On the Nihilist Interpretation of Madhyamaka

Thesis / main argument

Westerhoff argues that the persistent characterisation of Madhyamaka as nihilism — by non-Buddhist Indian critics, Buddhist critics (especially Yogācāra), and modern Buddhologists alike — is not simply a two-millennia-long misunderstanding. He constructs a philosophically consistent form of nihilism from two premises (eliminativism about the dependent + non-foundationalism) and argues that this form is compatible with Madhyamaka. Crucially, it differs from the five forms of nihilism that Madhyamaka explicitly rejects. He concludes with an “equilibrium principle”: the best interpretation of Madhyamaka is opponent-relative, and against today’s dominant naturalistic realism, the nihilist reading provides the sharpest philosophical edge.

Key claims

• Nihilism as a charge against Madhyamaka appears across non-Buddhist Indian philosophy (Uddyotakara, Kumārila, Śańkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva), Buddhist critics (Asańga’s pradhāna nāstika in the Bodhisattvabhūmi, Vasubandhu’s sarvanāstitā), and modern Buddhologists (de la Vallée Poussin, Kern, Keith, Wood, Oetke, Burton, Williams) (pp. 337–355)
• A consistent nihilism can be constructed from: (a) eliminativism about the dependent (only the fundamental exists), and (b) non-foundationalism (there is nothing fundamental) — yielding “nothing exists” without self-refutation, because appearances can still appear without bearing ontological weight (pp. 358–361)
• Madhyamaka explicitly rejects five other forms of nihilism: (1) nihilism as an extreme view, (2) annihilationism (uccheda), (3) denial of functional efficacy, (4) reified non-existence (emptiness taken as a substantial “view”), and (5) moral nihilism (denial of karmic results). None of these is identical to the consistent nihilism described above (pp. 362–369)
• The Williams-Burton argument — that dependent entities require an independent foundation, else we get nihilism — fails because dependence-structures can be circular or infinitely descending; they need not be hierarchically grounded (pp. 356–357)
• Candrakīrti in the Prasannapadā on MMK 18:7 effectively concedes an “essential identity” (vastutas tulyatā) between the Mādhyamika and the nihilist at the ontological level, while insisting on a vast epistemological and soteriological difference between the two (pp. 351–352)
• The “equilibrium principle”: the right interpretation of Madhyamaka is opponent-relative. Against naturalistic realists, the nihilist interpretation provides the sharpest alternative. Against anything-goes relativists, one would stress conventional truth’s stability. This follows from Madhyamaka’s lack of a “master argument” — its arguments adapt to specific opponents (pp. 371–373)
• Gendun Chöpel’s critique of the Geluk object of negation (dgag bya) as too narrow is cited as precedent: Madhyamaka reasoning should apply directly to pots and pillars, not just to “inherently existent” straw men, because sensory appearance prevents any actual slide into nihilism (pp. 370–371)

Methodology

Westerhoff combines close textual analysis of Indian sources (Sanskrit and Tibetan, with original-language quotations) with analytic philosophical argumentation. He surveys historical criticisms of Madhyamaka across traditions, constructs a formal argument for consistent nihilism using Western philosophical categories (eliminativism, non-foundationalism), and then maps this back onto Madhyamaka texts to test for compatibility. He engages seriously with traditional commentarial sources (Candrakīrti, Asańga) while also bringing in contemporary analytic philosophy (Siderits, Dennett).

Tenpa’s critical notes

This source is highly relevant but requires careful handling. Westerhoff is the most methodologically balanced modern interpreter in the paper’s survey, but his argument here partially concedes nihilism rather than refuting it via the hermeneutical framework. He argues that a sophisticated nihilism is compatible with Madhyamaka — the critics were reacting to real features of the system, but took these to entail problems that Madhyamaka’s version of nihilism does not generate.

This creates an interesting tension with the paper’s thesis. Westerhoff doesn’t argue that the nihilist reading fails because it lacks the Mahāyāna hermeneutical framework. He argues that a properly nuanced nihilism is defensible within the system. The paper will need to position this carefully: Westerhoff succeeds precisely because he engages with the traditional interpretive context (Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā, the five forms of rejected nihilism, the Two Truths methodology), even while arriving at a provocative conclusion.

The Candrakīrti “theft” example (Prasannapadā on MMK 18:7) is particularly important: Candrakīrti concedes ontological sameness between Mādhyamika and nihilist while insisting on soteriological difference. This supports the paper’s argument that the Two Truths framework is doing essential interpretive work — without it, you can’t distinguish the Mādhyamika’s “nothing exists ultimately” from the nihilist’s “nothing exists.”

Connections

• Directly responds to: Burton’s Emptiness Appraised and Williams’s nihilism concerns — the Williams-Burton argument is the main modern target
• Engages with: Candrakīrti extensively (Prasannapadā on MMK 18:7, 24:7, 15:11); Asańga’s Bodhisattvabhūmi critique; Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa
• Cites approvingly: Siderits on eliminativism/reductionism; Cabezón on Prāsaṅgika language; Gendun Chöpel on the object of negation
• Contradicts: any reading that dismisses the nihilism charge as simple misunderstanding — Westerhoff takes it seriously as pointing to real features of the system
• Supports: the paper’s thesis that engagement with traditional commentarial sources produces more coherent readings, though by an unexpected route (Westerhoff’s nihilism is coherent because it’s informed by the tradition)

Relevance to paper

• Section 5.2 (Burton): Westerhoff’s direct refutation of Burton’s nihilism charge; the Williams-Burton argument and its resolution via non-hierarchical dependence
• Section 5.3 (Williams): same argument, Williams as co-author
• Section 5.5 (Westerhoff): primary source for characterising his interpretive method — engages traditional sources while maintaining academic rigour; the equilibrium principle as methodological innovation
• Section 3.3 (Candrakīrti): the Prasannapadā “theft” example on MMK 18:7 — Candrakīrti’s concession of ontological sameness with nihilism, qualified by soteriological difference
• Section 6.1 (framework necessity): Westerhoff’s discussion of Candrakīrti on MMK 24:7 (emptiness = dependent origination ≠ non-existence) as evidence that the Two Truths framework is presupposed
• Section 6.2 (what happens without framework): the Williams-Burton argument as a case study — their nihilism worry arises precisely from reading MMK without the commentarial apparatus
• Flag: Westerhoff’s equilibrium principle could suggest the outline needs a methodological note in Section 5.5 or 6.1 about opponent-relative interpretation. This does not contradict the paper’s thesis but adds nuance — the framework is necessary, but how one deploys it depends on the interlocutor.