knowledge — the Bengal-tiger and Candrakīrti eye-disease taimirika analogies; dṛṣṭi → darśana, MMK XIII.8), lack of explicit conceptualisation (Heidegger’s hammer, the absorbed pianist — hence “no thesis” at the time of meditation, compatible with an accurate thesis afterwards), and focussed conceptualisation (one-pointed samādhi on the single quality of emptiness — hence śānta, anānārtha) (pp. 66–81). He endorses the dGe lugs view that emptiness is “multiple, not a unitary Absolute” (Napper on Tsongkhapa, p. 73)
• (Ch 3) Burton’s deflationary reading of the emptiness of emptiness (MA VI.186). He reads śūnyatāśūnyatā as opposing the apprehension of emptiness as a dngos po (bhāva) = “a mind-independent existent”: the true nature of entities is itself dependent on the mind’s conceptual construction, so emptiness is no mind-independent absolute (pp. 68). This is the non-foundationalist gloss — yet in Ch 4 he runs the regress that demands an unconstructed basis (see the wiki author’s note 10)
• (Ch 3) Two criticisms of interpretation (2). (i) Emptiness as a mere absence: can one discriminate a mere absence, or does meditation on emptiness collapse into discriminating nothing at all (the nirodhasamāpatti / cessation), hence not a state of knowledge? (ii) Nihilism (forward reference to Ch 4): if universal absence of svabhāva entails nihilism, there are no entities to bear emptiness and no emptiness to be their quality, so there can be no meditative knowledge by acquaintance of emptiness — making interpretation (2) “untenable” (pp. 82–83)

Non-Conceptuality and Knowledge of Reality

In Chapter 3 Burton addresses the two-truths / two-realities problem (Burton’s “reality₁ / reality₂”). The chapter sets up an apparent contradiction in Nāgārjuna — reality is the absence of svabhāva (conceptual, expressible) yet reality is niṣprapañca / nirvikalpa (non-conceptual, inexpressible) — and tests two incompatible resolutions.

Interpretation (1): non-conceptual knowledge of an unconceptualisable reality. This equivocates on “reality”: reality₁ is the conceptualisable absence of svabhāva (Bhāvaviveka’s specifiable, paryāya ultimate, expressible by a thesis); reality₂ is an unconceptualisable ultimate apprehended only by a non-conceptual gnosis (tattvajñāna) (Bhāvaviveka’s aparyāya ultimate, “beyond conceptual diffusion,” beyond the extremes of existence and non-existence). Burton sub-divides this into (1a) an immanent unconceptualisable reality (the true nature of entities) and (1b) a transcendent Absolute placed apart from the dependently-originating world; he finds (1b) textually unsupported (no Nāgārjunian evidence for an Absolute apart), and (1a) the only candidate. He names Jizang, the Tibetan yod min med min position, and — following Williams — Mipham as proponents (Mipham citing MMK XV.10; Burton adds RV I.62).

Burton rejects interpretation (1) on both textual and philosophical grounds:

• Textual: the unconceptualisable-reality verses are uncommon “passing remarks”; reading a developed reality₂ doctrine into them risks R. Robinson’s “mosaic interpretation” and “insinuating the future” (reading later Madhyamaka back into Nāgārjuna).
• Philosophical (four lines): (i) the paradox of unconceptualisability — to state that reality is unconceptualisable is itself a conceptualisation, hence self-refuting (he canvasses two escapes — the “only legitimate concept is ‘unconceptualisable’” two-tier move and the New-York analogy — and leaves the matter undecided); (ii) the problem of the two truths — if the ultimate is unconceptualisable, how can conceptual conventional teachings be efficacious toward it? The chasm cannot be bridged; no formulation can be shown “closer” to an ineffable object, so epistemological and ethical relativism follow; the Zen “finger pointing at the moon” defence is incoherent (“to indicate is to discriminate”); Candrakīrti’s reply on MMK XXIV.9 (PP 494) “does not really come to terms with” the objection; (iii) the “night in which all cows are black” (Hegel on Schelling) — a reality that cannot be discriminated, known by a knowledge that discriminates nothing, is contentless; concepts are what enable discrimination (Dummett), so “non-conceptual knowledge” is not knowledge, and non-conceptual consciousness is impossible (consciousness is always of x); buttressed by S. Katz and M. Bagger against pure/unmediated mystical experience; (iv) an ethical-political rider — a leader claiming inexpressible non-conceptual realisation “need not be accountable… surely a recipe for despotism.”

Interpretation (2): the non-conceptual meditative knowledge-experience of emptiness. Burton’s preferred reading. The non-conceptuality language describes not reality but the character of the experience of knowing reality (the absence of svabhāva). The experience is conceptual in one sense — it discriminates its object (emptiness) — but “non-conceptual” in three further senses: knowledge by acquaintance (vs theoretical knowledge: the Bengal-tiger analogy; Candrakīrti’s taimirika eye-disease analogy on MMK XVIII.9 / PP 373; dṛṣṭi → darśana at MMK XIII.8), lack of explicit conceptualisation (Heidegger’s hammer, the absorbed pianist — the meditator “has no thesis” while absorbed, yet can state an accurate thesis afterwards), and focussed conceptualisation (one-pointed samādhi on the single quality of emptiness — yielding śānta and anānārtha). Along the way he endorses the dGe lugs reading that emptiness is multiple, “not a unitary Absolute” (Napper on Tsongkhapa), and reads Candrakīrti’s emptiness of emptiness (MA VI.186) deflationarily: emptiness is not a dngos po (bhāva) / mind-independent existent, the true nature of entities being itself dependent on conceptual construction. He then turns interpretation (2)‘s own gains against it twice: meditation on a mere absence may collapse into discriminating nothing (the cessation, nirodhasamāpatti), and — forward to Ch 4 — if universal niḥsvabhāva is nihilism, there are no entities to bear emptiness and so no knowledge-by-acquaintance of it.

In sum: Chapter 3 shows Burton mounting a modern analytic attack on the apophatic / gnosis wing of the framework (the “real ultimate reached by gnosis” reading held by Gorampa and Mipham), distinct from the Abhidharma regress of Ch 4 — and doing so while agreeing with this wiki that there is no separate reality₂ Absolute (the zhentong / Vedānta error this wiki also rejects).

Methodology

Analytic philosophical appraisal. Burton explicitly reads Nāgārjuna through Western philosophical categories — scepticism, nihilism, realism, the problem of the given — while attempting to ground his reading in the Abhidharma philosophical context. He deliberately disengages from the later commentarial tradition: “I will be dealing with Madhyamaka at its very earliest stage of development. I intend to be careful not to import what are actually later Mādhyamika concepts, terminology, and arguments, attributing them naively to Nāgārjuna” (p. 6). He assumes a trans-historical rationality and argues that Indian philosophers reasoned according to the same basic logical laws as modern Western thinkers (pp. 11–12). His primary interlocutor is Paul Williams, under whose supervision the doctoral thesis was written.

Notable quotes

• “Perhaps unfortunately, much of what Nāgārjuna says does not withstand the rigorous philosophical scrutiny which I am advocating” (p. 12)

Connections

• Westerhoff — On the Nihilist Interpretation of Madhyamaka (westerhoff-nihilist-interpretation-2016) is a direct response to Burton (and Williams). Westerhoff engages the nihilism charge through the equilibrium principle and a partial concession to nihilism that avoids Burton’s full nihilistic conclusion.
• Kalupahana — Burton explicitly rejects Kalupahana’s reading that Nāgārjuna simply reasserts the Buddha’s original teaching of dependent origination (Preface, pp. x–xi). Both remove the Mahāyāna framework but arrive at different destinations: Kalupahana at deflationary pragmatism, Burton at nihilism.
• Tsongkhapa — Burton notes the dGe lugs pa solution to the paradox that “emptiness is true but does not truly exist” (Ch 4, n. 23, pp. 117–118) as “the most ingenious attempted solution which I have come across” but does not fully engage with it because it falls outside his self-imposed methodological limits.
• Gorampa — Burton mentions Gorampa (as “Go rams pa bSod nams seng ge”) in the Introduction as holding that ultimate truth is “beyond conceptual diffusion” — the second of his three interpretations (p. 4). This is precisely the position Burton argues leads to a “trans-rational gnosis” problem.
• Eighth Karmapa / Ninth Karmapa — Burton mentions Mikyö Dorje (p. 4) as holding the actual nature of things to be “quite ‘other’ than the conceptualisable world,” attributing this to Williams. This is the Karmapa’s “freedom from elaborations” position.
• Mipham — named (Ch 3, p. 51, via Williams 1998b) as a proponent of interpretation (1): going beyond x and not-x “forces the mind to… the gnosis which is the calming of all verbal differentiations.” Burton’s critique of interpretation (1) (night of black cows, relativism, despotism) is aimed at exactly this reading. The paper relies on Mipham as an ally against nihilism, so this is a tension to be met head-on — see the wiki author’s note 9 for the rebuttal (Mipham’s zung ‘jug ≠ Burton’s reality₂).
• Bhāviveka — Burton frames reality₁/reality₂ as Bhāviveka’s paryāya / aparyāya-paramārtha (the specifiable vs unspecifiable ultimate, Tarkajvālā) and uses the karmadhāraya / tatpuruṣa analysis of “paramārtha” (Tjv) to mark the reality-vs-knowledge-of-reality distinction (pp. 50–51, 68). The same two-ultimates structure grounds Mipham’s and Gorampa’s readings.
• Dolpopa / Tāranātha — Burton considers and rejects a zhentong reading of AS 44–45b in the Appendix (pp. 218–219).